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ABSTRACT 
Enhancing the Calibration Accuracy of Adult Learners: A Multifaceted 
Intervention 
by  
Antonio P. Gutierrez 
Dr. Gregory Schraw, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Educational Research, Cognition, & Development 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
The present study employs the Nelson and Narens Model of Metacognition 
(NNMM) to examine the influence of metacognitive strategy training and extrinsic 
incentives on performance, level of confidence, and the calibration accuracy of 
undergraduate students’ metacognitive judgments within a pretest/posttest experimental 
design. Calibration of performance is crucial because it allows learners to engage in 
appropriate comprehension monitoring during a learning episode. As metacognition 
implies, those individuals who are better calibrators can more adequately adapt to the 
demands of the situation (monitoring), and thereby better prepare for learning episodes 
that are similar in format or content (control). Consequently, this aids in the improvement 
of performance, confidence, and calibration accuracy.  
Findings suggest that strategy training and incentives enhanced performance and 
level confidence in performance. However, only strategy training increased the 
calibration accuracy of feeling-of-knowing judgments. Theoretically, both strategy 
training and incentives influence learners’ metacognitive monitoring and control; 
therefore, the results support the NNMM. Educational implications and directions for 
future research are discussed.    
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Students use cognitive skills and strategies as well as metacognitive knowledge 
and regulation to successfully prepare for future assessments of performance in the 
service of learning. Students are effective self-regulators of their learning when they can 
accurately determine what they know and do not know about domain content. This 
permits learners to focus attention and other cognitive resources on material they have 
not yet mastered and spend less time rehearsing material they already know, thus 
effectively demonstrating self-regulated learning (SRL) behavior. When asked how well 
they will perform in some future objective assessment of their knowledge, these more 
metacognitive learners will be able to accurately convey their actual performance because 
they can better calibrate confidence judgments of their knowledge of performance. 
Conversely, students who are less metacognitive are not as readily able to accurately 
pinpoint what they know or do not know about a domain or topic, and thus, they are less 
capable of regulating their learning (i.e., they may be lacking in planning, evaluation, 
information management, or comprehension monitoring skills). This situation leads to 
inaccurate calibration because students are prone to too much confidence or insufficient 
confidence when making judgments of their performance on a criterion task; in other 
words, there is a larger disparity between metacognitive judgments in one’s knowledge 
and actual performance on a reference task, such as an exam. Consequently, these 
students are inefficiently allocating and utilizing cognitive resources when learning.  
 Research suggests that students can benefit greatly from tailored interventions 
targeted at increasing the accuracy of the metacognitive judgments and decreasing the 
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level of bias (i.e., over- or under-confidence) of their performance. The present study 
investigates one main aspect of calibration, namely accuracy, in an experimental 
framework. The main purpose was to ascertain whether a multifaceted educational 
intervention incorporating strategy instruction, incentives, and type of test 
(pretest/posttest) is successful at increasing the accuracy of undergraduate students’ 
metacognitive judgments regarding their knowledge. Students are predicted to improve 
their accuracy as a result of the proposed interventions.          
Organization 
In this Chapter, I first provide definitions of constructs under investigation. These 
operational definitions will be followed by an introduction to the Nelson and Narens 
Model of Metacognition (Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994), which serves as the theoretical 
foundation for the present study. Next, a brief summary of the most relevant research 
regarding SRL, metacognition, calibration, and interventions aimed at enhancing 
calibration accuracy will be discussed. Finally, the chapter will end with a description of 
the present study, including purposes, research questions and hypotheses, methodology, 
and a summary and conclusion.  
Operational Definitions  
Table 1 includes a summary of key terms and their respective sources. Self-
regulation (SR) generally refers to individuals’ ability to control, monitor, and regulate 
their cognition and behavior (Corno & Mandinach, 1983; Corno & Rohrkemper, 1985). 
In learning contexts, SR incorporates more specific functions, including: students’ 
metacognitive strategies for planning, monitoring, and modifying their cognition (e.g., 
Brown, Bransford, Campione, & Ferrara, 1983; Corno, 1986; Zimmerman & Pons, 1986, 
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1988); management and control of their effort on learning tasks (Corno, 1986; Corno & 
Rohrkemper, 1985); and the actual cognitive strategies that students invoke in the service 
of learning (Corno & Mandinach, 1983; Zimmerman & Pons, 1986, 1988). While there is 
much overlap between SR and SRL, SRL is conceptualized as thoughts, feelings, and 
actions that are systematically invoked toward the fulfillment of learners’ own goals 
(Barak, 2010; Zimmerman & Schunk, 1989). Metacognition, in a very general sense, 
refers to knowledge about cognition and cognitive processes (Lin & Zabrucky 1998; 
McCormick 2003), which is a critical component of SR and SRL. On a finer grain, it is 
conceptualized as higher-order mental processes that individuals invoke during learning 
tasks (Dunslosky & Thiede, 1998; Flavell, 1979), as opposed to the mostly automated 
mental processes indicative of cognition that occur outside of awareness. The use of 
sophisticated problem solving strategies, the planning and allocation of resources, as well 
as monitoring learning and performance are all examples of metacognition.  
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Table 1  
Key Terms, Definitions, and Sources 
 
Term 
 
 
Definition 
 
Recent Sources 
Self-Regulation Generally refers to individuals’ ability to control, 
monitor, and regulate their cognition and behavior.  
Corno and Mandinach 
(1983); Corno and 
Rohrkemper (1985) 
 
Self-Regulated 
Learning 
The ability to control and influence one’s learning 
processes (e.g., planning, goal setting, strategy 
implementation, summarizing, and monitoring 
one’s progress). It is a multidimensional process 
which involves personal (cognitive and emotional), 
behavioral, and environmental components. 
 
Barak (2010); Zimmerman 
and Schunk (1989) 
Metacognition Knowledge, including: declarative knowledge (i.e., 
knowledge about the self and strategies), 
procedural knowledge (i.e., how to appropriately 
apply strategies), and conditional knowledge (i.e., 
awareness of how and when to apply strategies). 
Regulation, including: planning (e.g., goal setting 
and allocating resources before a learning episode), 
information management strategies (i.e., skills and 
strategy sequences used online to process 
information more efficiently such as organizing, 
elaborating, summarizing, and selective focusing), 
debugging strategies (i.e., strategies used to correct 
comprehension and performance errors), and 
evaluation (i.e., analysis of performance and 
strategy effectiveness after a learning episode). 
 
Artzt and Armour-Thomas 
(1992); Baker (1989); 
Brown (1987); Schraw and 
Dennison (1994); Schraw 
and Graham (1997); 
Schraw and Moshman 
(1995) 
Calibration The process of eliminating the discrepancy 
between perceived knowledge and actual 
knowledge (i.e., what one does and does not 
know). It has been variously described as feeling-
of-knowing (FOK) judgments, ease-of-learning 
(EOL) judgments, and judgments of learning 
(JOL). 
 
Nietfeld, Cao, and Osborne 
(2006); Nietfeld and 
Schraw (2002); Schraw 
(1995); Schraw (2009a, 
2009b)  
Calibration Accuracy The level of correctness between metacognitive 
judgments (i.e., perceived knowledge) and actual 
knowledge, as assessed by some objective task 
(e.g., test/exam). In other words, the magnitude of 
said discrepancy. 
  
Nietfeld and Schraw 
(2002); Schraw (2009b) 
Calibration Bias The direction of the discrepancy between 
metacognitive judgment and actual performance, 
which can be best understood as over- or 
underconfidence. 
Nietfeld and Schraw 
(2002); Schraw (2009b) 
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Metacognitive judgments are central to calibration. They refer to a probabilistic 
judgment of one’s performance (e.g., tests/exams) before, during, or after performance 
(Schraw, 2009a). As such, calibration is defined as the process of eliminating the 
discrepancy between perceived performance and actual level of performance.  The 
products of this calibration process are accuracy and bias with respect to the 
metacognitive judgments of confidence in one’s knowledge of a domain or topic and 
one’s performance. Accuracy is a measure of the magnitude of discrepancies between 
perceived versus actual knowledge whereas bias is the direction of discrepancies 
(Schraw, 1995). Highly accurate judgments of performance yield little or no bias; 
therefore, accuracy and bias are highly related constructs.  When judgments are 
inaccurate, an individual may be biased in terms of overconfidence or underconfidence. 
Calibration involves selecting strategies and resources for the fulfillment of a learning 
task at the cognitive level and monitoring comprehension and evaluating the learning 
episode at the metacognitive level. These judgments can precede or follow the 
completion of a test item (local level) and/or the entire test (global level) (Nietfeld, Cao, 
& Osborne, 2006; Schraw, 2009a).  
In sum, calibration of performance is both the process of making judgments about 
the information or knowledge one has learned about a domain, topic, or task in 
anticipation of performance on some task or objective assessment (e.g., an exam) and the 
product, or actual metacognitive judgment. Judgments may be accurate, or if they are 
inaccurate, they will be biased due to over- or under-confidence.  Of special importance 
in the current study, these metacognitive judgments are heavily influenced by such 
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elements as strategy selection, ability to monitor progress when learning, and evaluating 
overall performance.   
An Introduction to the Nelson and Narens Model of Metacognition 
 Within the context of calibration research, the Nelson and Narens Model of 
Metacognition (NNMM; Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994) illustrates a theoretical 
framework that situates goal-directed action and volition (i.e., expression) as individuals 
use metacognitive processes to regulate their learning. Figure 1 presents the NNMM, 
which depicts the constant cyclical interaction between cognition and metacognition. 
These two interrelated components are linked together by two distinct processes 
governed by the actor, or more specifically the learner, namely monitoring and control. 
Control, or executive processes, refer to the manipulations learners impose on their 
environment in order to achieve some goal-directed end. In other words, the meta-level 
has the capacity to modify and make necessary adjustments to the object-level in order 
for the learner to come one step closer to a desired learning outcome. Monitoring, on the 
other hand, refers to the type and quality of the information received from the object-
level so that the meta-level can make necessary changes. The more sophisticated the type 
of information and the more precise the information is from the object-level, the better 
the decisions and actions that the meta-level can make and take. In essence, monitoring 
can be conceptualized as a process by which the learner uses information at the object-
level to evaluate progress toward a goal for learning at the meta-level. 
 
 
 
7 
 
Figure 1. A visual representation of the Nelson and Narens Model of Metacognition. 
Note the dynamic and cyclical interaction between the object-level/environment and the 
meta-level (higher-order metacognitive processing), including explicit or implicit control 
and monitoring. These elements are central to effective self-regulated learning. The meta-
level derives an imperfect model, or representation, of the object-level. Adapted from 
Nelson and Narens (1990). 
 This flow of information from the object-level to the meta-level is characterized 
by a representation of the meta-level of all the information available in the object-level 
(monitoring) in order for the meta-level to make accurate, precise decisions (control) 
given that this model will always, by nature, be imperfect. Presumably, accurate 
monitoring allows an individual to construct a mental model of his or her learning goals 
and plans at the meta-level, and it is a process by which learners evaluate the adequacy, 
precision, and accuracy of the model or their performance when striving to reach one of 
the goals and/or plans specified by the model. 
The living brain, so far as it is to be successful and efficient as a regulator 
for survival must proceed, in learning, by the formation of a model (or 
models) of its environment. There can no longer be any question about 
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whether the brain models its environment: it must (Conant & Ashby, 1970, 
as quoted in Nelson & Narens, 1994, pp. 10-11) 
 
 Needless to say, the ability of our metacognitive mind to model our environment 
has profound implications for learning (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Rouse & Morris, 1986; 
Yates, 1985), and comprehension monitoring and calibration accuracy and bias in 
particular. This is especially significant considering that learners are perceived to be 
imperfect with respect to their ability to model their environments and to use models to 
regulate their performance (i.e., accuracy and bias). In other words, “people are construed 
as imperfect measuring devices of their own internal processes” (Nelson & Narens, 1994, 
p. 18), and thus the NNMM is an ideal framework in which to situate the present study on 
calibration accuracy.  In general, the NNMM predicts that interventions that enhance 
either the control or monitoring aspects of metacognition will improve level of 
confidence in metacognitive judgments, calibration accuracy, and performance. 
Overview of Relevant Literature on Calibration  
Research suggests that monitoring accuracy is poor and that monitoring 
judgments affect strategy use. Many studies reveal poor calibration accuracy (see 
Brannick, Miles, & Kisamore, 2005 and Glenberg, Sanocki, Epstein, & Morris, 1987 for 
a review). In a series of experiments, Glenberg and associates (1987) found that poor 
calibration accuracy is not related to a particular type of performance test but rather it is 
found with inference tests, verbatim recognition tests, and idea recognition tests. 
Moreover, poor calibration accuracy was found when the test was provided immediately 
after reading as well as when the test was scheduled after a delay. Findings by Schraw et 
al. (1993) suggest that individuals harbor a strong response bias as they calibrate their 
performance; in other words, individuals were prone to report their accuracy consistently 
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irrespective of item difficulty and accuracy of response, indicating that negative feedback 
was not integrated to improve all aspects of calibration (i.e., accuracy and bias).  
A second general finding is that feedback and incentives are related to students’ 
use of strategies, and performance on cognitive tasks (Pintrich, 2002; Schraw et al., 1993; 
Thomas & McDaniel, 2007; Tobias & Everson, 2002-2003; Yates, 1990). This point is 
relevant for the present study because incentives are an integral part of the proposed 
intervention. Based on the findings of previous research, it is reasonable to expect that 
both feedback and incentives will influence students’ calibration accuracy.   
Glenberg et al. (1987) argued that the likely reason for poor calibration accuracy 
was that students assess familiarity with the general domain of a text instead of assessing 
knowledge obtained from a particular text. Research on this topic has concluded that 
calibration accuracy can be improved if students are provided with a pretest that furnishes 
self-generated feedback (Brannick, et al., 2005; Glenberg et al., 1987). However, 
calibration accuracy was improved only when the processes and knowledge invoked by 
the pretest are closely related to the processes and knowledge required on the criterion 
task (Glenberg et al., 1987). These findings are in stark contrast to research conducted by 
Schraw and associates (1993) in which results suggested that feedback had no effect on 
calibration accuracy of feeling of knowing judgments. On the other hand, incentives have 
been found to affect calibration accuracy (Hogarth, Gibbs, McKenzie, & Marquis, 1991; 
Schraw et al., 1993; Yates, 1990). Incentives to improve performance were found to 
negatively influence performance when contrasted with incentives to improve calibration 
accuracy, indicating that individuals are apt to rely on subjective feelings when 
calibrating their performance rather than more objective information (e.g., difficulty of 
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the test items; Hacker, Bol, & Bahbahani, 2008; Schraw et al., 1993). Therefore, 
interventions should be developed that seek to enhance the calibration accuracy of 
learners.  
 A review of relevant literature suggests that interventions targeted at increasing 
the accuracy of learners have been successful in a variety of domains. In problem solving 
and reasoning tasks, Kruger and Dunning (1999) found that students who received a brief 
instructional intervention were better equipped to judge the number of Wason selection 
problems they had solved correctly than those who were untrained. Similarly, Prowse-
Turner and Thompson (2009) designed an experiment aimed at improving the calibration 
accuracy of undergraduate students’ syllogistic reasoning skills. The instructional 
intervention was successful in enhancing the accuracy of metacognitive judgments and 
was also effective in resolving students’ misunderstandings about the task. More 
specifically, those in the training condition were more proficient at estimating their 
overall performance (global level) than those in the no-training condition.  
 Along a similar vein, Mitchum and Kelley (2010) explored whether differences in 
problem solving strategies affect the ability of students to monitor their problem solving 
effectiveness as measured by confidence judgments. Their results demonstrated that 
spontaneous constructive matching in nonverbal spatial reasoning problems was related 
to improved confidence calibration and resolution when compared to response 
elimination. In the second experiment, they found that constructive matching yielded 
improved monitoring. The implication of this research is that instructed and spontaneous 
strategies are often not equivalent. In some instances, not all students are able to benefit 
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from an instructed strategy or benefit to the same extent as those who spontaneously 
construct the strategy.  
 Regarding reading comprehension, Glenberg and his colleagues (Glenberg & 
Epstein, 1985; Glenberg et al., 1987; Walczyk & Hall, 1989) conducted several 
experiments on enhancing the calibration accuracy of students’ text comprehension. In 
two separate experiments, Glenberg & Epstein (1985) found that providing training in 
calibration enhanced the accuracy of metacognitive judgments regarding text 
comprehension. In addition, they argued that improvement from initial calibration to 
recalibration of comprehension could be due to students’ access to their own knowledge 
as well as normative knowledge available to all students (e.g., students may be skilled at 
deducing which inference verification items are particularly challenging, and 
subsequently lower confidence). In a follow-up study, Glenberg et al. (1987) found that 
calibration accuracy may be improved if students are furnished a pretest that offers self-
generated feedback. In such treatments, students are able to utilize feedback from the 
pretest to predict subsequent test performance with a fair degree of accuracy. Walczyk 
and Hall (1989) extended the previous research (Glenberg et al., 1987) by reporting that 
the accuracy of students’ confidence judgments can be enhanced if they read expository 
text that contains illustrative examples and embedded questions. They argued that 
examples and embedded questions furnish students with an opportunity to evaluate their 
own level of understanding of texts, which results in more accurate confidence judgments 
of comprehension than would be obtained from plain text. 
 Maki et al. (1990) investigated whether increased processing enhances calibration 
accuracy. In two experiments, they manipulated the amount of processing of text by 
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having students read intact text or text with deleted letters. They found that text with 
deleted letters yielded improved calibration accuracy. In essence, students can predict 
performance on text material with a relatively high degree of accuracy due to more active 
processing during reading afforded by text with missing letters. Henrion, Fischer, and 
Mullin (1993) examined the calibration accuracy of students in subjective probability 
distributions using three conditions: direct assessment (students directly estimated 
probabilities), experimenters’ decomposition (variables were determined by the 
experimenter and evaluated by the students), and students’ decomposition (variables and 
solutions were determined by the students). They found that, contrary to the divide and 
conquer principle, decomposition did not improve the accuracy of confidence judgments, 
as there were no significant differences between the experimenters’ and students’ 
decomposition conditions. Interestingly, students in the direct condition tended to 
underestimate their performance and students in the decomposition condition tended to 
overestimate their performance. 
 In an experimental study using prediction and postdiction judgments, Bol, 
Hacker, O’Shea, and Allen (2005) found that students in the overt calibration practice 
condition did not significantly improve the accuracy of their confidence judgments when 
compared to students assigned to the no-practice condition. However, they reported that 
higher achieving students were significantly more accurate, yet underconfident in their 
predictions, whereas lower achieving students were less accurate and overconfident. 
Therefore, this instructional intervention manipulating overt calibration practice had no 
effect on the accuracy of metacognitive judgments. However, Bol et al. did not include a 
pretest measure to establish group equivalence, which may have behaved as a confound 
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in the study, thus undermining any potential intervention effects. On a follow-up study 
investigating the effects of extrinsic rewards and reflection on calibration accuracy, 
Hacker, Bol, and Bahbahani (2008) found that high-achieving students were highly 
accurate in their confidence judgments and did not exhibit significant increases in their 
calibration accuracy. Low-achieving students, on the other hand, were less accurate in 
their confidence judgments and gained modest increases in their calibration accuracy due 
to reflection. Interestingly, students in the incentives condition demonstrated significant 
gains in their calibration accuracy compared to those in the no-incentives condition, 
although reflection on explanations for their cognitive judgments had no effect on 
calibration accuracy.  
 In two experiments, Nietfeld and Schraw (2002) tested the influence of prior 
knowledge and strategy training on monitoring accuracy. They found that knowledge of 
the domain was related positively to domain-specific performance and monitoring 
accuracy, and that strategy training enhances performance, confidence, and monitoring 
accuracy irrespective of aptitude. More specifically, strategy training enhanced 
performance and monitoring accuracy immediately following the test, but not following a 
one-week delay. Furthermore, the study lent credence to the trainable hypothesis (i.e., 
short-term strategy training enhances monitoring accuracy, even when such strategy 
training is not explicit). Along a related line, Schraw (1998) demonstrated that 
instructional strategies, such as promoting general metacognitive awareness and 
improving self-knowledge and regulatory skills, lead to enhanced metacognitive 
awareness, which subsequently positively informed students’ metacognitive judgments.  
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 In an experiment manipulating cue familiarity and accessibility of FOK 
judgments, Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) found that both familiarity and accessibility 
improved students’ FOK judgments, but the effects of accessibility were found mostly 
when familiarity was high. This moderating pattern was found when FOK judgments 
were delayed, yet not when they were immediate. Finally, Lodewyk, Winne, and 
Jamieson-Noel (2009) examined the influence of task structure on calibration accuracy. 
They found that students tended to calibrate their knowledge better in ill-structured 
versus well-structured problems, presumably because students reported greater 
metacognitive strategy use in the ill-structured problems compared to their performance 
on well-structured problems. In addition, low achieving students showed poorer 
calibration accuracy on both tasks compared to high achieving students who 
demonstrated more proficient calibration accuracy.  
 Overall, these studies suggest that experimental interventions to improve 
calibration accuracy improve both performance and the monitoring accuracy of 
performance judgments.  Nevertheless, interventions targeted at improving calibration 
accuracy have yielded modest/weak effect sizes as indices of the explained variance in 
the outcome measures that can be attributed to the experimental manipulations. For 
instance, Hacker et al. (2008) reported effect sizes (η2) of 0.08 to 0.12 and Bol et al. 
(2005) found effect sizes ranging from 0.04 to 0.15. Moreover, Nietfeld et al. (2006) 
reported effect sizes ranging from 0.10 to 0.17. Hence, modest effect sizes in the present 
study would be in line with the body of literature on improving FOK judgments, albeit 
larger effect sizes may result. Moreover, although most studies did not link their findings 
to the NNMM, it appears that some studies improved calibration accuracy by improving 
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control processes (i.e., knowledge and feedback), while others improved monitoring 
processes (i.e., judgment strategies).  Therefore, it is conceivable that interventions 
incorporating metacognitive strategy training and extrinsic incentives will positively 
influence learners’ control and monitoring processes. This should presumably improve 
the calibration accuracy of learners’ metacognitive judgments.  
Purpose and Overview of the Proposed Study 
Calibration of confidence judgments of performance is crucial because it allows 
learners to engage in appropriate comprehension monitoring during a learning episode. 
As the use of the term metacognition implies, those individuals who are better calibrators 
can more adequately adapt to the demands of the situation, and thereby better prepare for 
future learning contexts that are similar in format or content (i.e., domain). Therefore, 
accurate and less biased metacognitive judgments are necessary ingredients in the recipe 
for a successful and metacognitively aware learner. In sum, individuals cannot be fully 
self-regulated if they cannot accurately calibrate their performance because they would 
not otherwise be able to monitor their comprehension as they engage in a learning task. 
 With this in mind the present study addressed whether the proposed interventions 
(i.e., strategy training and incentives) or their interaction enhance students’ metacognitive 
judgments by increasing calibration accuracy. I anticipate that each intervention will have 
a positive effect.    
Methods 
Experimental Interventions 
 The experimental interventions consisted of the following two components. The 
first component involved metacognitive strategy training specifically developed to 
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enhance the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in undergraduate students (e.g., 
Glenberg et al., 1987; Hogarth et al., 1991; King, Zechmeister, & Shaughnessy, 1980; 
Koriat, 1997; Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002). These metacognitive strategies were drawn from 
a previous mixed methods study in which students were asked a prediction (prospective 
judgment) and postdiction (retrospective) question on their expected performance on an 
exam. Individuals were asked a set of interview questions and then given a think-aloud 
protocol regarding the exam they took. The interview and think-aloud were intended to 
examine which metacognitive strategies were particularly effective at increasing 
accuracy, and they will be included as part of the metacognitive strategy training. The list 
of potentially beneficial strategies was reduced to seven strategies that were hypothesized 
to optimize calibration accuracy with respect to performance, including: (a) read and 
summarize in your own words; (b) use contextual cues in the items and responses, (e.g., 
bolded, italicized, underlined, or capitalized words); and (c) using diagrams, graphs, 
tables, etc. These strategies were derived from a content analysis of the interviews and 
think aloud. The strategy training independent variable is assumed to enhance the 
monitoring and control processes in the NNMM, as elaborated within Table 3 in the next 
chapter.    
 The second component involved providing students with a reward as an incentive 
to rehearse the metacognitive strategies, thereby improving the accuracy of their 
metacognitive judgments (e.g., Hacker et al., 2008; Hogarth et al., 1991; Nietfeld & 
Schraw, 2002; Swanson, 1990; Yates, 1990). Incentives are presumed to increase 
students’ motivation to more meaningfully learn strategies provided during training. 
Therefore, incentives are predicted to positively affect students’ information-gathering 
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capabilities by permitting them to learn strategies to improve calibration accuracy in a 
more in-depth manner; hence, the monitoring function of the NNMM will be enhanced. 
Furthermore, incentives could potentially influence not only the monitoring capacity of 
students but their control as well. Once learned, incentives should motivate students to 
apply the strategies to actually improve their calibration accuracy. In this fashion, 
incentives are expected to influence the control function of the NNMM as well. Although 
the literature regarding the role of incentives on calibration accuracy has spanned both 
external and internal reward structures (see Hogarth et al., 1991 for a review), the present 
study focuses exclusively on external incentives. The incentive involved a monetary 
reward of $10.00 for performance that meets or exceeds 80% of the items answered 
correctly at posttest. As suggested by the literature and supported by the NNMM, this 
improved performance is due to enhanced accuracy.    
Study Design    
The study design is a four-group pretest-posttest experimental design, in which 
two levels of the strategy training intervention are crossed with two levels of the 
incentives intervention. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups: (1) 
strategy training and incentives; (2) strategy training only; (3) incentives only; and (4) 
control (see Figure 4) in which they receive one of the four possible combinations of the 
experimental strategy training and incentive manipulations. Additionally, a pretest and 
posttest were administered to ascertain whether the intervention was effective at 
improving the accuracy of students’ metacognitive judgments.  
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Hypotheses and Predictions 
 The present study tested the general hypothesis that external interventions 
improve calibration accuracy by facilitating control and monitoring processes. I expect 
the strategy intervention to improve monitoring and the incentives to improve control 
through added attention to the use of these processes to self-regulate. With respect to the 
interaction between the strategy training and incentives manipulations and the type of 
test, I expect that those randomized into those conditions would exhibit more accurate 
calibration and increased performance and confidence at posttest when compared to those 
who were not. Moreover, I predict that the proposed strategy training and incentives 
enhance the accuracy of students’ metacognitive judgments, presumably due to improved 
performance from baseline to posttest. Finally, students’ performance on learning tasks, 
such as tests/exams, is predicted to increase. 
Data Analysis Plan 
 In order to address the objective of this study, a one-way analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) was conducted, with posttest performance serving as the dependent variable 
while statistically controlling for baseline performance. Moreover, two 2 (strategy 
training, no training) x 2 (incentives, no incentives) factorial mixed-model analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) were conducted, with type of test (pretest, posttest) serving as the 
within-subjects factor. Confidence and calibration accuracy each served as a dependent 
variable in a separate analysis in keeping with the data-analysis strategy in previous 
experiments. Furthermore, a series of repeated measures analyses of variance (RM 
ANOVAs) were conducted to compare performance on the pretest (i.e., 20) and posttest 
(i.e., all 40) items. The first RM ANOVA compared performance on the 20 items given at 
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pretest to those same 20 items given at posttest. The second RM ANOVA compared the 
performance on the 40 items given at posttest—that is, the previous 20 items given at 
pretest with the 20 items added at posttest. Correlations among all outcome variables 
were computed and reported as well. All appropriate data screening and assumption 
testing procedures were conducted prior to data analysis.  
Summary and Conclusion 
Metacognition—and more specifically metacognitive judgments like calibration 
accuracy—is a central component of SRL, and the NNMM provides a meaningful 
theoretical model by which to examine calibration accuracy and connect it to the larger 
framework of SRL. Students cannot be self-regulated learners if they are poor calibrators 
(i.e., rely primarily on inaccurate and biased metacognitive judgments). In order to 
successfully navigate learning episodes and succeed, students need to rely on effective 
cues and strategies to calibrate their performance. Therefore, finding interventions that 
succeed in increasing the accuracy of students’ metacognitive judgments has important 
implications not only for SRL and metacognition theory, but for educational practice and 
broader societal goals (e.g., producing competent, independent thinkers capable of 
accurately discerning what they know and do not know) as well. However, with research 
demonstrating that the effects of interventions aimed at improving calibration accuracy 
are short lived (e.g., Glenberg et al, 1987; Hacker et al., 2008; Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002), 
it is equally as important for theory, research, and practice to find ways to sustain 
meaningful long-lasting behavior change in students’ metacognitive judgments, such as 
through incentives. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Finding ways to enhance learners’ metacognitive judgments is crucial. Students 
can become more competent self-regulated learners if instruction is tailored to improve 
their ability to evaluate their learning in terms of process and outcomes. However, 
without systematically vetting instructional practices via the inclusion of appropriate 
experimental and statistical means to control for extraneous factors, the development and 
implementation of strategies aimed at the enhancement of metacognitive judgments may 
very well be a wasted effort fraught with elusive and misleading results. Therefore, 
research-based interventions specifically developed for the improvement of 
metacognitive judgments should be sought, modified if necessary to fit specific 
contextual needs, and implemented within a rigorous experimental design. Preferably, 
experiments evaluating the effectiveness of interventions should be designed with 
adequate internal validity and external validity so that results can be generalized to other 
samples of the intended population.  
 Because undergraduate students engage in complex, higher order thinking in the 
course of their learning, they are ripe for interventions targeted at improving 
metacognitive judgments. For instance, interventions that maximize the accuracy of 
metacognitive judgments would be an excellent approach towards students’ attainment of 
educational success and the accomplishment of their learning goals—all of which exhibit 
different aspects of SRL. Moreover, students’ representation of their environment (i.e., 
the model represented by the meta-level) can be understood in terms of how well they 
calibrate their performance. Because individuals at-large are imperfect gauges of their 
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internal processes, how well their meta-level represents the object-level influences their 
calibration accuracy. Thus, the aim of this literature review is to critically examine the 
various interventions that have been designed and promulgated for the explicit purpose of 
enhancing the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in college undergraduates.  
Organization 
 An effective literature review appropriately situates the research, research 
questions, hypotheses, and design in a broader theoretical context. Therefore, the 
following literature review places the present study in a theoretical context of SRL and 
metacognition via the Nelson and Narens Model of Metacognition (NNMM), and 
provides support for the necessity of the research. The Chapter begins with a taxonomy 
of relevant concepts to this research study that depicts how these concepts are 
interrelated. The next section includes a comparison and contrasts between the concepts 
of SR, SRL, and metacognition, and it sets the stage for the need to situate the research 
within the framework of the NNMM. The third section more fully describes the NNMM 
and how it helps explain the phenomenon of calibration as well as calibration accuracy. 
Next, the relation between metacognition and calibration is more fully developed. The 
fourth section includes a review of the antecedents/inputs to calibration, calibration itself, 
and the outcomes, or benefits, of more accurate calibration (i.e., inputs calibration 
outputs). The following section addresses the need for interventions aimed at enhancing 
the accuracy of metacognitive judgments. The Chapter ends with a summary/conclusion 
of the literature reviewed, the contributions of the present study to the broader body of 
literature, and a more detailed discussion of the present study.   
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A Taxonomy of Relevant Concepts 
Figure 2 presents a taxonomy of the interrelations among concepts pertinent to the 
present study. The diagram begins with the broadest concept, SR, at the top followed by 
progressively finer-grained concepts toward the lower levels. The umbrella concept of 
SRL, which encompasses cognition, metacognition, and motivation, is subsumed within 
SR. SRL as a broad theoretical framework includes several different theoretical models 
(see below for a detailed explanation). However, although SR and SRL are an integral 
part of the present study, the focus will be on the concepts highlighted in black in the 
diagram. More specifically, metacognition is illustrated in the NNMM, which situates the 
study of calibration as well as calibration accuracy within the theory of metacognition.   
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Figure 2. A taxonomy displaying the interrelations among self-regulation, self-regulated 
learning, metacognition, the Nelson and Narens Model of Metacognition, calibration, and 
calibration accuracy and bias. 
Comparison and Contrast Between SR, SRL, and Metacognition 
Dinsmore, Alexander, and Loughlin (2008) posited that the heightened emphasis 
on self-regulation in academic settings led to the emergence of a new term, SRL, which 
sought to amalgamate a variety of different strands that addressed aspects of cognition, 
metacognition, and motivation. SRL emerged in the 1980s and gained momentum in the 
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1990s. And yet the developmental path of SRL is quite different from the trajectories of 
metacognition and SR. More specifically, while metacognition and SR developed in 
parallel, with little opportunity for the research paths to converge, most models of SRL 
incorporate aspects of both metacognition and SR to shape its lens on learner monitoring 
(Dinsmore et al., 2008). Theorists and researchers initially conceptualized SRL as an 
integrated theory of learning (Corno & Mandinach, 1983), intentionally seeking to 
address the interaction of cognitive, metacognitive, motivational, and contextual factors 
as opposed to their individual contributions.  
Cognitive processes can be divided into two general categories, lower-order 
mental processes and operations, which reside mainly beyond one’s awareness, and the 
higher-order thought processes which involve knowledge, awareness, and control of the 
aforementioned lower-order cognition as well as reflection of one’s actions and 
performance. Since the time of Socrates and Aristotle, philosophers have been interested 
in the notion of consciousness and what it involves, such as higher-order thinking 
processes. Various philosophers such as Hume, Descartes, and Kant pondered which 
aspects of consciousness allowed humans to reason and convert sensory stimuli into 
thoughts and mental operations. Without a doubt these philosophers were toiling over the 
distinction between the lower-order mind and the higher-order mind. However, it was not 
until the advent of psychology in the mid 19th century that this distinction was more 
systematically considered. Nevertheless, researchers and philosophers acknowledged that 
both cognition and metacognition are essential components of SRL.  
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Models of SRL 
SRL encompasses cognition, metacognition and motivation. Several models of 
SRL have been proposed (Barak, 2010). For instance, Zimmerman (2000) described SRL 
as a cyclical process involving three parts: (1) forethought (e.g., goal setting, strategic 
planning, self-efficacy beliefs, and intrinsic motivation); (2) performance and volitional 
control (e.g., attention focusing, self-instruction, and self-monitoring); and (3) self-
reflection (e.g., self-evaluation, attributions, and self-reactions). Boekaerts (1999) 
proposed a three-layer model of SRL, including: (1) regulation of the self-choice of goals 
and resources; (2) monitoring of processing methods (i.e., the use of metacognitive 
knowledge and skills to direct one’s learning); and (3) regulation of processing modes 
(i.e., the choice of cognitive strategies). Schraw, Crippen, and Hartley (2006) presented a 
SRL model specifically tailored to science education, including: (1) knowledge (e.g., how 
to solve domain-specific problems); (2) metacognition (e.g., knowledge about oneself as 
a learner, goal setting, and implementing strategies); and (3) motivation (e.g., self-
efficacy beliefs that affect one’s engagement and persistence in a task). Self-efficacy is 
vital to self-regulated learning because it influences the level at which learners take on 
and persevere during difficult tasks (Bandura, 1993; Pintrich, 1999). In relation to SRL, 
Bandura (2006) presented several aspects of human agency via social cognitive theory. 
His four-part model included: (1) intentionality, (2) forethought, (3) self-reactiveness, 
and (4) self-reflectiveness. It is this last component, self-reflectiveness, which most 
closely aligns with metacognition and calibration accuracy.  
All of these models agree that learning is regulated by a variety of dynamic 
interacting and cyclical cognitive, metacognitive, and motivational factors (Butler & 
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Winne, 1995). With respect to the present study, all of these models of SRL include some 
metacognitive component, although not all of them necessarily refer to it as such. Schraw 
et al. (2006), for example, explicitly use metacognition whereas Zimmerman (2000) 
refers to it as self-reflection and Boekaerts (1999) as monitoring and regulation of 
cognitive processing. Conversely, while they all incorporate the same essential 
components, they differ in their complexity and specificity. For instance, Zimmerman’s 
model is specific and includes performance as an explicit element whereas Schraw et al.’s 
model is specific but broader, explicitly using the umbrella terms of cognition, 
metacognition, and motivation and not expressly including performance. Regarding 
metacognition, Zimmerman’s model is the one most deeply imbued with a metacognitive 
influence, as every component involves some aspect of reflection or regulation of 
cognition and/or behavior. Metacognition is also an integral part of Boekaert’s model, 
which includes terms such as monitoring and regulation. Bandura’s and Schraw et al.’s 
models are better organized insofar as metacognition/self-reflectiveness is an actual, 
unitary component as opposed to interspersed throughout, albeit Schraw et al.’s is the 
most easily recognizable due to its terminology (i.e., cognition, metacognition, and 
motivation). In sum, these models view metacognition as the regulator of strategy choice 
and processing (cognition) as well as behavior/action/volition (motivation).            
Metacognition, and more specifically comprehension monitoring, is an essential 
component of SRL. All of the models of SRL proposed in the literature (e.g., Boekarts, 
1999; Schraw et al., 2006; Zimmerman, 2000) include a metacognitive component in 
which students reflect and regulate (e.g., planning, goal setting, strategy implementation, 
summarizing, and monitoring one’s progress) their behavior in the service of learning. 
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Presumably, calibration involves forethought and self-reflection; however, equally as 
important is students’ awareness of their previous and future performance so that they 
can develop appropriate volitional control of their learning. In spite of the benefits these 
theoretical frameworks have for learning outcomes, they do not specifically address the 
process students undergo to calibrate their performance because they are essentially all-
inclusive.  
Need for the Nelson and Narens Model of Metacognition 
Focusing on one aspect of SRL, more specifically calibration accuracy as a 
subcomponent of metacognition, necessitates a finer-grained model. Hence, a more 
relevant model specifically grounded in the theory of metacognition (Flavell, 1979; 
Hacker & Bol, 2004; Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994) is necessary to better capture the 
process of calibration and explicate its outcomes, namely accuracy and bias.  
The NNMM addresses two fundamental questions regarding metacognitive 
monitoring. The first involves studying the factors that influence individuals’ 
metacognitive judgments (Nelson & Narens, 1994). However, while this question 
attempts to elucidate the factors that increase the degree of confidence in performance, it 
does not address the accuracy or bias of individuals’ confidence judgments of 
performance. Therefore, the second question fills this gap by ascertaining the factors that 
affect the accuracy and bias of confidence judgments of performance. Nelson and Narens 
(1994) explained that individuals’ metacognitive monitoring is erroneous inasmuch as it 
omits important information from the context and it may also include information that is 
not actually germane to the context. Hence, even though monitoring may vary across 
situations and individuals (i.e., more or less refined), the individual never has an absolute 
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fix on the environment, thereby influencing accuracy and introducing bias. Consequently, 
the NNMM (Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994) is an appropriate model in which to research 
calibration accuracy. According to this theoretical framework, more proficient calibrators 
will perform better and learn more efficiently than poor calibrators because their 
metacognitive judgments are more accurate and less biased vis-à-vis objective 
performance assessments. The next section includes a more detailed explanation of the 
NNMM.     
Theoretical Framework 
The Nelson and Narens Model of Metacognition 
Fundamentally, the NNMM (see Figure 1) conceptualizes the process of thinking 
as cognitive (i.e., lower-order cognitive processes such as strategy selection during a 
learning episode) and metacognitive (i.e., the higher-order cognitive processes intended 
to govern and regulate the lower-order processes). Therefore, any metacognitive activity 
involves a combination of lower-order cognition and higher-order thinking. Presumably, 
calibration accuracy and bias influence and are influenced by lower-order and higher-
order thinking. More specifically, calibration accuracy and bias affect the selection of 
strategies and skills at the cognitive level and the knowledge (e.g., procedural and 
conditional) and regulatory (e.g., planning, monitoring, and evaluation) elements that are 
necessary to successfully succeed in a learning task at the metacognitive level, contingent 
upon contextual needs and demands. By the same token, the cognitive and metacognitive 
elements continuously influence individuals’ calibration accuracy and bias in an on-going 
cyclical and reciprocal manner. In connection with SRL and metacognitive theories, 
individuals’ calibration accuracy and bias are affected by cognitive and metacognitive 
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levels of processing. In order for individuals to achieve optimum calibration accuracy, 
they need to be effective self-regulated learners as well as metacognitive thinkers (e.g., to 
adequately monitor comprehension and to evaluate overall performance in the service of 
learning). Therefore, the NNMM is a scientifically sound and appropriate theoretical 
framework in which to situate the present study on the enhancement of calibration 
accuracy in adult learners. 
 The strength of the NNMM is that metacognition serves as the connecting link in 
the chain between cognition, cognitive development, and motivational processes (Nelson 
& Narens, 1994). This, again, joins the broad theory of SRL with metacognition theory 
and, by extension, to the scientific study of calibration as a process (i.e., how are 
metacognitive judgments formed and what contributes to their development?) and a 
product (i.e., aspects of the metacognitive judgments themselves, such as accuracy and 
bias). Nelson and Narens (1994) remarked,  
A college student studying for an examination is a conscious, self-directed 
[learner] who is continually making memory-relevant decisions about how 
difficult it will be to memorize a given item or set of items, about what 
kind of processing to employ during that memorization, [or] about how 
much longer to study this or that item … (p. 7) 
 
Evidently, the model is quite appropriate for theoretically supporting the study of 
calibration accuracy among college students by specifying not only the cognitive and 
metacognitive aspects, but the self-regulatory one as well. As alluded to in Chapter 1, the 
NNMM has two basic components, or levels, the meta-level and the object-level. The 
meta-level is the executive which strives to model the object-level, albeit imperfectly. 
The levels are analogous to the mind (meta-level) and the environment (object-level). 
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Although somewhat simplistic, the model can be modified to varying levels of 
complexity. Nelson and Narens (1994) described this dynamic as such,  
During monitoring, the metal-level uses information about the object-
level—and perhaps about the relationship between the object-level and 
still other levels for which that level is in turn the meta-level. This 
information is used to update the meta-level’s model of what is occurring 
at the object-level. (p. 12) 
 
Thus, the “model” at the meta-level is simply one’s representation and exchange 
of information (i.e., monitoring) between the object-level, or one’s environment, 
and the meta-level, or one’s mind. More specifically to this study, a learner’s 
meta-level model of the object-level includes all of the input related to a learning 
episode. For instance, if Tommy knows that he will have an exam next week, his 
meta-level model could conceivably include a representation of the exam study 
guide, his prior knowledge about the topics the exam will cover, knowledge of his 
repertoire of learning strategies, assessments about the time and effort it will take 
to prepare for the exam, and any study materials that he will use to prepare. All of 
these model components would then inform his confidence judgments of 
performance on the exam.     
These two interrelated components, metal-level and object-level, are linked 
together by two similar yet distinct processes governed by the actor, or more specifically 
the learner, namely monitoring and control. These regulatory functions represent and fill 
the “void” between the meta-level and object-level in a constant, continuous flow of 
information between levels. It is important to note that the meta-level can influence or 
modify the object-level, but not vice-versa; in other words, the object-level cannot make 
adjustments to the meta-level. 
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In essence, control refers to the ability of the meta-level component of the system 
to make adjustments or modifications to the object-level. However, this ability is not 
mutual, as the object-level cannot modify the meta-level. “The information flowing from 
the meta-level either changes the state of the object-level process or changes the object-
level process itself” (Nelson & Narens, 1994, p. 12). The intention and action this yields 
on the part of the actor could involve: (1) initiating an action; (2) proceeding with an 
action, which is not necessarily the same as what the actor was already doing because 
time has elapsed and the goal state may be closer than before; or (3) to cease an action. 
Therefore, “control processes are not conceptualized as being limited to the starting and 
stopping of object-level processes … control processes can also modify the object-level 
processes” (p. 15).  “However, because control per se does not yield any information 
from the object-level, a monitoring component is needed that is logically (even if not 
psychologically) independent of the control component” (Nelson & Narens, 1990, as 
quoted in Nelson & Narens, 1994, p. 12).   
Monitoring, on the other hand, involves information-gathering and represents the 
constant information flow between meta-level, object-level, and vice-versa. In essence, 
this monitoring process allows one to construct goals and plans as well as to evaluate the 
adequacy, precision, and accuracy of the meta-level model or one’s performance when 
striving to reach one of the goals and/or plans specified by the model. Nelson and Narens 
(1990) characterized this monitoring function as follows,  
The meta-level is informed by the object-level. This changes the meta-
level’s model of the situation, including “no change in state” (except 
perhaps for a notation of the time of entry, because the rate of progress 
may be expected to change as time passes). However, the opposite does 
not occur, i.e., the object-level has no model of the meta-level (as quoted 
in Nelson & Narens, 1994, p. 12).  
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Essentially, reflection and contemplation of one’s thoughts are transformed and 
applied to some goal-directed action/volition or purpose. From this perspective, 
metacognitive awareness is conceived as both process (reflection on one’s thinking) and 
product (application or expression of action for some meaningful purpose or end). 
Additionally, cognitive and metacognitive activities, such as calibration accuracy and 
bias, are seen as both individual and social activities inasmuch as “[meaning] must 
activate the object and the object must activate the [meaning]” (Moore, 1972, as cited in 
Hacker, Keener, & Kircher, 2010, p. 156). Necessarily, an individual must reflect and 
become aware of his or her own intentions, goals, and thoughts, but others must likewise 
be able to internalize and approximate the original meaning of the individual who is the 
initiator of said thoughts, goals, and intentions. In other words, this individual-social 
interaction is a metacognitive endeavor, and, by extension, indicative of SRL.  
Initially conceptualized as a general metacognitive framework, the NNMM has 
been applied to domains such as writing (Hacker et al., 2010). Hacker and his colleagues 
(2010) posited that the NNMM is “a versatile theoretical framework for the 
conceptualization of metacognition as a heuristic for further theorizing and empirical 
research” (p. 161) on metacognition. In grounding written composition in this 
metacognitive framework, they declared, “Writing is the production of thought for 
oneself or others under the direction of one’s goal-directed metacognitive monitoring and 
control, and the translation of that thought into an external symbolic representation” (p. 
154). This not only anchored the domain of written composition to metacognitive theory, 
but to the larger theory of SRL as well by incorporating motivational flavors (i.e., 
volition, goals, and intention). Likewise, the NNMM will be used as the central station 
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that will link this study on the enhancement of calibration accuracy of undergraduate 
students to metacognition, SRL, and SR. 
Whereas the research on calibration of performance has spanned over 25 years, 
few empirical studies exist that utilize the NNMM as a guiding theoretical framework. To 
date the NNMM has been invoked by several researchers doing work in other domains, 
such as written composition (Hacker et al., 2010). However, these studies did not concern 
calibration accuracy. Moreover, the NNMM has never been adapted to an experimental 
study on the enhancement of calibration accuracy, and hence, the present study 
contributes to the literature by testing the utility of this model in an experimental context 
as it pertains to calibration accuracy. The model’s strength lies in its utility as a means to 
explain the calibration process and how individuals’ accuracy is influenced by their 
monitoring and control capacity. Of special relevance to this study, the NNMM assists in 
illustrating how metacognitive strategy training can benefit learners’ monitoring and 
control capabilities, and subsequently, enhance the accuracy of their metacognitive 
judgments. The model is also parsimonious, which makes it simple to understand for a 
wide range of readers. However, this parsimony serves as a liability as well because there 
are other metacognitive components which are not explicitly accounted for by the model, 
such as planning, evaluation, debugging, and metacognitive knowledge. Hence, its 
explanatory power is necessarily limited.       
Link Between Metacognition and Calibration 
Metacognition 
Although terms like metacognition, metacomprehension, and metamemory—
indicative of higher-order thinking—were not coined until 1979 by Flavell, well after the 
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birth of cognitivism, the main attributes of metacognition were being debated by 
philosophers well before then. In 1841, a Scottish physician by the name of John 
Abercrombie philosophized about consciousness and the notion of reflective thought. 
Abercrombie (1841) argued that consciousness simply meant any thought that is 
currently passing through the mind which one is attending to, necessitating awareness. In 
his chapter, Abercrombie noted, 
That more extensive operation to which we ought to give the name of 
Reflection, as distinguished from simple consciousness, seems to be 
connected with a power of remembering past perceptions, and past mental 
processes—of comparing them with present feelings, so as to trace 
between them a relation, as belonging to the same sentient being—and, 
farther, of tracing the laws by which the mental processes themselves are 
regulated [italics added for emphasis]. It is employed also in tracing the 
relations and sequences of external things, and thus proves the source of 
certain notions expressive of these relations. It is therefore a compound 
operation of mind, including various mental processes, especially 
consciousness, memory, and the act of comparison or judgment [italics 
added for emphasis]. The knowledge which we derive from this source, 
whether we call it consciousness or reflection, is referable to three heads. 
(p. 69) 
 
Abercrombie (1841) further suggested that knowledge (i.e., mental processes) that 
originates in either consciousness or reflection can be understood vis-à-vis: (1) 
knowledge of mental processes; (2) what he termed “compound notions” (e.g., time, 
cause-effect inferences, and motion); and (3) primary truths or intuitive beliefs. In 
essence, Abercrombie was describing the core ingredients of metacognition and SRL far 
in advance of both cognitivism and Flavell. Unfortunately, because he was not a 
researcher, Abercrombie was not able to systematically test his theory. However, it is 
doubtful whether his theory would have been given much attention, even if he had been 
systematic, considering that the founders of psychology, Wundt and James, fared no 
better. It was not until Flavell (1979), under the new zeitgeist of cognitivism, that 
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metacognition became an anchor in the map of cognitive latent constructs relevant to 
human learning and cognition. 
Flavell’s (1979) model of metacognition involves four main categories: (1) 
metacognitive knowledge (world knowledge), (2) metacognitive experiences (insight into 
what information is necessary to fully understand a task/problem), (3) goals/tasks, and (4) 
actions/strategies. It is important to note that Flavell never truly intended for 
metacognition to be simply “cognitive,” as the fourth category suggests. In essence, 
metacognition has a behavioral/action component interwoven in its fabric. Arguably, 
metacognition plays an important role in such varied tasks as: oral communication of 
information, oral persuasion, oral comprehension, reading comprehension, writing, 
language acquisition, attention, memory, problem solving, social cognition, and, several 
forms of self-control and self-instruction (i.e., aspects of self-regulation). In a practical 
sense, metacognition is the ability to deliberately and intentionally reflect and think about 
tasks, situations, and problems that we face on a daily basis (e.g., attempting to 
consciously block distracting environmental stimuli, reflecting abstractly on better 
strategies to solve novel problems, etc.; Hacker, 1998). 
Although Flavell (1979, 1987) sought to place metacognition at the reins of 
cognitive processes, he was unclear and rather vague about this distinction. He asserted 
that metacognitive knowledge and metacognitive experiences can be distinguished from 
other kinds—namely lower-order cognitive processes—only in their content and 
function, not in their form or quality. In this sense the imaginary line that divides 
cognitive from metacognitive activity becomes muddy, especially if one considers that 
the connection from cognitive to metacognitive activities is not linear. For instance, 
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research has demonstrated that metacognitive strategies can, and do with some frequency, 
become automatized, and hence, traverse to the cognitive arena (Livingston, 2003), as is 
the case as one gains expertise in a domain. Livingston (2003) posited that the distinction 
can be clarified by considering how the information is utilized by an actor.  
The primary distinguishing factor between the two is in the goal or intent of the 
activity. For instance, cognitive activities seek to obtain, retain, and transfer knowledge 
for the implementation of activities while metacognitive activities are aimed at regulating 
and governing task implementation. Cognitive strategies are intended to assist an 
individual to achieve a particular goal (e.g., text comprehension) while metacognitive 
strategies are invoked to ensure that the goal has been achieved (e.g., reviewing and 
summarizing to evaluate one’s comprehension). Conversely, the NNMM views this 
relationship differently. Rather than focus on the distinction between cognitive and 
metacognitive activities, the NNMM underscores one’s metacognitive capabilities, 
namely monitoring and control, and how they function to represent at the meta-level the 
information flowing from the object-level. As such, the NNMM elucidates how the 
information-gathering function (monitoring) affects learners’ ability to adjust or modify 
the environment (control). Presumably, these metacognitive capabilities exert some 
influence over cognitive activities.      
In fact, Flavell (1979, 1987) was the first to make connections between 
comprehension monitoring and FOK. For instance, the sudden feeling that one does not 
comprehend something another person just said, such as a teacher during a learning 
episode, is indicative of comprehension monitoring and FOK. While he was far from 
discussing the role and function of calibration as a means to determine bias and accuracy 
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in comprehension monitoring, Flavell paved the way for future researchers to bridge the 
gap between regulation of cognition comprehension monitoring and calibration of 
performance. The arrows portray the expected causal flow between metacognition at a 
broad level and calibration accuracy and bias at a more specific level. However, while 
Flavell provided the foundation for the conceptualization of metacognition, Baker and 
Brown (1984) provided the dichotomous definition of metacognition that is now widely 
accepted. These two distinct elements are the knowledge about cognition and the self-
regulatory mechanisms that situate monitoring as a primary focus. The self-regulatory 
processes involve checking the outcome, planning, monitoring effectiveness, testing, 
revising, and evaluating strategies (Baker & Brown, 1984).  
Calibration 
Calibration of performance is crucial to effective self-regulation (Winne & 
Jamieson-Noel, 2002) and it is an important cognitive and metacognitive process 
(Nietfeld et al., 2006; Nietfeld, Enders, & Schraw, 2006; Schraw, 1995; Schraw, Dunkle, 
Bendixen, & Roedel, 1995). Unlike comprehension monitoring, which focuses on the 
assessment of one’s learning or strategy use toward the fulfillment of some desired end, 
calibration more specifically involves the confidence judgments of the state of one’s 
knowledge vis-à-vis performance on a criterion task that requires one to draw upon such 
knowledge. The products of this calibration process are the actual metacognitive 
judgments themselves as well as the level of accuracy and bias of those judgments.  
In general, students tend to calibrate tasks better when they use their 
metacognitive knowledge and beliefs to inform their cognition and behavior regarding 
the aspects and demands of a task and make ongoing and productive adjustments based 
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on task information (Butler & Winne, 1995; Winne & Jamieson-Noel, 2002). Thus, as 
students engage in tasks, they self-regulate their learning in a variety of ways that include 
metacognitively representing the task and invoking strategies by acquiring information 
from their background knowledge and from monitoring aspects associated with the task 
and themselves (Butler & Cartier, 2004). This feedback loop permits students to make 
metacognitive judgments regarding progress and mastery and, with this information, 
make informed decisions about whether to continue with current strategies or modify 
them to address gaps in cognitively representing the task and performance (Lodewyk, 
Winne, & Jamieson-Noel, 2009).  
Antecedents Calibration Outputs 
Antecedents/Inputs to Calibration.  
Metacognitive experiences typically precede or follow a cognitive activity. They 
are elicited when cognitive processes fail, such as the recognition that one did not 
comprehend a passage one just read (Flavell, 1979, 1987; Livingston, 2003). This 
breakdown in the cognitive flow is thought to trigger metacognitive processes as the 
learner attempts to remedy the situation (Roberts & Erdos, 1993). This disruption in 
comprehension presumably significantly influences the accuracy and bias of learners’ 
metacognitive judgments.  
As learners engage in learning activities (e.g., in preparation for an upcoming 
exam), they invoke cognitive (e.g., rehearsing, summarizing, elaborating, and 
transforming learned information into meaningful individual knowledge) and 
metacognitive learning strategies (comprehension monitoring, planning and allocating 
resources prior to the learning episode, and understanding when information has been 
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sufficiently rehearsed) with respect to the knowledge they expect the criterion task to 
involve. In order to successfully navigate and perform the task (e.g., the exam itself), 
individuals must be able to appropriately calibrate what they do and do not know about 
the topic(s) the task will cover.  
The dilemma lies in the fact that learners are incapable of perfectly assessing their 
internal cognitive processing (Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994) and, by extension, unable to 
precisely and accurately diagnose gaps in their knowledge. Consequently, more highly 
metacognitive learners are better able to allocate cognitive resources and monitoring to 
achieve greater accuracy and less bias in their metacognitive judgments because they 
utilize more sophisticated cognitive strategies and metacognitive knowledge (e.g., 
declarative and conditional knowledge) as well as regulatory skills (e.g., planning, 
monitoring, and evaluation). Less metacognitive learners, conversely, are ill-equipped to 
perform these functions effectively because they lack a repertoire of more sophisticated 
cognitive strategies and the metacognitive awareness to regulate their learning (Artzt & 
Armour-Thomas, 1992; Baker 1989; Brown, 1987; Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994; 
Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Schraw & Graham, 1997; Schraw & Moshman, 1995). 
Therefore, these less metacognitive learners will exhibit greater bias and decreased 
accuracy in their metacognitive judgments because they are less confident of what they 
do and do not know.    
Research on calibration has involved a variety of factors that influence accuracy 
and bias in metacognitive judgments, including personal characteristics, task parameters, 
and text and test parameters. For instance, individuals bring certain characteristics to 
learning settings (e.g., dispositions, attitudes, beliefs, aptitude, etc.) which are impacted 
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by influences embedded in the tasks (e.g., strategy training and delaying judgments) as 
well as the text and tests (e.g., test format, item difficulty, and complexity of text). These 
then presumably affect individuals’ calibration accuracy and bias.   
Personal characteristics. Personal characteristics include any characteristic that 
an individual brings to the setting (Schraw, 2009b). Several personal characteristics 
found in the literature are: the role of working memory in the accuracy of judgments; 
verbal ability; and sociocultural differences.  In terms of working memory, working 
memory capacity is associated with probability judgments (i.e., comprehension 
monitoring), although it is not necessarily related to frequency judgments (Dougherty & 
Hunt, 2003; Sprenger & Dougherty, 2006).  Along a similar vein, the relative accuracy of 
FOK judgments is related to executive cognitive functions, although JOLs exhibited no 
such relationship (Souchay, Isingrini, Clarys, & Eustache, 2004). In regards to verbal 
ability, more proficient readers were found to be better equipped to predict and judge 
performance on a reading task than poor readers (Gillstrom & Ronnberg, 1995).  
Moreover, reading ability is related to absolute accuracy (a measure of the precision of a 
confidence judgment vis-à-vis performance on the same criterion task in which the 
confidence judgments were made), but not to relative accuracy (a measure of the 
relationship between confidence judgments and performance scores on a criterion task) 
(Maki, Shields, Wheeler, & Zacchilli, 2005). In essence, poor readers were more 
overconfident than proficient readers, warranting interventions to eliminate this bias. 
Finally, research on cultural differences suggests that culture influences monitoring 
accuracy, presumably because of differences in overconfidence (Lundeberg, Fox, Brown 
& Elbedour, 2000; Wallsten & Gu, 2003).  For instance, individuals reared in cultures 
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that emphasize community and deference to authority (e.g., Asian and Hispanic cultures) 
may be prone to underconfidence in their judgments whereas individuals reared in more 
individualistic cultures (e.g., American and Western European cultures) that accentuate 
the role of the individual may be more prone to overconfidence.  
Task parameters. Task parameters are aspects of the task that influence 
accuracy.  A variety of aspects are found in the literature, such as differences between 
immediate versus delayed metacognitive judgments, different types of judgment tasks, 
and strategy training.  Metacognitive judgments have been found to be more accurate 
when they are made after a delay (Kimball & Metcalfe, 2003; Nelson, Narens, & 
Dunlosky, 2004; Thiede, Anderson & Therriault, 2003; Thiede, Dunlosky, Griffin & 
Wiley, 2005) due to more time to engage in metacognitive monitoring (Schraw, 2009b). 
Apparently, different types of judgments influence performance on recall and recognition 
tests because they are more sensitive to verbal ability and information (Metcalfe & 
Kornell, 2005). Presumably, different metacognitive judgment tasks necessitate different 
underlying metacognitive processes (Keleman, Frost, & Weaver, 2000). For example, 
some aspects of calibration accuracy and bias may tap into different elements of 
metacognitive awareness, such as knowledge (i.e., procedural, declarative, and 
conditional) and regulation (e.g., information management or debugging strategies or 
evaluation) of cognition. Strategy use and strategy training have also been found to be 
related to accuracy and bias. For instance, studies have found that summarizing texts 
increased the relation between confidence and performance (Thiede & Anderson, 2003), 
and that distributed study enhanced relative accuracy (Son, 2004).  Along a similar line, 
research has demonstrated that monitoring accuracy remained stable throughout the 
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semester, in spite of continual monitoring practice (Bol et al., 2005; Neitfeld et al., 2006). 
However, individuals may be more prone to overconfidence with practice (Koriat, 
Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002), as would be the case if self-efficacy transforms into 
overconfidence due to over-practice in one domain.   
Text and test parameters. Text and test parameters are elements of the text, such 
as length and complexity, and test items, such as difficulty, that influence accuracy and 
bias (Schraw, 2009b). Text difficulty was evidently related to relative accuracy such that 
accuracy was optimum when text is at the reader’s current reading level as opposed to 
overly difficult or simple (Lin, Moore, & Zabrucky, 2001). This finding is in line with 
Vygotsky’s (1978) zone of proximal development (ZPD), in which individuals need the 
right amount of challenge (i.e., not too difficult or easy) in order to optimize learning. 
Other text and test parameters that influence calibration accuracy and bias include, test 
item difficulty (which significantly constrained performance accuracy judgments that 
influenced both poor and proficient task performers; Burson, Larrick & Klayman, 2006;  
Schraw & Roedel, 1994), test item format (especially degree of overconfidence; Juslin, 
Wennerholm, & Olsson, 1999), deception (decreases accuracy; Brewer, Sampiano, & 
Barlow, 2005), and information that is perceived to be important to a judgment task (by 
increasing accuracy; irrelevant information, on the other hand, undermined accuracy; 
Dougherty & Franco-Watkins, 2003; Dougherty & Sprenger, 2006). 
Other studies have unearthed similar factors which contribute to one’s monitoring 
accuracy and bias, including: (1) characteristics of the testing environment (e.g., 
difficulty, format, length, and time the test was given vis-à-vis when the learner prepared 
for the exam; Baker, 1989; Pressley & Ghatala, 1989, 1990); (2) externally-imposed 
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processing constraints (e.g., feedback, incentives, and explicit instruction; Nietfeld & 
Schraw, 2002); and (3) individual traits the learner brings to the setting (e.g., expertise 
and aptitude; Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002).  
In sum, the literature indicates that individual differences, task constraints, test 
and text parameters, expertise, and aptitude, among others, significantly influence 
monitoring accuracy and bias.  However, Schraw (2009b) warned that it is not well 
established whether differences examined in research involving these elements is due to 
shifts in metacognitive ability, or to the influence of external scaffolding such as 
additional time to make judgments, longer texts, or additional test items.   
In spite of this lack of clarity, research has demonstrated that several 
characteristics influence confidence judgment accuracy and bias, and that these fluctuate 
within individuals based on the type of judgment they make, among other factors, such as 
those surveyed above. For instance, personal characteristics of the learner, such as 
motivation and disposition, may either benefit or hinder the calibration process by either 
increasing or decreasing accuracy and bias. Additionally, environmental characteristics, 
such as complexity of the domain (e.g., assessing learning in English, physics, or 
engineering), type and method of evaluation of learning (e.g., selecting performance 
assessments using holistic- or rubric-based evaluation), and format and difficulty of the 
test/exam used to assess learning (e.g., using multiple-choice- or essay-format tests) exert 
an influence on calibration processes and inevitably impact learners’ ability to calibrate 
accurately. On a more macro level, these various elements affect the monitoring 
(information-gathering) and control (ability to adjust and modify the environment) 
mechanisms of the learner (see Figure 1), which in turn, influence the calibration 
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accuracy and bias of their metacognitive judgments and subsequently outcomes (e.g., 
achievement) at the micro level.  Therefore, these different factors have a bearing on 
learning outcomes through the following trajectory: antecedent metacognition 
monitoring and control calibration accuracy and bias outcomes.    
Calibration (Metacognitive) Judgments.  
Calibration can be described as the process of eliminating the discrepancy 
between perceived performance and actual performance on an objective task, such as a 
test/exam assessing declarative knowledge of a domain or topic. As learners calibrate 
their performance in preparation for a test/exam, their calibration will be either more or 
less accurate and more or less biased. Calibration accuracy refers to the level of 
correctness between metacognitive judgments (i.e., perceived knowledge) and actual 
performance, as assessed by some objective task (e.g., test/exam); in other words, the 
magnitude of said discrepancy. Calibration bias, on the other hand, refers to the direction 
of the discrepancy between metacognitive judgment and actual performance, which can 
be best understood as over- or under-confidence.  
Metacognitive judgments are categorized into three types of judgments regarding 
monitoring one’s performance, known as prospective, concurrent, and retrospective 
judgments. They differ in terms of when the judgment is made vis-à-vis the performance 
task of interest (Schraw, 2009b). Prospective judgments (i.e., predictions) require the 
individual to make a judgment about learning or performance prior to performing the 
criterion task.  Concurrent judgments ask individuals to make confidence or performance 
judgments during task performance.  Typically, examinees complete a task (e.g., an 
exam) and make a confidence or performance accuracy judgment after each item (i.e., 
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local level).  With retrospective judgments (i.e., postdictions), on the other hand, 
individuals evaluate the ease of learning or performance after completing a task. Unlike 
concurrent judgments, in which individuals assess performance on an item-by-item basis, 
prospective and retrospective judgments are more often than not holistic (i.e., individuals 
judge their performance on all test items at once) (Schraw, 2009b). The present study will 
focus exclusively on concurrent judgments at the local level.       
Prospective. Three different types of prospective judgments are common in the 
literature on metacognitive monitoring; these include judgments of learning (JOLs), 
feeling of knowing (FOK), and ease of learning (EOL) judgments. JOLs gauge an 
individual’s ability to study to-be-learned information (e.g., word lists) and subsequently 
make predictions of recollection for each item (e.g., words or word pairs). JOLs are 
theorized to invoke metacognitive judgments about one’s capacity to encode and store 
information in memory. FOK judgments refer to an individual’s ability to predict whether 
he will recognize information that could not be recalled from long term memory or from 
a previous learning episode. FOK judgments gauge one’s ability to monitor the contents 
of memory and to query memory for information. EOL judgments are defined as 
evaluations regarding the time it takes or the necessary effort to learn information for 
some future use (e.g., performance assessments). EOL judgments are theorized to tap 
one’s ability to monitor the relative difficulty of the comprehension process (Nelson & 
Narens, 1994; Schraw, 2009b). 
Concurrent. Concurrent judgments refer to continual evaluations of one’s 
learning or performance (Schraw, 2009b). Examples include confidence judgments 
regarding learning or performance, ease of solution, and performance accuracy judgments 
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during task performance. Research on these three judgments as outcomes is similar 
inasmuch as an individual responds to a test item or performs a task and immediately 
thereafter makes a judgment regarding confidence, ease of problem solution, or 
performance accuracy.  Concurrent confidence judgments gauge individuals’ ability to 
monitor their performance continually in real time. Ease of solution judgments assess 
individuals’ ability to monitor task difficulty vis-à-vis their available cognitive resources. 
Judgments of performance accuracy furnish information about individuals’ ability to 
monitor their performance on the task (Nelson & Narens, 1994).   
Retrospective. Retrospective judgments occur after the task has been performed.  
Examples include local as well as global judgments in which a single ease of learning or 
performance evaluation is made for the overall task.  Retrospective ease of learning or 
ease of solution judgments are quite similar to concurrent and prospective, with the 
notable exception that they are made post hoc as opposed to a priori (prospective) or 
during (concurrent).  For instance, after completion of a test, individuals may make 
global retrospective ease of learning or solution judgments even if they have already 
made local judgments. Retrospective performance accuracy judgments are made 
according to a similar process (Nelson & Narens, 1994; Schraw, 2009b). Such a situation 
is more comprehensive insofar as individuals provide information at both the local and 
global levels. It is plausible for individuals to more accurately calibrate performance of 
one or the other but not necessarily both.  
Outputs/Outcomes of Appropriate Calibration 
 As the NNMM (Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994) suggests, the calibration process is 
dynamic and cyclical in nature. Presumably, highly metacognitive learners will continue 
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to adequately monitor and regulate their learning effectively because the antecedents to 
good calibration accuracy will inform the calibration process (the monitoring function in 
the NNMM), and thus, yield successful performance on learning tasks (the control 
function in the NNMM). Clearly, these individuals are better equipped and able to more 
accurately represent the meta-level model of the object-level, which in turn produces an 
enhanced capacity to subsequently adjust or modify the object-level (i.e., control). 
Unfortunately, such cannot be said regarding the less metacognitive learners. Because 
their assessment of their own internal cognitive processes is more flawed (i.e., 
inaccurate), their calibration processing is likely to be more shallow and superficial, 
thereby perpetuating the cycle of inaccurate and biased metacognitive judgments. These 
individuals do not perform as successfully on tasks because the feedback (information-
gathering or monitoring function) they receive on their poor performance is not 
incorporated in, or even communicated to, the meta-level, and thus, their metacognitive 
judgments remain inaccurate and biased. Stated differently, less metacognitive learners 
have more limited monitoring and control capabilities than their more metacognitive 
counterparts; therefore, the meta-level model of the object-level is more 
imperfect/inaccurate, which leads to poor performance on learning tasks due to more 
inaccurate and biased assessments of their actual knowledge. It is these less 
metacognitive individuals that can benefit the most from interventions targeted at 
increasing the accuracy of metacognitive judgments.   
 The benefits to appropriate calibration are varied and broad in scope. For instance, 
with respect to the NNMM, learners who engage in appropriate calibration processing 
have the benefit of enhanced monitoring (i.e., information-gathering) and control (i.e., 
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ability to adjust and modify the environment) capabilities. On a finer grain, the cognitive 
and metacognitive skills and strategies invoked prior to and during calibration processing 
can be honed and refined as antecedents to future calibration processing, thus 
continuously augmenting its efficiency and effectiveness. More specifically, cognitive 
skills and strategies include: summarizing; elaborating; chunking; mnemonics; putting 
knowledge into one’s own words for added significance and meaning to increase 
retention; exerting extra effort on more complex information and less effort on simpler 
information; and knowing when information has been learned so as not to expend 
unnecessary effort on already-learned information (i.e., overlearning). Metacognitive 
skills and strategies at the regulatory end involve: planning for appropriate allocation, 
investment, and expenditure of resources and effort; improved monitoring for better 
comprehension of learned information; more sophisticated information management and 
debugging strategies to handle incoming information and correct errors in judgment, 
respectively; and more effective evaluation of learning. At the knowledge end, 
metacognitive skills and strategies include more in-depth knowledge of one’s cognitive 
capabilities, increased ability to appropriately apply strategies, and a better grasp of when 
and why to apply strategies. Beyond benefitting learners’ cognitive and metacognitive 
abilities, good calibration accuracy greatly contributes to one’s actual performance on 
learning tasks, and thus, to improved achievement outcomes (Nelson & Narens, 1990, 
1994; Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002; Schraw & Dennison, 1994). 
Review of Research on Improving Metacognition and Calibration 
 The following section includes a review of relevant literature addressing the 
enhancement of monitoring accuracy. Table 2 includes a summary of the most relevant 
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previous research on interventions developed specifically for increasing the accuracy and 
decreasing the bias of metacognitive judgments. However, before proceeding with the 
review of interventions, it is necessary to first establish the need for an intervention. 
Table 2  
Summary of Previous Relevant Research on the Enhancement of Calibration  
Study 
 
Independent 
Variable  
 
Outcomes Synthesis of Findings 
Kruger and Dunning 
(1999); Mitchum and 
Kelley (2010); 
Prowse-Turner and 
Thompson (1999) 
 
Instructional 
training on 
problem 
solving and 
reasoning 
Accuracy Enhanced the accuracy of 
metacognitive judgments and resolved 
students’ misunderstandings of problem 
solving and reasoning tasks. 
Glengberg and 
Epstein (1985); 
Glenberg et al. 
(1987); Walczyk and 
Hall (1989) 
Instructional 
training on 
expository 
text with 
embedded 
questions; 
providing 
students 
with 
feedback on 
calibration 
accuracy 
 
Accuracy and 
Bias 
Enhanced the accuracy of 
metacognitive judgments regarding text 
comprehension. Students benefit from 
benefit from individual and normative 
knowledge in improvements in 
accuracy and bias from pretest to 
posttest. 
Glenberg et al. (1987) Provision of 
pretest  
Accuracy and 
Bias 
Calibration accuracy and bias were 
improved for students who were 
furnished a pretest that offers self-
generated feedback. However, this 
effect is limited to pretest that are 
highly related to the actual objective 
performance assessment used for the 
purposes of calibration. 
 
Chu, Jamieson-Noel, 
and Winne (2000) 
Different 
testing 
conditions 
Confidence, 
Bias, and 
Discrimination 
Feedback that had no effect on 
calibration due to its domain generality. 
Confidence, bias, and discrimination 
are not per se influenced by testing 
conditions, suggesting a general 
monitoring skill. 
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Maki et al. (1990) Different 
texts 
Accuracy Text with deleted letters yielded 
enhanced calibration accuracy due to 
increased processing time. 
 
Thiede and Leboe 
(2009) 
Different 
study times 
Accuracy and 
Bias 
Self-paced study times suggested that 
encoding fluency was not closely 
linked to the magnitude of 
overconfiedence. Students may have 
been immersing themselves in strategic 
responding to maximize correct recall. 
  
Henrion et al. (1993) Different 
training 
conditions 
on 
probability 
recall 
 
Accuracy and 
Bias 
Although the training failed to improve 
accuracy, the directional biases were 
helpful in informing students’ 
probability judgments.  
Bol et al. (2005); 
Hacker et al. (2008) 
Calibration 
practice and 
no practice 
Accuracy and 
Bias 
Bol et al. found that the overt practice 
condition did not significantly improve 
accuracy; however, higher achiever 
tended to be less biased than lower 
achievers. Hacker et al. found that 
calibration practice somewhat 
improved accuracy, but only for low 
achieving students. Incentives were 
also successful at enhancing accuracy. 
  
Nietfeld and Schraw 
(2002) 
Monitoring 
accuracy 
training and 
no training 
Accuracy and 
Bias 
Strategy training enhanced 
performance, confidence, and 
monitoring accuracy irrespective of 
aptitude, albeit training had no impact 
on bias. Incentives were not effective at 
sustaining the intervention effects after 
a one-week delay.  
 
Koriat and Levy-
Sadot (2001) 
Cue 
familiarity 
and 
accessibility 
training 
 
Accuracy Cue accessibility and familiarity 
improved calibration accuracy. 
Lodewyk et al. (2009) Task 
structure 
and task 
complexity 
Accuracy and 
Bias 
Students’ calibration accuracy and bias 
was better in ill-structured as opposed 
to well-structured tasks. Task structure 
and complexity influence calibration.   
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Learners Are Imperfect Evaluators of their Own Internal Processes  
Researchers have argued that there are crucial connections between students’ 
initial assessments, their use of strategies, and their learning and performance on 
cognitive tasks (Pintrich, 2002; Thomas & McDaniel, 2007; Tobias & Everson, 2002-
2003). In fact, some researchers (e.g., Pintrich, 2002; Tobias & Everson, 2002-2003) 
have argued that metacognitive judgments are the most foundational of the metacognitive 
processes because there can be little corrective strategy use with erroneous assessments. 
However, students’ metacognitive assessments are often inaccurate and biased (Grimes, 
2002; Kennedy, Lawton, & Plumlee, 2002; Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994), although 
results reported by Lin et al. (2001) suggested that students were capable of monitoring 
comprehension and performance in spite of relatively poor calibration accuracy, 
especially for prediction judgments. In addition, they found that more skilled prediction 
calibrators tended to be more skilled postdiction calibrators as well, and that students’ 
calibration accuracy remained stable across measures and assessment conditions.  
Contrary to popular belief, the relation between calibration accuracy and actual 
performance is typically low. In other words, poor calibration accuracy is the rule, rather 
than the exception (Brannick et al., 2005; Glenberg et al., 1987). The high levels of 
calibration accuracy that have been reported in studies on the calibration of probabilities 
and FOK research may be the product of utilizing feedback from taking the test to assess 
the probability of correct performance on the test (Glenberg et al., 1987). For instance, in 
a series of experiments, Glenberg and associates (1987) found that poor calibration 
accuracy is not related to a particular type of performance test but rather it is found with 
inference tests, verbatim recognition tests, and idea recognition tests. Moreover, poor 
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calibration accuracy was found when the test was provided immediately after reading as 
well as when the test was scheduled after a delay. These general findings are supported 
by additional research (e.g., Epstein, Glenberg, & Bradley, 1984; Glenberg & Epstein, 
1985; Glenberg, Wilkinson, & Epstein, 1982; Maki et al., 1990; Schraw, 1994; Schraw et 
al., 1993). On a similar vein, findings by Schraw et al. (1993) suggest that individuals 
harbor a strong response bias as they calibrate their performance; in other words, 
individuals are prone to report their accuracy consistently irrespective of item difficulty 
and accuracy of response, indicating that negative feedback was not integrated to 
improve both aspects of calibration per se.   
This rather small association between confidence about performance and actual 
performance reported in the literature is critical, partly due to its consequences for student 
strategies while studying (Brannick, et al., 2005). Optimal calibration accuracy is 
arguably necessary for sustained effort. For instance, students are likely to persevere 
while tackling a difficult problem if previous experience has demonstrated that they will 
ultimately succeed in solving it. Nevertheless, if students believe that efforts to master a 
subject or solve a problem are fruitless, the likelihood that they will persist in such efforts 
decreases. However, if students feel that they have mastered a topic, they are less likely 
to expend additional time studying it. Therefore, poor calibration accuracy can be 
expected to result in students misallocating effort in wasteful endeavors. Conversely, 
enhanced calibration accuracy should permit students to become more aware of their own 
strengths and weaknesses, thereby improving the ability to determine where to best 
expend effort (Brannick, et al., 2005; Glenberg et al., 1987; Schraw et al., 1993).  
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Glenberg et al. (1987) argued that the likely reason for poor calibration accuracy 
was that students assess familiarity with the general domain of a text instead of assessing 
knowledge obtained from a particular text. Nevertheless, calibration accuracy can be 
improved if students are provided with a pretest that furnishes self-generated feedback 
(Brannick, et al., 2005; Glenberg et al., 1987). These findings are in stark contrast to 
research conducted by Schraw and associates (1993) in which results suggested that 
feedback had no effect on calibration ccuracy of FOK.  
On the other hand, incentives have been found to affect calibration of 
performance (Hogarth et al., 1991; Schraw et al., 1993; Yates, 1990). The literature 
examining the effects of incentives on calibration accuracy has typically distinguished 
between internal versus external incentives. Internal incentives draw upon individuals’ 
intrinsic motivation to perform well on a task (Hogarth et al., 1991), which is driven by 
inherent enjoyment of the task itself. Sources of this intrinsic motivation include: (a) a 
need to achieve true mastery of the material (Hogarth et al., 1991; White, 1959); (b) pride 
and/or enjoyment; and/or (c) a desire to impress or outperform others (see Deci & Ryan, 
1985 for a review). Conversely, external incentives are driven by tangible rewards, such 
as money or extra credit, which are heavily reliant on individuals’ performance on a 
criterion task. Whereas incentives have the potential to impact individuals’ performance 
on tasks, the effect may not necessarily always be positive. For example, Lepper, Greene, 
and Nisbett (1973) and Levine and Fasnacht (1974) found that when individuals ceased 
to receive external incentives to motivate task performance on an intrinsically enjoyable 
task their performance and interest on the task waned. Furthermore, the provision of 
incentives to influence task performance has been found to have deleterious effects on the 
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amount of incidental learning that individuals attain during learning episodes, presumably 
because attention is focused on the salient aspect of the task that is rewarded (Bahrick, 
1954; Bahrick, Fitts, & Rankin, 1952; Hogarth et al., 1991) rather than the task at hand.  
The body of research on the effects of incentives has yielded inconclusive results, 
especially when performance and calibration accuracy are paired together. For instance, 
incentives to improve performance were found to negatively influence performance when 
contrasted with incentives to improve calibration accuracy, indicating that individuals are 
apt to rely on subjective feelings when calibrating their performance rather than more 
objective information (e.g., difficulty of the test items; Hacker et al., 2008; Schraw et al., 
1993). Yet other studies have demonstrated that incentives have no influence on either 
calibration accuracy or performance (see, Hogarth et al., 1991, for a review). Hence, the 
literature suggests a complex dynamic between incentives, calibration accuracy, and 
performance. Incentives, for example, have a tendency to improve performance for tasks 
that are easily understood, such as simple, routine, and consistent responses that can be 
executed quickly and frequently (McCullers, 1978). However, the effect of incentives is 
less obvious with respect to tasks that require flexibility and creative thinking and 
creativity (McCullers, 1978; McGraw, 1978; McGraw & McCullers, 1979).  
Training to Improve Metacognitive Monitoring     
 Although most individuals of normal intelligence engage in some degree of 
metacognitive regulation when faced with an effortful cognitive endeavor, some are more 
metacognitive than others. The more proficient metacognitive students tend to be more 
successful in their learning (Livingston, 1997; Schraw, 1994) when compared to their 
counterparts with poor command of their regulatory mechanisms. However, in spite of 
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the research that demonstrates that by and large individuals, including adult learners, are 
not metacognitive (e.g., Livingston, 2003; Schraw & Moshman, 1995; Schraw et al., 
1995), fortunately, individuals can be taught skills and strategies on how to enhance their 
regulation of cognitive activities while learning.   
 Arguably students who fare well on tasks (e.g., tests) monitor with better accuracy 
than those who perform poorly (Alexander, Carr, & Schwanenflugel, 1995; Baker, 1989; 
Baker & Brown, 1984; Garner, 1987; Garner & Alexander, 1989; Pressley & Afflerbach, 
1995; Schraw & Moshman, 1995). In addition, students who can count on a large store of 
strategies solve problems and monitor with greater accuracy than learners with less 
knowledge of strategies. Research by Pressley and Wharton-McDonald (1997) 
demonstrated a strong positive relationship between strategy training and improved 
performance. Moreover, research has shown that strategy use (Pressley & Wharton-
McDonald, 1997) and strategy training (Jacobs & Paris, 1987) enhance performance on 
learning tasks. For instance, Nietfeld and Schraw (2002) found that students who have 
undergone metacognitive skills training enhanced their learning and academic 
achievement. Moreover, underachieving students have benefitted greatly from 
metacognitive training (Swanson, 1990) irrespective of intellectual ability (Pressley & 
Ghatala, 1990; Yan, 1994). The implication for educational practice is that students with 
well-developed metacognitive awareness exhibit higher achievement, even those who 
may not necessarily have high aptitude. 
 Research conducted by Brown and Pressley (1994) and Pressley, Van Etten, 
Yokoi, Freebern, and Van Meter (1998) found that teaching metacognitive monitoring 
skills enhances learning outcomes. Paris, Cross, and Lipson (1984), for example, found 
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that students who underwent metacognitive awareness training were more capable of 
learning new information effectively and they had more knowledge of reading strategies 
when compared to students who did not receive such training. Delclos and Harrington 
(1991) studied the influence of metacognitive training on problem solving. They found 
that students in the metacognitive training with problem solving skills group 
outperformed students in the problem solving only and the comparison group. Moreover, 
Nietfeld and Schraw (2002) concluded that research on metacognitive monitoring 
training explains significant incremental variance of performance when controlling for 
the effects of other forms of instruction, such as problem solving skills.     
 Research on general metacognitive training provides insight into the cognitive 
processes involved in learning and what characteristics distinguish successful from 
unsuccessful students. Furthermore, it has implications for instructional interventions, 
such as teaching students how to be more reflective in their learning processes and 
outcomes as well as how to regulate those processes for more productive learning 
(Livingston, 2003). 
Review of Research on Interventions to Enhance Calibration 
It is immensely valuable for students to understand when they have learned the 
material because studying insufficiently may be costly whereas studying too much can be 
a wasteful expenditure of resources. In order to achieve this complex task, students must 
learn to effectively and efficiently calibrate the comprehension of what they have learned 
(Glenberg et al., 1987; Zabrucky & Moore, 1994; Zabrucky, Agler, & Moore, 2009). The 
NNMM suggests that students who are highly metacognitive will be successful in 
achieving this task whereas less metacognitive learners will find it challenging, perhaps 
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never succeeding at the task. Interestingly, the research on interventions targeting the 
enhancement of the accuracy in metacognitive judgments is somewhat conflicting. 
Glenberg and Epstein (1987), on the one hand, found a negative relationship between 
performance and monitoring accuracy. On the other hand, Schraw and his associates 
(1995) reported a positive relationship between knowledge and monitoring accuracy. 
Presumably, learners who possess relevant strategies solve problems and monitor with 
greater accuracy than learners who are less strategic (Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994; 
Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002). 
 Pertinent to the present study, monitoring accuracy is malleable and is honed as 
students obtain additional information from a test or when they gain a deep store of 
metacognitive knowledge. For instance, making tests longer or increasing exposure of 
test information enhances monitoring accuracy. Furthermore, manipulating external 
processing effects (e.g., feedback and information about test preparedness) influences 
monitoring accuracy in positive ways. Conversely, general aptitude does not seem to 
affect monitoring accuracy (Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002).  
 Metacognition, and more specifically calibration accuracy, is enhanced in a 
variety of instructional environments (Alexander et al., 1995; Livingston, 2003; Schraw 
& Moshman, 1995). Schraw and Graham (1997), for example, proposed that one possible 
mechanism for the enhancement of metacognitive judgments is the connection between 
the instructional environment and domain specific knowledge, illustrated as follows: 
instruction increased knowledge base metacognition. The instructional environment 
is defined broadly to include explicit monitoring strategy instruction, which is 
subsequently combined with either explicit or implicit scaffolding. The mechanism 
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presumes that each of these instructional techniques enhances metacognitive monitoring 
by initially increasing students’ knowledge store, and thus, guiding their knowledge 
acquisition; in other words, shifts in students’ knowledge store mediate the relationship 
between instructional interventions and metacognition. This model for the enhancement 
of monitoring skills has received support from several research studies. For instance, 
Palincsar and Brown (1984) found that scaffolded instruction yields significant increases 
in strategy use and comprehension monitoring during an explicit strategy training 
intervention and following a six month delay. Scruggs, Mastropien, Jorgensen, and 
Monson (1986) found that explicit metacognitive strategy instruction yielded a similar 
increase in monitoring strategy use and subsequent performance.  
 Accurate confidence judgments are essential in order for students to become 
successful self-regulated learners. A critical element in this calibration process is 
students’ ability to rate how well they will perform prior to tests (prediction/prospective) 
and subsequently rate how well they feel they performed after completing tests 
(postdiction/retrospective) (Bol et al., 2005). In fact, predicting and postdicting test 
performance has been defined as a core element of the process of calibration (Lin & 
Zabrucky, 1998). Calibration accuracy has been significantly correlated with both 
metacognitive skills and achievement (Butler & Winne, 1995; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; 
Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002; Schraw, et al., 1993).  
 Previous attempts to enhance students’ calibration accuracy have been 
inconclusive in terms of their success. On the one hand, some research studies have found 
modest gains in students’ ability to predict and postdict performance (Hacker, Bol, 
Horgan, & Rakow, 2000; Horgan, 1990; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994, 1996; Nietfeld & 
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Schraw, 2002; Pressley, Synder, Levin, Murray, & Ghatala, 1987; Walczyk & Hall, 
1989). Other studies have resulted in no significant change in calibration accuracy after 
practice or other types of interventions (Bol & Hacker, 2001; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & 
Kleinbolting, 1991; Koriat, 1997; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischoff, 1980). A plausible 
explanation for the mixed results of the success of calibration accuracy enhancement 
interventions lies in methodology. Schraw (2009b) argues that the method of 
measurement chosen to gauge calibration accuracy (i.e., absolute versus relative accuracy 
versus discrimination) can have profound repercussions on results and interpretation. 
Schraw suggests, among other recommendations, to carefully align measurement to the 
goals of the research study [i.e., research question(s)] and to use multiple forms of 
measurement (e.g., using absolute, relative, and discrimination measures) whenever 
possible so as to obviate these methodological pitfalls. Therefore, the inconsistent results 
of some of these studies may be methodological artifacts rather than failure of or gaps in 
the theoretical frameworks invoked to explain results, especially considering that many of 
these studies used only a single measure of calibration accuracy.    
 Students’ achievement has been found to be strongly associated with accuracy 
(Barnett & Hixon, 1997; Bol & Hacker, 2001; Grimes, 2002; Hacker et al., 2000; Kruger 
& Dunning, 1999; Winne & Jamieson-Noel, 2002). Higher achieving students have 
consistently shown better accuracy, but greater underconfidence, in their predictions 
when compared to lower achieving students, who are less accurate yet more 
overconfident in their predictions. Kruger and Dunning (1999) posited that the most 
underachieving tended to be the most miscalibrated, overestimating their performance 
even when faced with negative feedback, thus demonstrating poor comprehension 
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monitoring and evaluation skills. Therefore, it would appear that underachieving, 
miscalibrated students are the most ripe for effective interventions aimed at improving 
calibration accuracy. 
 Considerations for interventions. An important consideration for research and 
practice is determining the reasons why metacognitive judgments are impervious to 
enhancement, despite some well-designed interventions in terms of internal validity. A 
step in this direction was attempted by Hacker et al. (2000) who found that students based 
their calibrations on previous calibrations, not previous performance scores, which are 
objective measures. Along a similar vein, Schraw (1997) reported that confidence 
judgments on a particular test were related to confidence judgments on unrelated tests, 
indicating that students base domain-specific judgments on information unrelated to the 
domain being assessed. In addition, Schraw and his associates (1993) demonstrated that 
reliability of performance judgments was considerably higher than the reliability of actual 
performance scores. Therefore, rather than anchoring their judgments of performance on 
objective learning activities, students appear to be anchoring their judgments on enduring 
subjective feelings of their personal characteristics (e.g., aptitude/ability). 
 Some researchers have argued that predictions of performance are subjective 
experiences of memory. For example, Hertzog, Dixon, and Hultsch (1990) described 
performance predictions as self-efficacy judgments based on: global and local memory 
self-efficacy; an evaluation of the memory task; and a set of general processes that 
transform students’ memory self-efficacy into confidence judgments. Kelley and Jacoby 
(1996) stated that subjective experiences of memory can take the form of analytic 
judgments, in which students can list the factors on which a judgment is made, and 
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nonanalytic judgments, in which assistance from several sources work in tandem to yield 
a memory experience. However, these sources have yet to be clearly and specifically 
identified, although research has already uncovered several of them, including 
motivational factors, volitional behavior, locus of control, self-esteem, self-confidence, 
and interest (Lin & Zabrucky, 1998; Osman & Hannafin, 1992; Pressley & Ghatala, 
1990; Zimmerman, 1995).  
 Interventions to enhance calibration. Calibration of students’ confidence 
judgments is essential for problem solving, reasoning, and sound decision making insofar 
as poor decision making should yield an appropriate lack of confidence (Prowse-Turner 
& Thompson, 2009). Enhanced calibration accuracy is critical because low confidence in 
a conclusion should be a sign to the learner to derive another (Shynkaruk & Thompson, 
2006), just as low confidence in a memory retrieval is a sign that additional resources  
may be necessary to make certain that the target memory is retrieved (e.g., Kruglanski, 
Peri, & Zakay, 1991; Zakay, 1998). Reasoners express high levels of confidence in faulty 
conclusions (Johnson-Laird & Savary, 1999; Quayle & Ball, 2000; Shynkaruk & 
Thompson, 2006), and variables that influence accuracy may have no or different effects 
on confidence (Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). Shynkaruk and Thompson (2006), for 
instance, reported that reasoners expressed more confidence in conclusions that they were 
given additional time to evaluate, even if this additional time did not enhance accuracy. 
Conclusion believability yielded different effects on confidence and accuracy insofar as, 
in relation to neutral conclusions, reasoners reported higher levels of confidence when 
evaluating conclusions that could be accepted or rejected on the basis of belief, even 
though only unbelievable conclusions yielded more accurate reasoning. Therefore, 
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training students on the skills necessary to reason effectively should enhance the accuracy 
of metacognitive judgments (Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006).  
 Kruger and Dunning (1999), for example, found that students who received a 
brief instructional intervention were better equipped to judge the number of Wason 
selection problems they had solved correctly than those who were untrained. Other 
instructional interventions also have been successful in enhancing the accuracy of 
metacognitive judgments and resolving students’ misunderstandings about problem 
solving and reasoning tasks (e.g., Mitchum & Kelley, 2010; Prowse-Turner & Thompson, 
2009). The implication of these studies is that instructed and spontaneous strategies are 
often not equivalent. In some instances, not all students are able to benefit from an 
instructed strategy or benefit to the same extent as those who spontaneously construct the 
strategy. This is a critical consideration for the present study, as strategies selected for the 
metacognitive strategy training were spontaneously developed by college undergraduates.   
 Considering the immense importance of reading comprehension, Glenberg and his 
colleagues (Glenberg & Epstein, 1985; Glenberg et al., 1987; Walczyk & Hall, 1989) 
conducted several experiments on enhancing the calibration accuracy of students’ text 
comprehension. These studies found that students were poor calibrators of text 
comprehension, unable to distinguish what they did and did not comprehend. Moreover, 
providing training in calibration accuracy (e.g., by providing expository text that contains 
illustrative examples and embedded questions, furnishing students with feedback on their 
calibration accuracy) enhanced the accuracy of metacognitive judgments regarding text 
comprehension. Interestingly, the improvement from initial calibration to recalibration of 
comprehension accuracy could be due to students’ access to their own knowledge as well 
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as normative knowledge available to all students (e.g., students may be skilled at 
deducing which inference verification items are particularly challenging, and 
subsequently lower confidence) (Glenberg & Epstein, 1985; Glenberg et al., 1987). 
Glenberg et al. (1987) found that calibration accuracy may be improved if students are 
furnished a pretest that offers self-generated feedback. In such treatments, students are 
able to utilize feedback from the pretest to predict subsequent test performance with a fair 
degree of accuracy. The effect of self-generated feedback is limited, however, as 
calibration accuracy improves only when the processes and knowledge drawn by the 
pretest are highly correlated with the processes and knowledge needed on the objective 
performance test.  
 Nevertheless, these results were later replicated by Chu, Jamieson-Noel, and 
Winne (2000), who reported that process feedback had no effect on calibration accuracy 
due to its domain-generality. Moreover, they found that confidence, bias, and 
discrimination are not per se influenced by testing conditions, indicating a general 
monitoring skill. Of particular importance to the present study is that the calibration 
training used in these research studies on text comprehension only yielded small 
improvements in calibration accuracy primarily because the researchers involved were 
unable to determine the causes of calibration accuracy failures. Therefore, the proposed 
study takes into account locating the purported causes of calibration accuracy failures 
among students (i.e., miscalibration) and including more specific training procedures and 
curricula so as to increase intervention effect sizes.   
 Maki and associates (1990) investigated whether increased processing enhances 
calibration accuracy. They found that text with deleted letters yielded improved 
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calibration accuracy. In essence, students can predict performance on text material with a 
relatively high degree of accuracy due to more active processing during reading afforded 
by text with missing letters. This research is in line with findings from Thiede and Leboe 
(2009). They asserted that miscalibration of competence is believed to occur when JOLs 
made in the presence of intact cue-target pairs during study create a “foresight bias,” 
which inflate JOLs due to the apparent relationship between a cue and a target. In two 
experiments, Thiede and Leboe found that self-paced study times indicated that encoding 
fluency was not closely linked to the magnitude of overconfidence. Error data showed 
that students may have been immersing themselves in strategic responding to maximize 
correct recall. Their results highlight the relevance of considering factors that influence 
both JOLs and recall performance when examining sources of miscalibration in absolute 
accuracy. Similarly, Castel, McCabe, and Roediger (2007) found miscalibration of 
competence for identical word pairs. These studies suggest the necessity for 
interventions, such as the one proposed in the present research, to consider processing 
time and aspects such as foresight bias.  
 Henrion, Fischer, and Mullin (1993) examined the calibration accuracy of 
students in subjective probability distributions using three conditions: direct assessment 
(students directly estimated probabilities), experimenters’ decomposition (variables were 
determined by the experimenter and evaluated by the students), and students’ 
decomposition (variables and solutions were determined by the students). They found 
that, contrary to the divide and conquer principle, decomposition did not improve the 
accuracy of confidence judgments, as there were no significant differences between the 
experimenters’ and students’ decomposition conditions. Interestingly, students in the 
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direct condition tended to underestimate their performance and students in the 
decomposition condition tended to overestimate their performance, demonstrating a 
relatively high degree of bias. While the training failed to improve calibration accuracy, 
the directional biases reported in the study have practical implications in terms of 
students’ probability judgments.    
 In an experimental study using prediction and postdiction judgments, Bol and her 
colleagues (2005) found that students in the overt calibration practice condition did not 
significantly improve their calibration accuracy when compared to students assigned to 
the no-practice condition. However, they reported that higher achieving students were 
significantly more accurate, yet underconfident, in their predictions whereas lower 
achieving students were less accurate and overconfident. Thus, this instructional 
intervention manipulating overt calibration practice had no effect on the accuracy of 
metacognitive judgments. This finding is particularly relevant to the proposed study, as it 
provides evidence that interventions to enhance calibration accuracy may not always be 
successful. However, Bol et al. did not include a pretest measure to establish group 
equivalence, which may have behaved as a confound in the study, thus undermining any 
potential intervention effects. On a follow-up study investigating the effects of extrinsic 
rewards and reflection on calibration accuracy, Hacker et al. (2008) found that high-
achieving students were highly accurate in their confidence judgments and did not exhibit 
significant increases in their calibration accuracy. Low-achieving students, on the other 
hand, were less accurate in their metacognitive judgments and gained modest increases in 
their calibration accuracy due to reflection. Interestingly, students in the incentives 
condition demonstrated significant gains in their calibration accuracy compared to those 
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in the no-incentives condition, although reflection on explanations for their cognitive 
judgments had no effect on calibration accuracy. These two studies are noteworthy 
because they included calibration accuracy training and incentives; however the mixed 
findings, especially as they relate to calibration accuracy justify the need to develop 
stronger, more appropriate interventions to enhance calibration accuracy.   
 In two experiments, Nietfeld and Schraw (2002) tested the influence of prior 
knowledge and strategy training on monitoring accuracy. Results suggest that knowledge 
of the domain was related positively to domain-specific performance and monitoring 
accuracy. Moreover, strategy training enhances performance, confidence, and monitoring 
accuracy irrespective of aptitude immediately following the intervention but not after a 
one-week delay post-intervention. In sum, this study demonstrated that performance, 
monitoring accuracy, and confidence scores were all enhanced by the intervention, which 
in turn supports the inference that metacognitive judgment skill enhancements are 
followed by concomitant increases in the accuracy of monitoring judgments. Of major 
significance to the present study, this research lent credence to the trainable hypothesis, 
which stipulates that short-term strategy training enhances monitoring accuracy, even 
when such strategy training is not explicit per se. 
 In an experiment manipulating cue familiarity and accessibility of FOK 
judgments, Koriat and Levy-Sadot (2001) posited that both cue familiarity and 
accessibility contribute to FOK; however whereas the effects of familiarity happen early, 
those of accessibility happen subsequently and only when cue familiarity is sufficiently 
high to drive the interrogation of memory for possible responses. They found that both 
familiarity and accessibility improved students’ FOK judgments, but the effects of 
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accessibility were found mostly when familiarity was high. This moderating pattern was 
found when FOK judgments were delayed, yet not when they were immediate. When 
considering interventions to enhance the accuracy of metacognitive judgments it is 
important to understand the influence of cue familiarity and accessibility on calibration 
accuracy, as the aforementioned research indicates.   
 Finally, Lodewyk, Winne, and Jamieson-Noel (2009) examined the influence of 
task structure on calibration accuracy. They found that students tended to calibrate their 
knowledge better in ill-structured versus well-structured problems, presumably because 
students reported greater metacognitive strategy use in the ill-structured problems 
compared to their performance on well-structured problems. In addition, low achieving 
students showed poorer calibration accuracy on both tasks compared to high achieving 
students who demonstrated more proficient calibration accuracy. Hence, it is valuable to 
the success of the intervention to acknowledge that tasks structure and the complexity of 
the task significantly influence not only the calibration process itself, but calibration 
accuracy as well.    
Summary and Conclusion 
 In conclusion, research demonstrates that students benefit from instruction 
targeted at improving metacognitive monitoring via more sophisticated strategy use and 
that several of these instructional interventions have been developed and successfully 
implemented. Furthermore, a preponderance of evidence exists suggesting that several 
instructional interventions specifically tailored to enhance the calibration accuracy of 
students’ metacognitive judgments in various domains (e.g., text comprehension, 
problem solving and reasoning, math) are successful, if only modestly. Nevertheless, 
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interventions targeted at improving calibration accuracy have yielded modest/weak effect 
sizes as indices of the explained variance in the outcome measures that can be attributed 
to the experimental manipulations. For instance, Hacker et al. (2008) reported effect sizes 
(η2) of 0.08 to 0.12 and Bol et al. (2005) found effect sizes ranging from 0.04 to 0.15. 
Moreover, Nietfeld et al. (2006) reported effect sizes ranging from 0.10 to 0.17. Hence, 
modest effect sizes in the present study would be in line with the body of literature on 
improving metacognitive judgments, albeit larger effect sizes may result.  
However, in order to develop and effectively implement such instructional 
interventions to enhance students’ accuracy of their metacognitive judgments, researchers 
need to consider other aspects beyond the intervention, including the influences on (e.g., 
properties of the testing environment, externally imposed processing constraints, and 
personal attributes of the learner) and mechanism for (e.g., relationship between the 
academic environment and domain knowledge) metacognitive strategy use, as these will 
influence not only the structure and type, but the effectiveness of selected interventions. 
Given that many of the interventions aimed at the enhancement of calibration accuracy 
reviewed here have resulted in inconclusive findings and/or small practical significance, 
it is necessary to continue to refine and modify them. By developing more sound and 
rigorous interventions that include various components such as training, incentives, and 
feedback, and which are subsequently implemented in an experimental context, many of 
the flaws in previous studies can be corrected.  
The Proposed Study 
Well-developed metacognitive skills are necessary to navigate the intricacies and 
heavy cognitive demands of modern life. Presumably, higher-order thinking skills such as 
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metacognition, critical thinking, and creative thinking and creativity contribute to the 
development and promotion of independent thinkers who are capable of critically 
consuming information in a fast-paced digital age, such as the present. With the 
environment rapidly in flux, highly metacognitive thinkers will become ever more 
necessary. For instance, metacognition plays a critical role in reading comprehension, 
writing, memory and metamemory, and problem-solving as well as other learning 
domains (Nietfeld et al., 2006; Schraw & Graham, 1997). Thus, metacognitively aware 
individuals can select appropriate problem-solving strategies in the service of learning 
and allocate resources effectively by invoking skills such as planning, monitoring, and 
evaluation. Moreover, metacognition affords individuals the ability to monitor their 
current knowledge and skills, plan and distribute cognitive resources efficiently, and 
evaluate the learning process (Schraw et al., 2006). Finally, metacognition places the 
individual at the very center of his cognitive processes as a reflective, volitional, and 
knowledgeable individual in control of his own thoughts and actions predicated on the 
strategies to problem solve derived from those thoughts (self-monitoring). This self-
monitoring component allows learners to invoke self-regulatory schemes to intentionally 
and deliberately choose strategies that maximize the likelihood of success in a task or 
finding a solution to a problem (Reynolds & Wade, 1986).   
This literature review has proposed that the NNMM (Nelson & Narens, 1990, 
1994) is an appropriate theoretical framework in which to situate the present study on the 
enhancement of calibration accuracy among adult learners, more specifically, college 
undergraduates. According to this perspective, more highly metacognitive thinkers have 
more refined monitoring (information-gathering) of the environment (the object-level) 
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which subsequently continuously informs the metal-level’s model (representation of the 
environment) of the object-level. Although still imperfect in terms of their representation 
of the environment and knowledge of their own internal processes, these highly 
metacognitive thinkers have a more perfect representation and increased awareness of 
their cognitive processes vis-à-vis their less metacognitive cohorts. Therefore, highly 
metacognitive students will be better able to engage in the calibration process and 
produce metacognitive judgments with more appropriate levels of confidence and greater 
accuracy than less metacognitive students. It is these less metacognitive students that are 
the main target audience for the proposed study.  
Description of Strategy Training and Incentives 
Strategy training. The strategy training component of the intervention involved 
providing students with instruction regarding more sophisticated and adaptive strategies 
that are more conducive to enhancing calibration accuracy. Examples of strategies that 
are part of the training include: (a) read and summarize in your own words; (b) use 
contextual cues in the items and responses, e.g., bolded, italicized, underlined, or 
capitalized words; and (c) using diagrams, graphs, tables, etc. These strategies were 
derived from a content analysis of the interviews and think aloud and they have been 
demonstrated to maximize improvements in calibration accuracy with respect to 
performance (e.g., Bol et al., 2005; Hacker et al., 2008; Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002), and 
hence, they are more spontaneous in nature. Once introduced and explained in detail, the 
strategies were scaffolded and demonstrated so that students perceived their value with 
respect to improved calibration accuracy. Finally, students were provided with an 
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opportunity to apply and to practice the skills/strategies to bolster their confidence in the 
application of said strategies/skills. 
Incentives. Although the literature regarding the role of incentives on calibration 
accuracy has spanned both external and internal reward structures, the present study 
focused exclusively on external incentives for more accurate performance. Participants in 
the strategy training and incentives and the incentives only groups were explicitly 
instructed that their pay would depend on how well they perform at posttest: “Your pay 
for participation in the experiment WILL depend on how WELL you perform on the 
assessment at posttest. “WELL” is defined as getting ≥ 80% of the items correctly.” The 
incentive involved a monetary reward of $10.00. From pilot study data of 76 
undergraduates, a median percentage of 79 was calculated for performance on the test. 
The median score was selected because it is not susceptible to undue influence by 
outliers, as would be the case with the mean. As such, students need to answer at least 
80% of the items correctly on the performance assessment at posttest to receive the 
incentive. This procedure permits the isolation of the true influence of incentives on 
calibration accuracy with respect to performance.        
Proposed Research Question 
 The following research question guided the conduct of the proposed study: 
Are the proposed interventions, including metacognitive strategy training and incentives, 
effective at increasing the accuracy of students’ metacognitive judgments?  
Hypotheses 
 Predicated on the aforementioned question, the following hypotheses are 
proposed: 
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 H1: With respect to the combination of the strategy training and incentives 
manipulations, I hypothesize that the interactive effect will yield more accurate 
calibration, higher performance, and higher levels of confidence at posttest for the groups 
that are exposed to the combined interventions. Interestingly, Hacker et al. (2008) did not 
find an interaction effect between their training and incentives conditions. However, there 
is reason to believe that a combination of the two conditions in the present study will lead 
to improved performance, calibration, and confidence. When combined, strategy training 
and incentives positively influence both the information-gathering (monitoring) and 
control processes of the NNMM. These more effective monitoring and control processes 
in turn lead to better performance, presumably due to increased accuracy (i.e., more 
accurate confidence judgments).  
 H2: The proposed strategy training is predicted to enhance the calibration 
accuracy of students’ metacognitive judgments at posttest (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992; 
Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994). It is noteworthy to mention 
that Bol and her colleagues (2005) and Henrion et al. (1993) found that their training was 
not successful at enhancing calibration accuracy.  
 H3: Incentives are expected to positively influence calibration in such a way as to 
enhance accuracy (e.g., Hacker et al., 2008; Hogarth et al., 1991; Schraw et al., 1993; 
Yates, 1990). However, the findings regarding incentives also have been inconclusive, as 
some studies suggest it has no effect on monitoring accuracy (Hogarth et al., 1991).  
These mixed findings with respect to the effects incentives on the enhancement of 
calibration accuracy warrant further investigation, which this study proposes to achieve. 
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 H4: Moreover, students’ performance on learning tasks, such as tests/exams, is 
expected to increase for those exposed to the strategy training and incentives 
interventions. As students’ monitoring and control is enhanced due to the effects of the 
strategy training and incentives, as proposed by the NNMM, their subsequent 
performance on learning tasks is likely to improve as well (e.g., Hacker et al., 2008; 
Henrion et al., 1993; Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002). Enhanced information-gathering 
capabilities increase metacognitive awareness because the metal-level’s model of the 
object-level is more precise. As a result of this more accurate model, students’ control 
capabilities (e.g., applying appropriate and effective strategies while learning) are 
concomitantly enhanced, which consequently leads to improved performance.           
Situating the Hypotheses within the Nelson and Narens Model of Metacognition 
 The four hypotheses described above can be explained in terms of metacognitive 
processes modeled within the NNMM.  When learners are explicitly taught more 
sophisticated and specific strategies intended to produce good calibration accuracy their 
ability to gain a better understanding of their own internal cognitive processes will be 
enhanced. As they become more aware of their inner functioning, the NNMM suggests 
that learners’ information-gathering (monitoring) capability and ability to modify the 
environment (control) will be augmented. The delayed judgment effect, for instance, 
describes situations in which individuals’ accuracy improves, which allows for rehearsal 
and the opportunity for meaningful learning of strategies. Presumably this increased 
processing time has a positive effect on performance due to better accuracy caused by 
greater awareness of one’s internal processes (i.e., monitoring and control).  
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 Likewise, extrinsic and intrinsic incentives have been shown to have positive 
effects on performance (e.g., Hogarth et al., 1991) and calibration accuracy (e.g., Hacker 
et al., 2008), arguably because of intensified effort and motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985) 
on the part of the learner. Extrinsic rewards, as the exclusive form of incentives in the 
present study, should positively affect calibration accuracy as well. Conceivably this is 
achieved by motivating students to exert additional effort to hone their monitoring and 
control capabilities, thereby enhancing calibration accuracy, which should subsequently 
improve performance.  
 Therefore, whereas strategy training directly influences monitoring and control, 
and subsequently calibration accuracy and performance through greater self-regulation, 
incentives do so indirectly through motivational factors. In summary, the argument 
proffered is that both strategy training and incentives enhance individuals’ control and 
monitoring processes through greater, clearer insight to their own internal cognitive 
functioning, thereby improving calibration accuracy, resulting in improved performance. 
However, it is important to note that extrinsic incentives are intended to lead to higher 
performance as a vehicle to better accuracy. This can be succinctly conceptualized as 
follows: 
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Figure 3. The hypothesized explanatory trajectory of antecedents, calibration, and 
outcomes based on the two manipulations of strategy training and incentives used in the 
study. These are predicated on theoretical claims of the Nelson and Narens Model of 
Metacogniton.  
 Table 3 summarizes how strategy training and incentives influence the control 
and monitoring functions of the NNMM, which subsequently affect calibration accuracy.  
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Table 3  
Summary of the Effects of Strategy Training and Incentives on the Control and 
Monitoring Processes within the Nelson and Narens Model of Metacognition 
Predicted 
Implicit 
Processes in 
each 
Hypothesis 
 
Strategy Training Condition Incentives Condition 
H1: 
Monitoring 
and Control 
 
 
Through the combined effects of strategy training and extrinsic incentives 
combined, learners are able to not only meaningfully learn and retain strategies 
to yield better accuracy through improved performance (information-gathering 
or monitoring) but also have the disposition/desire to apply those calibration 
strategies (modify or control their environment)  
 
H2: 
Monitoring 
 
A greater repertoire of strategies that 
are meaningful and sophisticated 
increases learners’ information-
gathering capabilities which should 
make their metacognitive judgments 
more accurate. It is important to keep 
in mind that as highly related 
elements, what influences bias will 
affect accuracy and vice-versa  
 
H3: Control  
 Extrinsic incentives are expected to 
motivate learners to want to enhance 
their control capabilities. As such, an 
augmented control function should 
result in greater accuracy  
 
H4: Control 
and 
Monitoring 
Deeper insight to their internal 
cognitive processes afforded by 
strategy training leads to enhanced 
control and monitoring functions, and 
greater awareness of their capabilities 
is expected to increase accuracy, 
thereby resulting in better 
performance 
As learners’ desire to enhance their 
monitoring and control capabilities 
increases—leading to better 
accuracy—their performance on 
tests/exams is predicted to improve  
 
Contributions of the Present Study to the Literature 
 While previous studies on the enhancement of calibration accuracy have involved 
a plethora of different interventions, the proposed study will involve a distinct training 
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program. The training that is included as part of the intervention was developed from a 
pilot study I conducted during the Spring 2011 semester with college undergraduates. 
The mixed methods study involved a structured interview and a think-aloud protocol in 
which five proficient and four poor calibrators were selected to participate based on their 
quantitative prediction and postdiction scores. From these qualitative data, successful 
(versus unsuccessful) strategies, cues, and skills were extracted, which form an integral 
and innovative aspect of the proposed intervention. These strategies and skills are likely 
to be successful across a diverse range of undergraduates because they were 
spontaneously developed by the students themselves. Moreover, every attempt was made 
to include undergraduates with different cognitive styles, dispositions, and profiles as part 
of the pilot study. Incentives also form part of the proposed intervention. These are used 
to ascertain their influence on confidence, accuracy, and performance. As previously 
highlighted, the research has been mixed in terms of not only the effects of various 
training programs, but also the influence of incentives. Hence, this study will contribute 
to the literature by providing additional evidence as to the influence of incentives and 
training on the calibration accuracy of college undergraduates. 
 Likewise, the proposed study contributes to theory by affirming the utility and 
value of the NNMM (Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994), which recently has fallen under 
heavy criticism by calibration scholars and researchers (Boekaerts & Rozendaal, 2010; 
Efklides, 2011). The process of calibration as well as calibration accuracy are influenced 
and explained by the processes described in the model, as enumerated throughout this 
discussion. For instance, because of our inability to perfectly and accurately represent the 
environment (object-level) in the meta-level’s model, even the most highly metacognitive 
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learners are prone to some level of inaccuracy and bias in their metacognitive judgments. 
This imprecise monitoring (information-gathering) and limited control (ability to modify 
and adjust the environment) functions inevitably have profound consequences for 
learners’ ability to engage in the calibration process and on the accuracy of their 
metacognitive judgments. It is for these very reasons that the proposed intervention is 
necessary. Highly metacognitive learners who exhibit high accuracy are without a doubt 
better able to monitor their environment, inform the meta-level’s model, and make 
appropriate adjustments and modifications to their environment, thus subsequently 
yielding better learning and achievement outcomes. This is the ultimate goal of 
educational research, and this study contributes to the fulfillment of this goal. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
Participants and Setting 
 An a priori power analysis with power equaling .80, a p-value of .05, and a 
medium effect size yielded a total of 128 participants as adequate power for this design. 
However, every attempt was made to recruit sufficient participants, taking into account a 
20% attrition rate, in order to find statistical and practical significance. Because such 
large samples would be difficult to secure utilizing only the Educational Psychology 
Experiment Management System, participants were also recruited from the Department 
of Psychology’s subject pool. Appropriate permissions were secured from the 
Department of Psychology Subject Pool Coordinator. Therefore, participants were 
undergraduate students enrolled in either general psychology or educational psychology 
courses.  
 One hundred-sixty participants were recruited to participate in the study. 
Participants’ age ranged from 18-65 years (M = 22.76, SD = 7.15). There were 49 male 
(30.6%) and 111 female (69.4%) participants, nearly half of them [77 (48.1%)] reporting 
enrollment in education-related majors ranging from early-childhood education to 
secondary education. The remaining 83 participants (51.9%) reported majors ranging 
from engineering to hospitality to art therapy. Participants varied with respect to 
undergraduate standing, with 25 (15.6%) freshmen, 50 (31.3%) sophomores, 56 (35.0%) 
juniors, and 29 (18.1%) seniors. Finally, slightly fewer than half of participants [71 
(44.4%)] reported their ethnicity as White/Caucasian, 32 (20%) reported Hispanic/Latino, 
5 (3.1%) reported African American/Black, 35 (21.9%) reported Asian/Pacific Islander, 1 
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(0.6%) reported Native American/Alaskan Native, and 16 (10.0%) reported Other/Mixed. 
Nevertheless, approximately 30% of participants were lost to attrition, yielding 107 cases 
with complete data. Little and Rubin (1987) argue that this level of attrition in studies 
using repeated measures designs or some variation is typical.         
Design and Materials 
The study design is a four-group pretest-posttest experimental design, in which 
two levels of the strategy training intervention are crossed with two levels of the 
incentives intervention. Additionally, a pretest and posttest were administered to ascertain 
whether the intervention was effective at improving the accuracy of students’ 
metacognitive judgments. At pretest, individuals read a passage, answered 20 multiple 
choice items, and rated their confidence of performance for each test item.  At posttest, 
individuals reread the passage, answered 40 multiple choice items, and rated their 
confidence of performance on the items. Twenty of the posttest questions constituted 
“old” items that followed the pretest, while 20 items constituted “new” items. Figure 4 
presents a schematic of this design.   
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Figure 4. A schematic of the proposed intervention, including the four-group breakdown 
with respect to the two components of the intervention, strategy training and incentives.   
Table 4 presents a summary of strategies that are included in the strategy training 
component of the intervention as well as the level of processing, the affected calibration 
component, the NNMM function in operation, and the hypothesized influence of each 
strategy on calibration.  
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Table 4  
Summary of Metacognitive Strategies and their Relation to Calibration and Theory  
Strategy 
 
Affected 
Calibration 
Component  
 
NNMM Function 
in Operation  Hypothesized Influence on Calibration 
Review main objectives of 
the text and focus on main 
ideas and overall meaning 
 
Both Monitoring Enhance calibration through clarifying 
misunderstandings and tying details to 
main ideas 
Read and summarize 
material in your own 
words to make it 
meaningful; use 
elaboration and create 
your own examples 
 
Both Both Enhances calibration by transforming 
knowledge into something personally 
meaningful 
Reread questions and 
responses and reflect on 
what the question is 
asking; go through and 
take apart the question 
paying attention to 
relevant concepts  
 
Both Both Purposefully slowing information 
processing allows for a more accurate 
representation of the problem, thus 
decreasing errors in judgment 
Use contextual cues in the 
items and responses, e.g., 
bolded, italicized, 
underlined, or capitalized 
words 
 
Accuracy Monitoring Using contextual cues allows the mind 
to focus on salient aspects of the 
problem rather than seductive details, 
thereby increasing accuracy 
Highlight text; underline 
keywords within the 
question to remind 
yourself to pay attention 
to them; use different 
colors to represent 
different meanings 
 
Accuracy Control Highlighting and underlining can assist 
one to focus on main ideas and what is 
truly important, increasing accuracy; 
however, relying too much on this can 
be counterproductive and may 
potentially increase errors 
Relate similar test 
questions together and 
read them all before 
responding to any 
Accuracy Control Relating information together provides a 
clearer understanding of the material and 
may highlight inconsistencies that need 
to be resolved; it may point to 
information the learner may have 
missed, increasing accuracy 
 
Use diagrams, tables, 
pictures, graphs, etc. to 
help you organize 
information 
Accuracy Both These strategies help simplify complex 
topics by breaking them down to their 
constituent parts; this increases accuracy 
by decreasing errors 
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 The proposed intervention incorporates several aspects from interventions 
previously demonstrated to be successful at improving students’ metacognitive 
judgments, as thoroughly discussed in the previous chapter. Nietfeld and Schraw (2002) 
and Schraw (1998) argued that direct strategy instruction is effective at enhancing 
metacognitive judgments. For instance, Schraw (1998) asserted that instructional 
strategies, such as promoting general metacognitive awareness and improving self-
knowledge and regulatory skills, lead to enhanced metacognition; this improved 
metacognitive awareness should subsequently positively influences students’ 
metacognitive judgments. Likewise, Nietfeld and Schraw (2002) found that a short 
strategy training session was effective at increasing both domain-specific content 
knowledge and accuracy of metacognitive judgments. Strategy instruction included 
training on improving self-knowledge and regulatory skills (i.e., monitoring accuracy). 
These studies have demonstrated that strategies similar to the seven strategies illustrated 
in Table 4 are the most effective at increasing calibration accuracy with respect to 
performance.   
  Offering students incentives has also been shown to increase the accuracy of 
calibration (e.g., Hacker et al., 2008; Hogarth et al., 1991; Schraw et al., 1993; Yates, 
1990). Hacker and his associates (2008) and Schraw and his colleagues (1993) reported 
that students in the incentives condition demonstrated significant gains in their calibration 
accuracy when compared to those in the no-incentives condition. Therefore, incentives 
also play a role in the proposed intervention. More specifically, students randomly 
assigned to the incentives conditions will receive rewards to ascertain the effect of 
incentives on metacognitive judgments.  
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Demographics 
A brief, researcher-developed demographic form (see Appendix A) was utilized 
to obtain demographic information from participants. This form included questions 
soliciting participants’ gender, age (on a continuum), major, ethnic identity, and 
undergraduate standing. These demographic variables were used to describe the 
population.   
General Metacognitive Awareness 
 The eight components of metacognition (i.e., knowledge of cognition: declarative, 
procedural, and conditional; regulation of cognition: planning, monitoring, debugging, 
information management, and evaluation) were measured using the Metacognitive 
Awareness Inventory (MAI; see Appendix B) developed by Schraw and Dennison 
(1994). The MAI is a 52-item instrument which measures domain-general metacognition 
through its constituent components. Sample items include: “I ask myself periodically if I 
am meeting my goals” (monitoring); “I try to use strategies that have worked in the past” 
(procedural knowledge); “I reevaluate my assumptions when I get confused” 
(debugging); and “I ask myself if I have considered all options after I solve a problem” 
(information management).  
 Ratings on each item were marked by a vertical slash on a continuous 0-100 
bipolar (i.e., “not at all true of me” representing 0 and “very true of me” representing 
100) scale line that is 10 cm (i.e., 4 inches) in length. This rating scheme is superior to an 
ordinal Likert scale because it enhances the reliability of the instrument by increasing the 
variability of responses (Schraw & Dennison, 1994; Weaver, 1990). Each participant’s 
scores on the individual scales was derived by summing all the items from that scale and 
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taking the average. Hence, each participant had eight composite scores, one for each of 
the components of metacognition. The MAI has been used extensively as a measure of 
domain-general metacognitive awareness; studies using this instrument have consistently 
reported internal consistency reliability coefficients above 0.75 for all of the scales. 
Moreover, the MAI has been validated via exploratory factor analyses with common 
factor extraction methods with oblique rotations, and it has demonstrated good construct 
validity (see Schraw & Dennison, 1994).  
In spite of the argument that metacognition can be conceptualized as eight 
dimensions—three under knowledge of cognition and five under the regulation of 
cognition—Schraw and Dennison (1994) concluded that their two validation experiments 
for the MAI demonstrated little support for an eight-scale instrument. Instead, their 
results supported a two-factor solution separating metacognition into two components, 
knowledge of cognition and regulation of cognition. Therefore the three knowledge 
scales and the five regulation scales were collapsed to form one knowledge score and one 
regulation score. For the present study, the two MAI scales demonstrated high internal 
consistency reliability—Knowledge Scale, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87; Regulation Scale, 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.92. This demonstrates that respondents provided consistent 
responses across the two dimensions of metacognition as measured by the MAI, 
suggesting low measurement error in the hypothesized constructs.   
Calibration 
Calibration accuracy was assessed using a continuous scale. Schraw (2009b) 
posits that metacognitive judgments can be understood in terms of absolute and relative 
accuracy. Absolute accuracy measures the precision of a confidence judgment vis-à-vis 
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performance on a criterion task.  Absolute accuracy is the discrepancy between a 
confidence judgment and performance and it is obtained by computing the squared 
deviation between confidence and performance on the same scale.  Smaller deviations 
correspond to better accuracy.  This is a measure of “absolute” accuracy in the sense that 
a student’s confidence judgment is compared in an absolute fashion to his or her 
performance on the same task.   
Participants were asked to make continuous confidence judgments on a 0-100 
point scale on an item-by-item basis (see Appendix C) on a 100 millimeter bipolar scale 
(0% Confidence to 100% Confidence). This maintained a ratio scale rather than rely on 
the Gamma coefficient which is a 2x2 matrix of correct versus incorrect responses which 
is subsequently compared to either low or high confidence. Confidence scores were 
averaged across all items to obtain a confidence score composite. This score was 
subsequently compared against the proportion (i.e., percentage) of correct responses. 
Therefore, accuracy was evaluated by calculating the continuous difference score 
between the confidence judgment and actual performance (i.e., squared difference).   
Performance 
 The performance outcome was measured using a declarative knowledge test 
adapted by the researcher with the permission of the instructors who developed the tests 
(see Appendix C). The test included 40 multiple choice items with four responses per 
item (a correct response and three distractors), which all participants completed. Having 
all participants complete the same test ensures equity and obviates potential confounds. 
The test covers topics pertaining to general psychology, such as classical conditioning, 
cognitivism, information processing, memory, and metacognition.  
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For analytic purposes, the correct response to each item was coded as “1” whereas 
the incorrect response was coded as “0”, thereby yielding a dichotomous coding scheme. 
Each participant’s raw scores at pretest and posttest were computed by summing the total 
across all items such that performance ranged from 0-20 at pretest and 0-40 at posttest. In 
an effort to facilitate pretest and posttest performance comparisons, raw scores were 
transformed to proportions of correct responses by dividing the number of correct 
responses by the total number of items and multiplying the total by 100 to obtain a 
percentage of items with a correct response. Cronbach’s alpha becomes the Kuder-
Richardson (KR) 20 formula when assessing the internal consistency reliability of items 
with dichotomous response sets (SPSS, 2010). The KR 20 internal consistency reliability 
for the pretest was 0.60. The KR 20 reliability for the posttest items was as follows: first 
20 items (i.e., same items as pretest) = 0.68; last 20 items = 0.62; and for all 40 items 
combined = 0.78.  Reliability coefficients of ≥ 0.70 are considered good (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007).        
Strategy Training Manipulation Fidelity Check 
 A seven-item Strategy Training Fidelity Check scale developed by the researcher 
was used to ascertain the utility and relevance of the strategy training manipulation with 
respect to improving performance and calibration accuracy from the perspective of the 
participants randomized into the strategy training condition (see Appendix H). Sample 
items included, “The strategy training was clear and understandable.” and “Overall, I feel 
that the strategy training has adequately prepared me to increase the accuracy and 
confidence of my calibration of performance judgments.” Participants responded to the 
items on a 4-point Likert scale as follows: 1, “Strongly Disagree”; 2, “Disagree”; 3, 
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“Agree”; and 4, “Strongly Agree”. The higher the mean on the fidelity check, the higher 
the utility and relevance of the strategy training condition to the improvement of 
performance and calibration accuracy whereas a lower mean suggests lower utility and 
relevance. Internal consistency reliability for this scale was high, Cronbach’s alpha = 
0.92.     
Procedures 
The appropriate permissions were obtained from the Psychology Department’s 
subject pool coordinator and the Experiment Management System administrator. 
Subsequently, an institutional review board (IRB) protocol was prepared and submitted; 
the university’s IRB approved the dissertation research study as “Exempt” (see Appendix 
D). Students recruited to the study were randomly assigned to either one of four groups—
incentives, no incentives; strategy training or no training—making every effort to have 
equal sample sizes in each group. Table 5 contains a list of step-by-step activities that 
each of the four experimental groups experienced.  
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Table 5 
Summary of Activities by Experimental Group 
Experimental 
Session 
Experimental Group 
 
 Strategy Training and 
Incentives 
Strategy Training Only Incentives Only Control 
Session 1 1. Read and sign 
informed consent 
2. Read stimulus 
3. Complete pretest 
measures 
4. Receive an 
overview/advance 
organizer of strategies 
covered during training 
session 
5. Receive instructions 
related to posttest 
performance to receive 
incentive 
1. Read and sign 
informed consent 
2. Read stimulus 
3. Complete pretest 
measures 
4. Receive an 
overview/advance 
organizer of strategies 
covered during training 
session 
1. Read and sign 
informed 
consent 
2. Read stimulus 
3. Complete 
pretest measures 
4. Receive 
instructions 
related to 
posttest 
performance to 
receive 
incentive 
1. Read and 
sign 
informed 
consent 
2. Read 
stimulus 
3. Complete 
pretest 
measures 
 
Session 2 
 
1. PowerPoint 
presentation providing an 
overview of strategies 
2. Each strategy will be 
separately introduced, 
discussed/ scaffolded, and 
demonstrated 
3. After instruction, 
students will be provided 
psychology texts and a 
practice test unrelated to 
the study to apply and 
practice learned strategies 
4. Students will be 
allowed to ask questions 
throughout 
5. A brief summary of 
instruction will be 
provided at the end of the 
session     
 
1. PowerPoint 
presentation providing an 
overview of strategies 
2. Each strategy will be 
separately introduced, 
discussed/ scaffolded, and 
demonstrated 
3. After instruction, 
students will be provided 
psychology texts and a 
practice test unrelated to 
the study to apply and 
practice learned strategies 
4. Students will be 
allowed to ask questions 
throughout 
5. A brief summary of 
instruction will be 
provided at the end of the 
session 
 
 
Watch a 
psychology-
related film  
 
Watch a 
psychology-
related film 
 
Session 3  
1. Receive a summary of 
strategy training 
completed in Session 2 
2. Read stimulus 
3. Complete posttest 
measures 
4. Receive incentive if the 
≥ 80% of items answered 
correctly criterion is met  
1. Receive a summary of 
strategy training 
completed in Session 2 
2. Read stimulus 
3. Complete posttest 
measures 
1. Read stimulus 
2. Complete 
posttest 
measures 
3. Receive 
incentive if the 
≥ 80% of items 
answered 
correctly 
criterion is met 
1. Read 
stimulus 
2. Complete 
pretest 
measures 
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Session 1 
All students completed the demographics form, MAI, and the performance 
assessment simultaneously in a one-hour session. This session served as a baseline pretest 
to establish group equivalence on general metacognitive awareness and performance as 
well as to gather calibration accuracy scores of performance prior to the experimental 
manipulations. Students reported to different classrooms based upon the random group to 
which they were assigned for experimental purposes.  All students completed the same 20 
of the 40 items of the performance assessment at pretest. Students were exposed to the 
same stimulus—a text containing information related to the test (Slavin, 2009)—prior to 
completing the test (see Appendix E). At the end of this session, students randomized to 
the strategy training and incentives group received an overview of the strategies that were 
covered in the one-hour training session as well as the instructions regarding incentives 
for posttest performance (i.e., ≥ 80% of the items correct). Namely, they were explicitly 
instructed that their payment would depend on how well they performed (i.e., better 
performance, as manifested by greater accuracy) at posttest: “Your pay for participation 
in the experiment WILL depend on how WELL you perform on the assessment at 
posttest. WELL is defined as getting ≥ 80% of the items correctly.”  
The incentive involved a monetary reward of $10.00 contingent upon higher 
levels of calibration accuracy with respect to test performance at posttest. The 80% 
criterion was obtained from pilot study data of 76 undergraduates. A median percentage 
of 79 was calculated for performance on the test from the pilot study. The median score 
was selected because it is not susceptible to undue influence by outliers, as would be the 
case with the mean. As such, students needed to correctly respond to at least 80% of the 
91 
items on the performance assessment at posttest to receive the incentive. Students in the 
strategy training only group were given an overview of the one-hour training whereas 
those in the incentives only group were furnished instructions regarding the incentives for 
better posttest performance. Finally, students in the control group were excused after 
completion of all measures.  
Session 2  
Instruction for those individuals in the strategy training and incentives as well as 
the strategy training only groups occurred in a one-hour session. The strategy training 
component of the intervention involved providing students with instruction regarding 
more sophisticated and adaptive strategies that are more conducive to enhancing 
calibration accuracy with respect to performance. Table 4 includes a summary list of 
strategies that are part of the strategy training component of the intervention. The training 
session involved direct instruction and individual practice in using strategies with 
scaffolded feedback in a face-to-face lecture format.  
First, students were provided with a brief introduction to the goal of the session 
and an overview of the types of strategies that would be covered. Next, the researcher 
covered each of the strategies separately. For each strategy, students were provided direct 
instruction that included explaining the strategy, identifying when it is applicable, and 
modeling as well as scaffolding the strategy so that students perceived its value with 
respect to improved calibration accuracy. Subsequently, students were provided 
opportunities to apply and practice each strategy covered during the session (see 
Appendix F) as well as a practice test (see Appendix G) to bolster their confidence in the 
application of the strategies. During this apply-practice part of each session, the 
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researcher walked around to provide additional guidance individually, where necessary. 
Students were afforded opportunities to ask questions and discuss strategies after they 
were introduced and modeled to clarify any misunderstandings.   
In sum, the session focused on strategy training, practice, and reflection via 
informational feedback. Following the strategy training, students in both the strategy 
training and incentives and strategy training only groups completed a brief strategy 
training fidelity check survey (see Appendix H) intended to gauge participants’ overall 
evaluation of the strategy training intervention. Students in the incentives only and 
control groups participated in an activity unrelated to the present study.     
This method of strategy training is warranted for two main reasons. First, the 
direct instruction affords students functional knowledge about strategies to enhance 
calibration accuracy regarding performance as well as when and why to apply them 
appropriately (conditional knowledge). Moreover, this approach furnishes students with 
an opportunity to actually practice and apply the newly internalized strategies as well as 
to receive scaffolding in the form of feedback and modeling. 
Session 3 
All students again read the stimulus text and completed the performance 
assessment simultaneously. Students were again placed in separate rooms. Those students 
in the strategy training and incentives and the strategy training only groups received an 
overview/summary of strategies covered during the training session (Session 2) before 
completing the assessment. All students first read the same stimulus as they were exposed 
to at pretest and completed the same 20 items on the performance assessment they 
completed at pretest as well as an additional 20 items to counter any potential testing 
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effects. All students, regardless of group, had the same time frame between the two data 
collection points to further control for any potential confounds.   
Data Analysis 
In order to address the objective of this study, a one-way analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) was conducted, with posttest performance serving as the dependent variable 
while statistically controlling for baseline performance. Moreover, two 2 (strategy 
training, no training) x 2 (incentives, no incentives) factorial mixed-model analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs) were conducted, with type of test (pretest, posttest) serving as the 
within-subjects factor. Confidence and calibration accuracy each served as a dependent 
variable in a separate analysis in keeping with the data-analysis strategy in previous 
experiments.   
Furthermore, a series of repeated measures analyses of variance (RM ANOVAs) 
were conducted to compare performance on the pretest (i.e., 20) and posttest (i.e., all 40) 
items. The first RM ANOVA compared performance on the 20 items given at pretest to 
those same 20 items given at posttest. The second RM ANOVA compared the 
performance on the 40 items given at posttest—that is, the previous 20 items given at 
pretest with the 20 items added at posttest. However, whereas the first analysis compared 
performance between pretest and posttest on the same 20 items, the second analysis was 
for posttest performance only—20 previous items compared to the 20 additional items. 
Correlations among all outcome variables were computed and reported as well.  
Data screening and assumption testing procedures proceeded by splitting the file 
by group and conducting these procedures for each group separately for each of the 
variables under consideration. This method is more accurate inasmuch as data screening 
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and assumption testing for the entire sample is meaningless when conducting between-
subjects analyses, as in the present study. Data screening was done by requesting box 
plots by group. Deletion of outliers from the dataset is preferred over transformation 
because transforming the variables in an attempt to normalize data complicates 
interpretation because the data is no longer in its original scale (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007); however, deletion of outliers may not be possible in situations in which deleting 
the outliers would lead to a severe loss of power—that is, datasets with smaller numbers 
of cases.  
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) warn that leaving outliers untreated is inappropriate 
because they unduly influence group means with respect to the outcome variables, and 
thus, they lead to results that are misleading and inaccurate. Reporting such misleading 
results is an unethical practice. For the present study, data screening detected no outliers 
that would undermine the trustworthiness of the data. Furthermore, the data met all 
requisite assumptions, including normality (all skewness and kurtosis values were <|2|) 
and homogeneity of error variance (all p-values were > .05 for Levene’s Test) for each of 
the outcome variables by group as well as homogeneity of regression coefficients and 
sphericity. Therefore, data analysis proceeded as planned with all 107 cases.     
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
Participant Attrition at Posttest 
 In order to strengthen the trustworthiness of the data, analyses were conducted to 
verify the absence of non-random sampling bias as well as to establish equality of 
outcome means at pretest—in which data were available for all 160 participants—
between participants who remained in the study and participants who were lost to 
attrition at posttest. These analyses were conducted prior to any data analysis with respect 
to the research question of the present study. Results of these preliminary analyses 
follow.    
Little’s MCAR χ2 Test 
 In an effort to verify that the missing data pattern was missing completely at 
random (MCAR), Little's MCAR χ2 statistics (Little & Rubin, 1989; Schaeffer & 
Graham, 2002) were requested from the missing values analysis for each group 
separately. A significant χ2 (i.e., p < 0.05) would suggest that the pattern of missing data 
is not MCAR (i.e., missing not at random (MNAR)], which poses a problem for 
interpretation of results because they may be biased due to systematic differences in non-
responses. However, for the present study, all results were not statistically significant, all 
p-values ≥ 0.23, suggesting that the missingness pattern in the data was MCAR.     
Equality of Outcome Means at Baseline 
 A series of independent samples t-tests were conducted to ascertain whether there 
were any significant differences between those who completed the study and those who 
were lost to attrition. All p-values were adjusted accordingly using the Bonferroni 
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adjustment to obviate the inflation of familywise Type I error rate. There were no 
statistically significant differences between the two aforementioned groups with respect 
to any of the outcome measures at pretest, all p-values ≥ 0.19, suggesting the absence of 
non-random sampling bias in the data. Given these results, data analysis proceeded as 
planned with the 107 complete cases. 
Primary Analyses of the Present Study   
Equality Among Groups 
 A series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted to establish equivalence among 
the groups on the various baseline measures. For all analyses, strategy training (training, 
no training) and incentives (incentives, no incentives) served as the independent 
variables. All p-values were adjusted accordingly by analysis using the Bonferroni 
adjustment to obviate the inflation of familywise Type I error rate.    
Metacognitive awareness. Results demonstrated that there were no statistically 
significant differences among the groups in either condition with respect to the 
knowledge and regulation components of metacognitive awareness, all p-values ≥ 0.22. 
Although not significantly different, the strategy training group reported the highest 
knowledge mean score (M = 74.61, SD = 10.08) whereas the no incentives group reported 
the highest regulation mean score (M = 68.10, SD = 11.49) when compared to the other 
groups. Due to the lack of significance between the groups on these measures, neither 
metacognitive awareness component was included as a covariate in the remaining 
analyses.     
Performance. There were statistically significant differences with respect to 
performance between the groups for the strategy training condition, F(1,105) = 3.96, p = 
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.02, η2 = 0.05, with the strategy training group (M = 67.58, SD = 12.57) outperforming 
the no training group (M = 62.98, SD = 11.02), and the incentives condition, F(1,105) = 
4.06, p = .02, η2 = 0.05, in which the incentives group (M = 67.77, SD = 12.42) 
outperformed the no incentives group (M = 63.13, SD = 11.31). Therefore, pretest 
performance was statistically controlled in the analysis of posttest performance.    
Confidence. Results showed that there were no statistically significant differences 
on confidence judgments at baseline between the groups in either condition, all p-values 
≥ 0.44. Therefore, pretest confidence judgment score was not statistically controlled in 
subsequent analyses. 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Descriptive statistics (e.g., means and standard deviations) for all outcome 
measures are reported by group in Table 6. Zero-order correlations are reported for the 
strategy training group and the no training group in Table 7; Table 8 presents the 
correlations of the incentives group and the no incentives group.  
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics of Outcome Measures by Group 
  Group 1a  Group 2b  Group 3c  Group 4d  
 
Variable 
  
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
  
M 
 
SD 
 
 
MAI K 
  
74.61 
 
10.08 
  
72.09 
 
11.10 
  
73.34 
 
10.92 
  
73.67 
 
10.26 
 
MAI R  67.16 10.81  66.94 11.91  66.11 11.06  68.11 11.49  
PreP  67.58 12.57  62.93 11.01  67.77 12.43  63.14 11.31  
PreC  67.15 14.40  65.32 10.33  65.55 13.98  67.22 11.32  
PostP1  75.00 12.89  69.21 12.84  76.84 11.45  67.64 13.28  
PostP2  71.26 10.84  64.54 13.56  70.65 13.25  65.73 11.20  
PostP3  73.13 9.88  66.87 11.85  73.74 10.66  66.69 10.66  
PostC  73.58 10.60  71.66 12.54  73.46 13.32  71.95 9.10  
Calibration1  13.78 9.42  8.50 7.24  10.55 8.37  12.46 9.43  
Calibration2  7.84 5.20  9.65 6.75  7.90 5.39  9.44 6.51  
Note. MAI K=MAI Knowledge Scale; MAI R=MAI Regulation Scale; PreP=Pretest 
Performance; PreC=Pretest Confidence; PostP1=Posttest Performance First 20 Items 
Percentage; PostP2=Posttest Performance Latter 20 Items Percentage; PostP3=Posttest 
Performance All 40 Items Percentage; PostC=Posttest Confidence; Calibration1=Pretest 
Calibration Accuracy; Calibration2=Posttest Calibration Accuracy. 
a Strategy training, n=60; b No training, n=47. 
c Incentives, n=56; d No incentives, n=51. 
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Table 7  
Zero-Order Correlations for the Strategy Training and No Training Groups 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1. MAI K 
 
- 
 
.64** 
 
-.10 
 
.13 
 
-.15 
 
-.04 
 
-.12 
 
.07 
 
.05 
 
.01 
2. MAI R .78** - -.13 .15 -.26* -.16 -.26* -.11 .16 .00 
3. PreP -.03 -.13 - .23 .71** .47** .72** .36* -.32* -.26* 
4. PreC .14 .20 .50** - .16 .08 .15 .51** -.20 -.21 
5. PostP1 -.06 -.07 .63** .40** - .38** .86** .47** -.31* -.39** 
6. PostP2 .04 -.10 .51** .30* .61** - .80** .57** -.23 -.19 
7. PostP3 -.01 -.09 .64** .39** .89** .90** - .62** -.33* -.36** 
8. PostC .12 .16 .36* .64** .59** .61** .67** - -.44** -.31* 
9. Calibration1 -.04 .09 -.32* .17 -.14 -.30* -.25 -.02 - .46* 
10.Calibration2 .02 .16 -.41** .13 -.40** -.52** -.15 -.01 .68** - 
Note. Correlations above the diagonal are for the strategy training groupa and those below 
the diagonal are for the no training groupb. MAI K=MAI Knowledge Scale; MAI R=MAI 
Regulation Scale; PreP=Pretest Performance; PreC=Pretest Confidence; PostP1=Posttest 
Performance First 20 Items Percentage; PostP2=Posttest Performance Latter 20 Items 
Percentage; PostP3=Posttest Performance All 40 Items Percentage; PostC=Posttest 
Confidence; Calibration1=Pretest Calibration Accuracy; Calibration2=Posttest 
Calibration Accuracy.  
a n=60; b n=47  
*p<.05 **p<.01 (two-tailed) 
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Table 8 
Zero-Order Correlations for the Incentives and No Incentives Groups 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
1. MAI K 
 
- 
 
.71** 
 
-.04 
 
.09 
 
-.21 
 
.09 
 
-.05 
 
.10 
 
-.03 
 
-.01 
2. MAI R .73** - .00 .02 -.20 -.04 -.13 -.02 -.02 -.05 
3. PreP -.04 -.24 - .49** .73** .51** .71** .42** -.05 -.20 
4. PreC .22 .35* .13 - .51** .33* .48** .68** -.24 -.20 
5. PostP1 .06 -.09 .63** .06 - .49** .84** .64** -.08 -.40** 
6. PostP2 -.04 -.20 .45** -.03 .51** - .88** .65** .08 -.21 
7. PostP3 .01 -.16 .63** .02 .89** .85** - .75** .00 -.35* 
8. PostC .12 .11 .26 .32* .46** .48** .54** - -.21 -.44** 
9. Calibration1 .14 .24 -.42** .13 -.18 -.39** -.32* -.23 - .39** 
10.Calibration2 .00 .17 -.46** .06 -.39** -.58** -.54** .04 .51** - 
Note. Correlations above the diagonal are for incentives groupa and those below the 
diagonal are for no incentives groupb. MAI K=MAI Knowledge Scale; MAI R=MAI 
Regulation Scale; PreP=Pretest Performance; PreC=Pretest Confidence; PostP1=Posttest 
Performance First 20 Items Percentage; PostP2=Posttest Performance Latter 20 Items 
Percentage; PostP3=Posttest Performance All 40 Items Percentage; PostC=Posttest 
Confidence; Calibration1=Pretest Calibration Accuracy; Calibration2=Posttest 
Calibration Accuracy.  
a n=56; b n=51  
*p<.05 **p<.01 (two-tailed) 
 
Strategy Training Intervention Fidelity Check 
The strategy training fidelity check was administered to ascertain whether 
participants who received the strategy training perceived the strategy training to be useful 
and utilitarian with respect to improved performance, confidence, and calibration 
accuracy. Results demonstrated that both groups (M = 3.51, SD = 0.47) perceived the 
training to be highly useful, relevant, and utilitarian in helping them to improve 
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performance, confidence, and calibration accuracy, with the strategy training only group 
rating the training more favorably (M = 3.63, SD = 0.37) than the strategy training and 
incentives group (M = 3.38, SD = 0.56). An independent samples t-test demonstrated that 
this difference in rating between the groups was not statistically significant, p = 0.06. 
Comparison Between Pretest and Posttest Performance 
 Results of the first RM ANOVA between pretest performance and posttest 
performance on the same 20 items demonstrated that there were statistically significant 
differences across time, F(1,106) = 51.02, p < 0.0005, η2 = 0.33, with participants 
performing better at posttest (M = 72.45, SD = 13.13) than at pretest (M = 65.56, SD = 
12.08), as expected due to the role of feedback. The subsequent RM ANOVA results 
between the first 20 items at posttest—the same that were given at pretest—and the 20 
items that were unique to the posttest showed statistically significant differences, F(1,106) 
= 11.71, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.10, with participants exhibiting increased performance in the 
first 20 items (M = 72.45, SD = 13.13) when compared to the new items (M = 68.31, SD 
= 12.51) (i.e., new items participants had never been exposed to).   
Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Interventions 
 For the remaining analyses regarding the strategy training and incentives 
interventions, performance was the only pretest measure to exhibit significant differences 
between the four groups, whereas confidence and calibration accuracy did not. Hence, 
pretest performance was the only variable used as a covariate in the analysis of posttest 
performance.  
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 Performance  
The strategy training x incentives interaction with respect to posttest performance 
while controlling for pretest performance was statistically significant, F(1,102) = 6.61, p = 
0.03, η2p = 0.12. Simple main effects follow up analyses were requested with the 
Bonferroni adjustment for the inflation of familywise Type I error rate. The strategy 
training x incentives interaction within strategy training demonstrated that those who 
received strategy training and extrinsic incentives (M = 74.83, SD = 9.03) performed 
significantly better than those who received the incentives only with no training (M = 
68.47, SD = 8.51), F(1,102) = 7.26, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.15. The difference between those who 
received strategy training and no training with no incentive was not statistically 
significant, p = 0.69. The incentives simple main effects demonstrated that there were 
significant differences between those who received incentives and no incentives and also 
received strategy training, F(1,102) = 9.79, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.09, with those who received 
incentives performing better than those who did not. The difference between those who 
received incentives and no incentives with no training was not statistically significant, p = 
0.52. 
In addition, main effects were interpreted in the presence of an ordinal interaction. 
The strategy training main effect was statistically significant, F(1,102) = 4.59, p < 0.05, η2 
= 0.07, with the strategy training group (M = 72.65, SD = 9.88) outperforming the no 
training group (M = 68.37, SD = 11.85) at posttest. The incentive main effect was also 
statistically significant, F(1,102) = 6.52, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.08, with those in the extrinsic 
incentives condition (M = 71.97, SD = 10.66) performing better at posttest than those in 
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the no incentive condition (M = 68.05, SD = 10.66) (see Table 9 for adjusted means, 
unadjusted means, and standard deviations).    
 Interestingly, approximately 75% of the participants who received the extrinsic 
incentive for improved posttest performance (i.e., ≥ 80% of the items correct at posttest) 
were from the strategy training and incentives group whereas only about 25% were from 
the incentives only group.   
Table 9 
Adjusted and Unadjusted Results of Posttest Performance  
Group 1a  Group 2b  Group 3c  Group 4d 
 
M 1 
 
M 2 
 
SD 
  
M 1 
 
M 2 
 
SD 
  
M 1 
 
M 2 
 
SD 
  
M 1 
 
M 2 
 
SD 
 
72.65 
 
73.13 
 
9.88 
  
68.37 
 
66.87 
 
11.85 
  
71.97 
 
73.74 
 
10.66 
  
68.05 
 
66.69 
 
10.66 
a Strategy training, n=60; b No training, n=47; c Incentives, n=56; d No incentives, n=51 
1 Adjusted means; 2 Unadjusted means 
 
Confidence  
Results of the factorial mixed-model ANOVA with confidence as the dependent 
variable demonstrated that the strategy training x incentive x time interaction was 
statistically significant, F(1,103) = 6.26, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.10. Simple effects were requested 
following the significant interaction. An inspection of the simple effects of the strategy 
training x incentives x time interaction within strategy training demonstrated that the 
difference between the strategy training group (M = 76.88, SD = 11.31) and the no 
training group (M = 69.56, SD = 8.18) which received incentives, was statistically 
significant, F(1,103) = 7.65, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.07, with the strategy training group exhibiting 
greater confidence than the no training group at posttest. All other group comparisons 
were not statistically significant, all p-values ≥ 0.11. The simple effects analysis of 
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incentives was statistically significant, F(1,103) = 6.49, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.09, with those in 
the extrinsic incentives condition who received strategy training exhibiting higher 
confidence at posttest than those who did not receive the incentive. Those who received 
incentives and no strategy training (M = 74.64, SD = 9.48) also showed greater 
confidence at posttest than those who did not receive the incentive (M = 68.56, SD = 
14.67), F(1,103) = 4.54, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.06. All other mean comparisons were not 
significant, all p-values ≥ 0.41.  
The simple effects results of time demonstrated that the change in confidence 
across time was statistically significant for: the strategy training group that received 
incentives (Pretest: M = 66.82, SD = 14.93; Posttest: M = 76.88, SD = 11.31), F(1,103) = 
26.35, p < 0.0005, η2 = 0.21; the no training group which received incentives (Pretest: M 
= 63.72, SD = 12.58; Posttest: M = 68.56, SD = 14.67), F(1,103) = 4.26, p = 0.04, η2p = 
0.06; and the no training group that received no incentives (Pretest: M = 66.85, SD = 
7.56; Posttest: M = 74.64, SD = 9.48), F(1,103) = 11.50, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.12. The greatest 
gain in confidence across time was achieved by the strategy training group which also 
received incentives. The change in confidence across time for the strategy training group 
that received no incentives was not significant, p = 0.36.        
Calibration  
The factorial mixed-model ANOVA results with calibration accuracy as the 
dependent variable demonstrated a statistically significant ordinal strategy training x time 
interaction, F(1,103) = 25.37, p < 0.0005, η2p = 0.20. Neither the strategy training x 
incentive x time (p = 0.18) interaction nor the incentives x time interaction (p = 0.70) was 
significant. A review of the simple effects of strategy training demonstrated that the 
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difference between the strategy training group (M = 13.78, SD = 9.43) and the no training 
group (M = 8.50, SD = 7.25) was statistically significant at pretest, F(1,103) = 10.86, p = 
0.001, η2 = 0.11, with the strategy training group exhibiting the lowest overall calibration 
accuracy at pretest. Moreover, the difference between the strategy training group (M = 
7.84, SD = 5.20) and the no training group (M = 9.65, SD = 6.75) at posttest was 
significant, F(1,103) = 5.24, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.09, with the strategy training group exhibiting 
greater calibration accuracy than the no training group; the strategy training group also 
showed the highest overall calibration accuracy at posttest. 
The simple effects results of time demonstrated that the change in calibration 
accuracy across time was statistically significant for the strategy training group (Pretest: 
M = 13.97, SD = 9.42; Posttest: M = 7.90, SD = 5.49), F(1,103) = 40.79, p < 0.0005, η2 = 
0.28, with this group showing significantly improved calibration accuracy at posttest as 
well as the greatest improvement in calibration accuracy across time. The change in 
calibration accuracy across time for the no training group was not significant, p = 0.29.     
Significant main effects for time were also interpreted in the presence of an 
ordinal interaction. The time main effect was statistically significant, F(1,103) = 11.92, p < 
0.01, η2 = 0.13, with the strategy training group demonstrating significantly improved 
calibration accuracy at posttest (Pretest: M = 13.78, SD = 9.43; Posttest: M = 7.83, SD = 
5.20); neither the no training group nor the incentives and no incentives groups exhibited 
a significant change in calibration accuracy across time, albeit those in the incentives 
group exhibited higher accuracy at posttest than those in the no incentives group.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION  
 The main research objective of the present investigation was to examine the 
separate and interactive effects of two interventions with respect to performance, 
metacognitive confidence judgments, and calibration accuracy within the theoretical 
framework of the NNMM. Individuals were assigned randomly to conditions. The first 
intervention involved metacognitive strategy training in which undergraduate students 
received instruction on the seven strategies outlined in Table 4 for one hour. The second 
intervention consisted of an incentive manipulation in which individuals were told, if 
they performed at or better than 80% (i.e., at least 80% of the items answered correctly 
on the posttest performance assessment), they would receive a cash payment for their 
posttest performance. Evaluation of the influence of these four conditions—strategy 
training, no training; incentives, no incentives—on confidence, performance, and 
calibration accuracy was the primary goal of the present study.      
 I predicted that each intervention would have a positive effect on the 
aforementioned constructs with respect to the monitoring and control processes described 
in the NNMM. I expected the strategy training intervention to improve monitoring and 
the incentives to improve control through added attention to the use of these processes to 
self-regulate learning. Providing students with metacognitive training increases their 
comprehension monitoring, as they reflect and become more aware of their own internal 
cognitive processes. Extrinsic rewards, on the other hand, increase students’ motivation 
to more closely attend to the task. These interventions, therefore, aided students in more 
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precisely feeling what they know and what they do not know, thereby improving 
performance, confidence, and calibration accuracy.  
 With respect to the interaction between the strategy training and incentives 
manipulations and the type of test, I expected that those randomized into those conditions 
would exhibit more accurate calibration and increased performance and confidence at 
posttest when compared to those who were not. Moreover, I predicted that the proposed 
strategy training and incentives enhance the accuracy of students’ metacognitive 
judgments, presumably due to improved performance from baseline to posttest. Finally, 
students’ performance on learning tasks, such as tests/exams, was predicted to increase. 
Research Hypotheses  
 H1: With respect to the combination of the strategy training and incentives 
manipulations, I hypothesized that the interactive effect would yield more accurate 
calibration, higher performance, and higher levels of confidence at posttest for the groups 
that were exposed to the combined interventions. When combined, strategy training and 
incentives are expected to positively influence both the information-gathering 
(monitoring) and control processes of the NNMM. These more effective monitoring and 
control processes in turn lead to better performance, presumably due to increased 
accuracy (i.e., more accurate confidence judgments).  
 H2: The proposed strategy training was predicted to enhance the calibration 
accuracy of students’ metacognitive judgments at posttest.  
 H3: Incentives were expected to positively influence calibration in such a way as 
to enhance accuracy. 
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 H4: Moreover, students’ performance on learning tasks, such as tests/exams, was 
expected to increase for those exposed to the strategy training and incentives 
interventions. As students’ monitoring and control is enhanced due to the effects of the 
strategy training and incentives, as proposed by the NNMM, their subsequent 
performance on learning tasks is likely to improve as well. Enhanced information-
gathering capabilities increase metacognitive awareness because the metal-level’s model 
of the object-level is more precise. As a result of this more accurate model, students’ 
control capabilities (e.g., applying appropriate and effective strategies while learning) are 
concomitantly enhanced, which consequently leads to improved performance.  
Performance Outcomes 
 The interaction between the metacognitive strategy training and incentives was 
statistically significant with respect to posttest performance after adjusting for the effects 
of pretest performance. Those in the strategy training condition who also received 
incentives performed significantly better at posttest when compared to those who 
received training and no incentives. This supports the first prediction (H1) that strategy 
training and extrinsic incentives combined to have an interactive effect regarding posttest 
performance, as neither manipulation alone—either strategy training or incentives—
appear to be as effective as the two combined, with the combination of the manipulations 
yielding nearly double the effect size than either alone. The fourth hypothesis (H4) also 
received additional support from the main effects results, which indicated that those who 
received strategy training outperformed those who received no training; the same pattern 
was found in the incentives manipulation, in which those who received incentives 
performed significantly better than those who did not. Moreover, a larger majority of 
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those who received the incentive also received strategy training, further supporting H1. 
Therefore, the data support the notion that metacognitive strategy training and incentives 
positively influence student performance. These findings are in line with previous 
research on strategy training and incentives with respect to performance (e.g., Bol et al., 
2005; Hacker et al., 2008; Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002; Swanson, 1990; Yates, 1990).  
Confidence Outcomes 
 The hypothesis with respect to confidence judgments (H1) also received 
overwhelming support from the data. The groups which received strategy training and 
incentives and incentives only demonstrated an increase in confidence judgments from 
pretest to posttest. Interestingly, however, participants in the group which received 
neither manipulation (i.e., the control group) also exhibited a gain in confidence across 
time, although their confidence judgments were misaligned with their performance, thus 
showing high miscalibration.  
Equally as important, the strategy training and incentives group demonstrated the 
highest improvement in confidence judgments from pretest to posttest, suggesting that the 
combined effect of the strategy training and incentives manipulations was more powerful 
than either one alone, especially given that the change in confidence across time was not 
significant for the group that received strategy training with no incentives. The fact that 
the strategy training only group did not have a significant increase in confidence levels at 
posttest suggests that the incentives manipulation was more successful at improving 
confidence from pretest to posttest by enhancing the value of the strategy training 
manipulation. In terms of the NNMM, the extrinsic incentives augmented students’ 
comprehension monitoring (i.e., information-gathering capabilities) with respect to test 
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items, which allowed them to make adjustments to their confidence (control). In sum, the 
strategy training and incentives manipulations were effective at improving confidence 
from pretest to posttest, which is supported by the body of literature on confidence 
judgments (e.g., Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Maki et al., 1990; 
Mitchum & Kelley, 2010; Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006).  
Calibration Outcomes 
 Hypothesis 1 (H1) pertaining to the interaction between strategy training and 
incentives with respect to calibration accuracy did not receive support from the data, as 
only the metacognitive strategy training manipulation significantly improved calibration 
accuracy at posttest. However, this finding fully supports hypothesis 2 (H2). It is 
noteworthy to mention that the strategy training group demonstrated the poorest 
calibration accuracy at baseline when compared to the other three groups, including the 
no incentives/no training group. However, the strategy training group not only 
demonstrated improved calibration accuracy at posttest when compared to the no training 
group, but it also showed the greatest improvement in calibration accuracy overall. In 
contrast, the change in calibration accuracy across time for the no training group was not 
significant. Therefore, the strategy training group displayed significantly improved 
calibration accuracy at posttest as well as the greatest improvement in calibration 
accuracy across time, thus strongly supporting H2.  
Overall, extrinsic incentives did not significantly aid in the improvement of 
calibration accuracy, which supports the general findings of Hogarth et al. (1991) and 
Yates (1990); hence, hypothesis 3 (H3) found no support from the data. Nevertheless, the 
strategy training significantly increased calibration accuracy (H2). These findings are 
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congruent with research conducted by Bol et al. (2005) and Nietfeld and his colleagues 
(Nietfeld et al., 2006; Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002).               
Conclusions 
 There are several important conclusions that can be drawn from the results of the 
present study. First, external manipulations, such as metacognitive strategy training and 
extrinsic incentives, are successful at improving students’ performance as well as 
confidence in their performance. Previous research studies utilizing similar interventions 
have found that some form of instruction or training can successfully help learners to 
perform better due to increased confidence in what they know and do not know about the 
topic, presumably because of increased calibration accuracy in their confidence with 
respect to actual performance (e.g., Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992; Hacker et al., 2008; 
Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994; Nietfeld et al., 2006; Nietfeld 
& Schraw, 2002).  
 The research on the use of extrinsic incentives, however, has not been as 
definitive, as some studies have found that extrinsic rewards aid in improving 
performance and confidence (e.g., Hacker et al., 2008; Schraw et al., 1993; Yates, 1990) 
whereas others have found their effects to be inconsequential (e.g., Hogarth et al., 1991). 
The present research supported the former group of studies, as incentives were effective 
at improving performance and level of confidence in feeling-of-knowing judgments. 
Extrinsic incentives enhance students’ control capabilities by motivating them to slow 
down their cognitive processing, thus allowing them to more closely attend to what test 
items are actually asking. Consequently, they are able to better comprehend, yielding not 
only increased performance but increased levels of confidence through increased control.  
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Nevertheless, very few studies have combined the use of instruction or training and 
extrinsic incentives (e.g., Bol et al., 2005; Hacker et al., 2008) with the express purpose 
of improving performance and/or confidence judgments. Therefore, the present study 
demonstrated that combining these two interventions can effectively help undergraduate 
students to exhibit better performance and increased confidence. 
 Moreover, extrinsic incentives do not seem to affect calibration accuracy, which 
is supported by work conducted by Hacker et al. (2008) and Hogarth et al. (1991). The 
explanations as to why incentives assist in the improvement of performance and 
confidence yet not calibration accuracy remain unclear. One possible explanation is that 
incentives focus the learner’s attention on performance outcomes rather than confidence 
or calibration accuracy per se. More specifically, providing instructions that improved 
performance would lead to an extrinsic incentives may have focused students’ attention 
directly on performance, and perhaps only implicitly on confidence and calibration 
accuracy. Therefore, although it led to higher performance at posttest, incentives may not 
have necessarily led to improved performance because students’ confidence judgments 
relative to performance may still have been somewhat inaccurate. The inclusion of 
calibration bias may help clarify this matter.  
 The metacognitive strategy training component of the study, however, was 
effective at improving the calibration accuracy of undergraduate students from pretest to 
posttest, which supports work done by Nietfeld and associates (e.g., Nietfeld et al., 2006; 
Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002) but runs counter to the research of Hacker and his colleagues 
(Bol et al., 2005; Hacker et al., 2008), who found no significant differences between the 
training and no training group. However, it is important to note that, unlike the present 
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study, these two latter studies were conducted in a quasi-experimental framework, which 
may have created issues of internal validity and help explain the lack of significance 
between-groups with respect to calibration accuracy.  
 In sum, although previous research on calibration accuracy using similar 
interventions has yielded somewhat mixed findings, especially as they pertain to accuracy 
of performance, the present study supports the contention that metacognitive strategy 
training and extrinsic rewards can be invoked in college classrooms to improve not only 
the performance and confidence in performance judgments of undergraduates but the 
accuracy of those judgments vis-à-vis performance as well.  
Theory and the Advancement of Knowledge 
Contributions to Theory      
 The NNMM has been the prevailing theoretical framework in the literature on 
calibration since its inception in 1990. However, the NNMM has recently fallen under 
heavy criticism by calibration scholars and researchers as simplistic and lacking (e.g., 
Boekaerts & Razendaal, 2010; Efklides, 2011). For instance, the model treats 
metacognition as essentially a unidimensional construct, and it does not adequately 
distinguish whether and how students process correct and incorrect responses differently 
(Schraw, Kuch, & Gutierrez, 2012). This distinction is necessary for the calibration 
process, especially as students gauge levels of confidence in their performance for 
purposes of determining accuracy. Nevertheless, with little empirical evidence with 
respect to the superiority of alternative frameworks, the NNMM is appropriate to help 
explain the findings of the present study.  
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 The results of this study suggest that the metacognitive strategy training 
intervention enhances the monitoring and control processes in the NNMM. The strategies 
learned during the training aided students in being more alert and attentive to the task by 
deliberately slowing down cognitive processing, which improves reflection and 
awareness of one’s internal cognitive processes. This, in turn, allowed students to more 
accurately and effectively gather information regarding the assessment, such as what the 
performance assessment items were truly asking. Consequently, they were able to more 
precisely feel what they knew and did not know about the concepts the items were 
tapping, and thus, were better able to respond to the items and adjust confidence 
accordingly to yield better accuracy, when their confidence judgments were compared to 
actual performance. This clearly shows how the strategy training influenced students’ 
monitoring capabilities, which is congruent with the NNMM.     
 Offering students a reward as an incentive to rehearse the metacognitive strategies 
led to significantly improved performance and the level of confidence of their 
metacognitive judgments (e.g., Hacker et al., 2008; Hogarth et al., 1991; Nietfeld & 
Schraw, 2002; Swanson, 1990; Yates, 1990). As predicted, incentives increased students’ 
motivation to more meaningfully learn strategies provided during training. Therefore, 
incentives positively affected students’ information-gathering capabilities by permitting 
them to learn strategies to improve calibration accuracy in a more in-depth manner, 
thereby enhancing the monitoring function of the NNMM. Furthermore, incentives were 
found to influence students’ performance. It appears that incentives helped students to 
apply the strategies to actually improve their performance and degree of confidence, thus 
positively influencing the control function of the NNMM.   
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 In sum, enhanced information-gathering capabilities increased metacognitive 
awareness because the metal-level’s model of the object-level was more precise for the 
students exposed to the manipulations. As a result of this more accurate model, students’ 
control capabilities (e.g., applying appropriate and effective strategies while learning) 
were concomitantly enhanced, which consequently led to improved performance, 
presumably due to increased accuracy. 
Advancement of Knowledge on Calibration 
 Few studies (Bol et al., 2005; Hacker et al., 2008) have combined multiple 
external interventions to evaluate their effects on calibration components (e.g., accuracy 
and level of confidence), which for the present study were metacognitive strategy training 
and extrinsic incentives. One of the contributions of this study is adding evidence in 
support of the NNMM as a vehicle to explain phenomena related to calibration accuracy. 
In addition, the strategy training intervention was innovative insofar as the strategies used 
for the training were drawn directly from a pilot study involving undergraduate students, 
rather than existing strategies pulled from previous research which may not have been 
intended for use with adult populations such as undergraduate students. The direct 
relevance of these strategies to the intended population in the present study may have 
contributed to the significant influence of the training intervention on outcomes of 
interest when compared to other studies that have failed to detect significant differences 
between students who were trained and those who were not (e.g., Bol et al., 2005; Hacker 
et al., 2008).  
 Finally, the study has added evidence in support of the positive influence of 
metacognitive strategy training and extrinsic rewards on performance and confidence, 
116 
and the positive effect of training on calibration accuracy. This is crucial to research on 
calibration of performance, as findings have been mixed with respect to strategy training 
and extrinsic rewards.     
Limitations of the Present Study 
As with any research involving human subjects, the present study is not without 
limitations. Thus, the results should be interpreted cautiously. The study involved a 
convenience sample of undergraduate students enrolled in psychology and educational 
psychology courses. Consequently, the sample of students, although randomly assigned 
to groups, was not randomly selected from the target population.  Moreover, participant 
attrition may have influenced the results, as approximately 30% of participants did not 
complete the posttest. A plausible explanation for this is that the study spanned three 
weeks, which may have discouraged some from completing all three sessions. Bias may 
also have been introduced in measurement. Even though the performance assessment and 
confidence judgments were objective in nature, the MAI may have been prone to bias in 
self-reports because students may have overestimated their metacognitive awareness, thus 
potentially biasing results.  
Next, this study did not include other potential variables that may affect 
performance, confidence, and/or calibration accuracy, such as achievement in 
psychology, interest in the topic (i.e., situational or personal interest), or calibration bias. 
As such, the effects of these confounding variables on the outcomes relevant to this 
investigation could be neither ascertained nor controlled. Furthermore, the use of 
artificial forms of extrinsic incentives—cash payments in the present investigation—limit 
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the generalizability of these results to classroom contexts with respect to the effects of 
extrinsic incentives on calibration accuracy.   
Finally, the NNMM does not come without shortcomings in spite of the fact that 
it presently remains the prevailing framework in calibration research. For instance, the 
model is necessarily limited in its explanatory power regarding calibration due to its 
simplistic view of metacognition. Recent research has elucidated the weaknesses of the 
NNMM, and it has proposed a different conception of calibration—as consisting of 
sensitivity and specificity components that learners use to judge inaccurate versus 
accurate responses—with respect to metacognition (Schraw et al., 2012). The model can 
be improved by shifting the focus away from the individual to contextual factors, such as 
affect (i.e., academic emotions), relevance of instruction, extrinsic utility value, and 
situational interest (e.g., Boekaerts & Razendaal, 2010). Moreover, additional 
metacognitive components beyond monitoring and control—for example, planning and 
evaluation—can be included to further strengthen the model’s explanatory power.      
 Despite these limitations, I believe that the present study offers new insights to the 
scientific inquiry regarding the role of metacognitive strategy training and incentives with 
respect to performance, calibration accuracy, and confidence judgments, and thus, 
represents a unique contribution to the literature on calibration. 
Educational Implications 
 Beyond contributions to research and theory, the findings of the present study also 
have direct application to educational practice. For instance, educators of undergraduate 
students should include metacognitive strategy training as part of their curriculum. 
However, the training, to be successful, should be explicit, clear, succinct, and directly 
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relevant and applicable to undergraduate students. This tailored strategy training should 
subsequently have a positive effect on student outcomes beyond performance, such as 
improved levels of confidence and calibration accuracy brought about by students’ ability 
to more accurately feel and attend to what they know and what they do not know about 
course content. Additionally, extrinsic rewards appear to positively affect performance 
and levels of confidence, albeit they had no significant effect on calibration accuracy. 
While the present study used cash payments as the reward structure, educators can adopt 
other extrinsic reward structures that are more suitable and sustainable in the classroom. 
For instance, educators can offer students the choice to opt out of a homework 
assignment or quiz as a form of negative reinforcement. These types of extrinsic 
incentives are far more feasible in classroom settings.     
Directions for Future Research 
 There has been little research examining the influence of multiple interventions 
on calibration accuracy, particularly within the lens of the NNMM. The present study 
demonstrated that a combination of metacognitive strategy training and incentives 
improves not only performance and confidence in performance judgments but calibration 
accuracy as well. However, this study did not investigate the influence of these 
interventions on calibration bias, another major index of calibration. Future research 
should focus on examining the effects of strategy training and incentives on both 
calibration accuracy and bias and their presumed impact on metacognitive monitoring 
and control. Moreover, the incentives manipulation involved the use of extrinsic rewards 
only. This is in line with the majority of research on the effects of incentives (e.g., 
Hogarth et al., 1991; Swanson, 1990; Yates, 1990). Nevertheless, understanding how and 
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to what extent extrinsic and intrinsic rewards influence performance, confidence, and 
calibration accuracy is critical to advancing research, practice, and theory not only as it 
pertains to metacognition and the NNMM but motivation as well (e.g., goal orientation, 
self-determination, self-efficacy, etc.). Therefore, future research should endeavor to 
include training as well as extrinsic and intrinsic incentives. Finally, as more research is 
uncovered highlighting the weaknesses of the NNMM, researchers should extend the 
findings of this study utilizing other theories of metacognition or other models of self-
regulated learning to ascertain whether these frameworks more clearly and completely 
capture the essence of calibration and explain the findings of this study.            
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Demographics 
Demographics Form 
 
Directions: Please answer each of the following demographic questions. 
 
1. What is your age? _________ 
 
2. What is your gender?  M___  F___ 
 
3. What is your ethnicity? Hispanic___ Caucasian___ African-American___  
 
Asian/Pacific Islander___ Native American/Alaskan Native___ 
 
Other___  (please specify)____________________________ 
 
4. Please indicate your major: 
 
Major_____________________________ 
 
5. What is your current undergraduate standing?  
 
a. Freshman   b. Sophomore 
 
c. Junior   d. Senior 
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Appendix B: General Metacognitive Awareness 
Directions: Please place a vertical slash at the point on the continuous line under each 
statement that best corresponds to how true each statement is about you.  
 
 
 
0      100 
 
For instance, the closer the slash is to “Not at all true of me” the LESS true that statement 
is about you. Conversely, the closer the slash is to “Very true of me” the MORE true that 
statement is about you. Likewise, drawing a slash on either end of the line (0 or 100) 
indicates that the statement is either not at all true of you (0) or very true of you (100).   
 
1. I ask myself periodically if I am meeting my goals. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
2. I consider several alternatives to a problem before I answer. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
3. I try to use strategies that have worked in the past. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
4. I pace myself while learning in order to have enough time. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
5. I understand my intellectual strengths and weaknesses. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
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6. I think about what I really need to learn before I begin a task.  
 
 
 
0              100 
 
7. I know how well I did once I finish a test. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
8. I set specific goals before I begin a task. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
9. I slow down when I encounter important information. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
10. I know what kind of information is most important to learn. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
11. I ask myself if I have considered all options when solving a problem. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
12. I am good at organizing information. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
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13. I consciously focus my attention on important information.  
 
 
 
0              100 
 
14. I have a specific purpose for each strategy I use. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
15. I learn best when I know something about the topic. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
16. I know what the teacher expects me to learn. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
17. I am good at remembering information. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
18. I use different learning strategies depending on the situation. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
19. I ask myself if there was an easier way to do things after I finish a task.  
 
 
 
0              100 
 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
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20. I have control over how well I learn. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
21. I periodically review to help me understand important relationships. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
22. I ask myself questions about the material before I begin. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
23. I think of several ways to solve a problem and choose the best one. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
24. I summarize what I’ve  learned after I finish. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
25. I ask others for help when I don’t understand something. 
 
 
 
0              100 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
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26. I can motivate myself to learn when I need to. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
27. I am aware of what strategies I use when I study. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
28. I find myself analyzing the usefulness of strategies while I study. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
29. I use my intellectual strengths to compensate for my weaknesses. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
30. I focus on the meaning and significance of new information. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
31. I create my own examples to make information more meaningful. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
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32. I am a good judge of how well I understand something. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
33. I find myself using helpful learning strategies automatically. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
34. I find myself pausing regularly to check my comprehension. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
35. I know when each strategy I use will be most effective. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
36. I ask myself how well I accomplished my goals once I am finished. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
37. I draw pictures or diagrams to help me understand while learning. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
38. I ask myself if I have considered all options after I solve a problem. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
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39. I try to translate new information into my own words.  
 
 
 
0              100 
 
40. I change strategies when I fail to understand. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
41. I use the organizational structure of the text to help me learn. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
42. I read instructions carefully before I begin a task. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
43. I ask myself if what I am reading is related to what I already know. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
44. I reevaluate my assumptions when I get confused.  
 
 
 
0              100 
 
45. I organize my time to best accomplish my goals. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
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46. I learn more when I am interested in the topic. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
47. I try to break studying down into smaller steps. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
48. I focus on overall meaning rather than specifics. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
49. I ask myself questions about how well I am doing while I am learning something 
new. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
50. I ask myself if I learned as much as I could have once I finish a task. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
51. I stop and go back over new information that is not clear. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
52. I stop and reread when I get confused. 
 
 
 
0              100 
 
 
  
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
Not at  
all true  
of me 
Very 
true  
of me 
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Appendix C: Performance Assessment 
Instructions: Circle the BEST response for each item. After you have responded to each 
item, please rate how much confidence you have in your response to that item by drawing 
a vertical slash along the line under each item. The closer the line is to “0% 
CONFIDENCE” the LESS confident you are in your response; the closer the line is to 
“100% CONFIDNENCE” the more confident you are in your response. For example, if 
you draw a line at “0% CONFIDENCE” you have NO confidence in your response to 
that item whereas if you draw a line at “100% CONFIDENCE” you are indicating that 
you have TOTAL confidence in your response to that item. On the other hand, if you 
draw a slash through the middle of the line you are indicating that you have “50% 
confidence” in your response to that item.    
1. Behavioral learning theories emphasize: 
a. thinking. 
b. development. 
c. observable actions. 
d. heredity over environment. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
2. Which of the following best describes operant conditioning? 
a. Pairing of a neutral stimulus with an unlearned response (such as an eye blink). 
b. Establishing an association between a learned behavior and its consequences. 
c. Establishing an association in memory. 
d. Learning though observation. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
3. Reinforcement causes behavior to ____________, punishment causes behavior to 
__________. 
a. decrease, increase 
b. accommodate, assimilate 
c. increase, decrease 
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d. generalize, condition 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
4. Alex turns in a perfect essay and receives an A+. He has apparently received: 
a. Punishment I. 
b. Positive reinforcement. 
c. Negative reinforcement.  
d. Punishment II. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
5. Slot machines are programmed to payoff using ___________, the strongest schedule of 
reinforcement. 
 
a. fixed interval 
b. variable interval 
c. fixed ratio 
d. variable ratio 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
6. Working memory capacity is limited to an estimated _____________ items. 
a. 9 + or - 2 
b. 7 + or - 2 
c. 5 + or - 2 
d. 3 + or - 2 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
7. Applying knowledge, reasoning, problem solving, and strategic learning are all 
examples of: 
a. behavioral learning 
b. higher-order cognition 
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c. declarative memory 
d. bottom-up processes 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
8. Schemas (such as the "restaurant schema") are BEST thought of as: 
a. specific memories for events, 
b. abstract memory representations, with slots that can be filled in. 
c. genetically endowed ways of organizing information in memory. 
d. networks of associations in memory. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
9. Procedural knowledge is: 
a. knowledge of facts. 
b. network organized. 
c. knowledge of "how to." 
d. knowing when and why. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
10. The best way to move information from working memory to long-term memory is: 
a. maintenance rehearsal. 
b. elaborative rehearsal. 
c. generalized rehearsal. 
d. rote memorization. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
11. Functional fixedness is the tendency when solving problems to: 
a. respond in the most familiar way. 
b. stick to the same strategy, even if is not working. 
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c. see objects for the intended purpose only. 
d. apply algorithmic strategies when heuristics are called for. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
12. Social learning theory as described by Bandura suggests that we learn by: 
a. doing 
b. observing 
c. engaging in activities with a more knowledgeable other 
d. being reinforced for our behaviors 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
13. Richard is studying both French and Spanish. In the same week, he learns that the 
French word for "mother" is mere and that the Spanish word for "mother" is madre. One 
day his French teacher asks Richard, "Who is married to your father?" and Richard 
erroneously answers, "Madre." Richard's memory error can best be explained in terms of: 
a. decay 
b. interference 
c. failure to store 
d. insufficient wait time 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
14. In which one of the following examples is metacognition most clearly illustrated? 
a. Mary knows all the letters of the alphabet before she begins kindergarten. 
b. Fran knows how much of a book she is likely to remember a month later. 
c. Billy can read fourth-grade-level books at the age of six. 
d. Alex has a photographic memory that enables him to remember almost 
everything he sees. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
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15. Which one of the following best illustrates concept mapping? 
a. Alexandra lists the defining and correlational features of the concept canine. 
b. Bob draws a chart listing the sequence of events leading up to World War II in 
chronological order. 
c. Christina puts the words force, gravity, velocity, acceleration, and time on a 
piece of paper; she then draws lines between pairs of related words and describes 
the relationships. 
d. Darnell makes a chart showing the hierarchy that biologists use to classify 
animals; his chart includes such concepts as vertebrates, invertebrates, mammals, 
fish, birds, mollusks, crustaceans, and so on. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
16. Which one of the following is the best example of positive transfer? 
a. Robert is trying to learn the spelling of the word shepherd; he remembers how 
he learned to spell lighthouse by putting two words together and so writes 
"shepherd." 
b. Vince notices that rules of grammar are not always the same in English and 
Japanese. 
c. Zelda uses the formula for calculating the area of a circle when she wants to 
figure out how much bigger a 10-inch pizza is than a 7-inch pizza. 
d. David is trying to learn to program a computer. He reads his programming 
manual but is confused by some of its instructions. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
17. Nathan has been playing golf with his parents for many years. When he goes out for 
the school baseball team, he has trouble hitting the ball because he keeps confusing the 
swing of the bat with how he swings a golf club. Nathan's difficulty reflects: 
a. Negative transfer 
b. General transfer 
c. Rote learning 
d. Mental set in problem solving 
0%                  100% 
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CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
18. Which one of the following statements best describes a situated cognition perspective 
of transfer? 
a. Transfer is more likely to be transferred when it is consciously retrieved from 
long-term memory. 
b. Knowledge and skills acquired in one context are unlikely to be used in a very 
different context. 
c. Studying principles of deductive and inductive reasoning leads to more logical 
thought processes in a variety of contexts. 
d. Students are more likely to transfer new knowledge when their teacher 
describes the situations in which they might use it. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
19. Which one of the following statements characterizes a well-defined problem? 
a. It has a clear goal. 
b. It can be solved only by a heuristic. 
c. It has several possible correct solutions. 
d. It is missing information essential for a solution. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
20. Albert Bandura uses the term _____ to describe the fact that people observe their own 
behavior, judge it, and themselves reinforce or punish.  
a. Self-confidence. 
b. Self-regulation. 
c. Self-denial. 
d. Self-efficacy. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
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21. The teacher would like Kerri to learn the entire alphabet. At first she reinforces Kerri 
for recognizing two letters, then four, then six, and so on. The teacher is using the 
technique called: 
a. Negative reinforcement. 
b. Generalization. 
c. Shaping. 
d. Punishment. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
22. For which component of the memory system is rehearsal most important? 
a. Long-term episodic. 
b. Short-term memory. 
c. Long-term procedural. 
d. Sensory register. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
23. Before a person connects the dots in a connect-the-dots task, he guesses what the 
figure is. This is an example of the Gestalt principle of: 
a. Figure-ground. 
b. Proximity. 
c. Closure. 
d. Pointilism. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
24. The process by which tasks require less and less attentional capacity as they become 
better learned is known as: 
a. Pre-attentional behavior. 
b. Fading. 
c. Automaticity. 
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d. Rehearsal. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
25. In a series of names on list, which are likely to be most difficult to remember? 
a. Those towards the beginning. 
b. Those towards the middle. 
c. Those towards the end. 
d. None of the above, as order is irrelevant to memory. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
26. Which one of the following italicized concepts is an example of undergeneralization? 
a. Fred thinks that spiders are insects. 
b. Ivan thinks that birds are not animals. 
c. Lenny thinks that “you” is a noun. 
d. Oscar thinks “you” is not a noun. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
27. The surest sign that students have mastered a concept is that they: 
a. Tend to overgeneralize rather than undergeneralize. 
b. Tend to undergeneralize rather than overgeneralize. 
c. Can accurately identify at least one example and one nonexample of the 
concept.  
d. Can consistently distinguish between examples and nonexamples. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
28. Which of the following statements best describes psychologists’ belief that children’s 
knowledge sometimes takes the form of theories? 
a. The ways in which children categorize their experiences usually have little 
relevance to physical reality. 
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b. Children form hypotheses about the characteristics of members of a particular 
concept category and then test those hypotheses against specific examples of the 
concept they encounter. 
c. In the early years, children develop concrete understandings of events; these 
understandings become increasingly more abstract as they reach adolescence.  
d. Children develop general belief systems about how aspects of the world 
operate. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
29. Which of the following concepts best describes conceptual understanding? 
a. Students learn all the facts that a teacher or textbook presents related to a topic. 
b. Students can describe two opposing perspectives about a controversial issue. 
c. Students come to the realization that a particular belief they have is incorrect.  
d. Students learn ideas related to a topic in a meaningful and integrated fashion. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
30. Which of the following is the best example of problem-based learning? 
a. Learning the logic behind certain problem-solving procedures in math. 
b. Learning history by reading detective novels set in certain historical eras. 
c. Solving a series of mathematical word problems that gradually progress in 
difficulty.  
d. Devising a way to move a large, heavy object using principles of physics. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
31. Students misconceptions about the world may come from a variety of sources. Which 
one of the following is not likely a source that theorists have identified? 
a. Students form general theories based on how the world appears to be. 
b. Teachers and textbooks sometimes provide misinformation. 
c. Students usually believe explanations that younger children give them.  
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d. Common expressions in language (e.g., the sun “sets” in the west) misrepresent 
reality. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
32. Which of the following best describes the process of conceptual change? 
a. Developing new categories to classify objects and events. 
b. Revising one’s beliefs after receiving information that contradicts those beliefs. 
c. Achieving the instructional objectives that a teacher has established for a 
lesson.  
d. Acquiring more sophisticated vocabulary with which to describe the events in 
one’s life. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
33. After getting in line quietly, Tony is told by the teacher, “Nice going! For setting such 
a good example, you do not have to help with the finger painting clean-up this afternoon. 
Tony has apparently received:  
a. Punishment I. 
b. Positive reinforcement. 
c. Negative reinforcement.  
d. Punishment II. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
34. Joe receives a piece of gum when he works three problems. Joe is being reinforced on 
what schedule?  
a. Fixed interval. 
b. Fixed ratio. 
c. Variable interval.  
d. variable ratio. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
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35. A child yells at his brother but not his mother. This is an example of:  
a. Generalization. 
b. Negative reinforcement. 
c. Antecedent stimulus.  
d. Discrimination. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
36. Mark and Tom each got a plastic model airplane as a gift. Mark watched Tom put his 
together and noted his mistakes. Mark then put his own plane together without making 
any mistakes. Mark learned new behavior through:  
a. Cueing. 
b. Positive reinforcement. 
c. Modeling.  
d. Shaping. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
37. Alice is a student who frequently tries to talk to others during seatwork. On Thursday, 
when Alice is working quietly, Mrs. Barnette says, “Good, Alice, I like it when you do 
your work so well.” Which intervention strategy is being used? 
a. Praise of other students. 
b. Simple verbal reminder. 
c. Praise for correct behavior.  
d. Nonverbal cues. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
38. Although Allen hasn’t typed in 10 years, he finds that while practicing on his new 
word processor the skills come back to him fairly quickly. Which component of memory 
is most directly involved?  
a. Long-term episodic. 
b. Short-term. 
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c. Long-term semantic.  
d. Long-term procedural.  
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
39. One problem with students’ practice of underlining material to be used for studying is 
the tendency to: 
a. Not underline enough material. 
b. Underline too much material. 
c. Consider underlining to be sufficient and not study the material as well at a 
later date.  
d. Using different colors when underlining. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
40. The process of repeating an item of information to yourself several times without 
altering its form is called: 
a. Perception. 
b. Encoding. 
c. Retrieval.  
d. Rehearsal. 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
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Appendix D: Institutional Review Board Approval 
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Appendix E: Performance Assessment Stimulus 
Instructions: Please read the following passage carefully. It covers topics related to 
general psychology, such as behaviorism and cognitivism, among others. After reading 
the passage, you will be given a performance assessment on topics related to the passage.   
 
Behaviorism and Related Theories1 
Children are excellent learners. What they learn, however, may not always be what we 
intend to teach. Researchers believe that children develop general belief systems about 
how aspects of the world operate based on how they appear to be, known as naïve 
theories. Ms. Esteban is trying to teach students how to behave in class, but by paying 
attention to Rebecca's outburst, she is actually teaching them the opposite of what she 
intends. Rebecca craves her teacher's attention, so being called on (even in an exasperated 
tone of voice) rewards her for calling out her answer. Not only does Ms. Esteban's 
response increase the chances that Rebecca will call out answers again but also Rebecca 
now serves as a model for her classmates' own calling out. What Ms. Esteban says is less 
important than her actual response to her students' behaviors. 
 
Behavioral learning theories focus on the ways in which pleasurable or unpleasant 
consequences of behavior change individuals' behavior over time and ways in which 
individuals model their behavior on that of others. Social learning theories focus on the 
effects of thought on action and action on thought. Later chapters present cognitive 
learning theories, which emphasize unobservable mental processes that people use to 
learn and remember new information or skills. Behavioral learning theorists try to 
discover principles of behavior that apply to all living beings. Cognitive and social 
learning theorists are concerned exclusively with human learning. Actually, however, the 
boundaries between behavioral and cognitive learning theories have become increasingly 
indistinct in recent years as each school of thought has incorporated the findings of the 
other. 
 
Pavlov: Classical Conditioning 
 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, Russian scientist I van Pavlov and his colleagues 
studied the digestive process in dogs. During the research, the scientists noticed changes 
in the timing and rate of salivation of these animals. Pavlov observed that if meat powder 
was placed in or near the mouth of a hungry dog, the dog would salivate. Because the 
meat powder provoked this response automatically, without any prior training or 
conditioning, the meat powder is referred to as an unconditioned stimulus. Similarly, 
because salivation occurred automatically in the presence of meat, also without the need 
for any training or experience, this response of salivating is referred to as an 
unconditioned response. Whereas the meat will produce salivation without any previous 
experience or training, other stimuli, such as a bell, will not produce salivation. Because 
these stimuli have no effect on the response in question, they are referred to as neutral 
                                                 
1 Passage taken from Slavin, R. E. (2009). Educational psychology: Theory and practice (9th ed.). Boston, 
MA: Pearson.   
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stimuli. Pavlov's experiments showed that if a previously neutral stimulus is paired with 
an unconditioned stimulus, the neutral stimulus becomes a conditioned stimulus and 
gains the power to prompt a response similar to that produced by the unconditioned 
stimulus. In other words after the bell and the meat are presented together, the ringing of 
the bell alone triggers the salivation in the dog. This process is referred to as classical 
conditioning. 
 
Skinner: Operant Conditioning 
 
Some human behaviors are clearly prompted by specific stimuli. B.F. Skinner proposed 
that the reflexive behavior accounts for a small proportion of all actions. Skinner 
proposed another class of behavior, which he labeled operant conditioning because they 
operate on the environment in the apparent absence of any unconditioned stimuli, such as 
food. Skinner’s work focused on the relation between behavior and its consequences. For 
example, if an individual’s behavior is immediately followed by pleasurable 
consequences, the individual will engage in that behavior more frequently. The use of 
pleasant and unpleasant consequences to change behavior is known as operant 
conditioning.  
 
Perhaps the most important principle in behavioral learning theories is that behavior 
changes according to its immediate consequences. Pleasurable consequences strengthen 
behavior while unpleasant consequences weaken it. A reinforcer is defined as any 
consequence that strengthens or increases the frequency of behavior. However, the 
effectiveness of the reinforcer must be explicitly demonstrated to the person whose 
behavior one wishes to modify. Positive reinforcers include praise, grades, stars, money, 
etc. because they give something pleasurable. Nevertheless, another way to strengthen a 
behavior is to have the behavior’s consequences be an escape from an unpleasant 
situation or a way of preventing something unpleasant from occurring. These types of 
reinforcers are known as negative reinforcers. Negative reinforcement is often confused 
with punishment because individuals are negatively reinforced for doing something 
unfavorable. One way to avoid this confusion is to remember that reinforcement, whether 
positive or negative, strengthens behavior whereas punishment is intended to decrease 
behavior.  
 
Punishment refers to consequences that are intended to weaken or decrease behavior. 
Presentation punishment, or Punishment I, is the use of unpleasant consequences or 
aversive stimuli, as when a student is scolded. Removal punishment, or Punishment II, is 
the removal of a pleasant consequence, such as loss of privileges or time out. Most 
students need some form for reinforcement along the way. When teachers guide students 
towards goals by reinforcing the many steps that lead to successful learning they are 
using a technique called shaping. The term shaping is used in behavioral learning theories 
to refer to the teaching of new skills or behaviors by reinforcing learners for 
approximating the desired final outcome.  
 
By definition, reinforcers strengthen behavior. But what happens when reinforcers are 
withdrawn? Eventually the behavior will be weakened, and ultimately, it will disappear 
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or become extinct. The effects of reinforcement depend on many factors, one of the most 
important which is the schedule of reinforcement, or the frequency with which 
reinforcers are given. One common schedule of reinforcement is the fixed ratio, in which 
reinforcers are given after a fixed number of behaviors. A variable ratio schedule of 
reinforcement is one in which the number of behaviors required for reinforcement is 
unpredictable, although it is certain that the behaviors will eventually be reinforced. In 
fixed interval schedules, reinforcement is available only at certain periodic times. Finally, 
in a variable-interval schedule, reinforcement is available at some times but not at others, 
and the individual being reinforced has no idea when a behavior will be reinforced. 
However, maintenance reinforcement occurs with behaviors that do not need to be 
reinforced because they are intrinsically reinforcing, that is engaging in these behaviors is 
pleasurable in itself.  
 
Antecedent stimuli, or events that precede a behavior, are also known as cues because 
they inform individuals about what behavior will be reinforced and/or what behavior will 
be punished. Discrimination is the use of cues, signals, or information to know when 
behavior is likely to be reinforced. Also, generalization, or transfer, refers to situations in 
which behaviors learned under one set of conditions is applied successfully to other 
situations different from the one in which they were learned. Overgeneralization involves 
including objects or events that are not true members of the category whereas 
undergeneralization involves having too narrow a view about which objects or events 
concepts include. This perspective differs from situated cognition, which stipulates that 
knowledge learned in one context is unlikely to transfer to a very different context. 
Positive transfer refers to situations in which learning from one situation assists learning 
in another whereas negative transfer is when learning from one situation interferes with 
learning in another situation. It is important to note that students sometimes develop 
misconceptions, or inaccurate information, about facts and information they encounter. 
Misconceptions are an important type of negative transfer. This is particularly 
problematic because misconceptions can lead to additional inaccurate learning and 
erroneous knowledge of the way the world operates (i.e., naïve theories). In order to 
dispel misconceptions, students are typically made aware of their misconception, 
introduced to the correct concept (e.g., ideas related to the topic in which the 
misconception exists is learned in a meaningful and integrated fashion so as to yield 
appropriate conceptual understanding), and then challenged to modify their 
understanding of the concept, a process known as conceptual change. Sometimes people 
are unable to generalize, such as when they see things for their intended primary purpose 
only, a phenomenon known as functional fixedness. Mastery of concepts involves 
learners consistently distinguishing between examples and non-examples.  
 
Bandura: Social Learning Theory 
 
Social learning theory is a major outgrowth of the behavioral learning tradition. 
Developed by Albert Bandura, social learning theory accepts most of the principles of 
behavioral theories but focuses to a much greater degree on the effects of cues on 
behavior and on internal mental processes, emphasizing the effect of thought on action 
and action on thought. Bandura noted that the Skinnerian emphasis on the effects of the 
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consequences of behavior largely ignored the phenomenon of modeling, or the imitation 
of others’ behavior, and of vicarious experience—learning from others’ successes and 
failures. Bandura’s observational learning involves four phases: attentional, retention, 
reproduction, and motivational. Another important concept in social learning theory is 
self-regulation, or rewarding or punishing one’s own behavior. Students can be taught to 
monitor and regulate their own behavior through an approach known as cognitive 
behavior modification. Likewise, problem-based learning is intended to develop both 
problem solving strategies and disciplinary knowledge bases and skills by placing 
students in the active role of problem solvers confronted with an ill-structured problem 
that mirrors real-world problems. However, some students may not appropriate utilize 
some strategies, such as the tendency to underline too much, thus rendering the strategy 
useless.        
 
Cognitivism 
 
Information-Processing Approaches 
 
Information-processing theory is a cognitive theory that describes the processing, storage, 
and retrieval of knowledge in the mind. Two widely known information-processing 
models include the levels-of-processing theory, which posits that people subject stimuli 
to different levels of mental processing and retain only the information that has been 
subjected to the most thorough processing, and the dual code theory of memory, which 
posits that information is stored in long-term memory as either visual or verbal/auditory. 
Sensory registers receive large amounts of information from each of the five senses and 
hold it for a very short time, no more than a few seconds. If nothing happens, information 
in the sensory registry is quickly lost. Perception of stimuli is not as straightforward as 
reception of stimuli. Instead, it involves mental representation and it is influenced by our 
mental state, past experience, knowledge, motivations, and other factors. Along a related 
line, attention is the active focus on certain stimuli while excluding others; it is a limited 
resource.  
 
Memory 
 
In the memory system, short-term memory is a storage system that can hold a limited 
amount of information, usually 5 to 9 pieces of information simultaneously, for several 
seconds. When we stop thinking about something, it disappears from our working 
memory, which is another term for short-term memory. In order to learn facts and other 
information individuals need to repeat the information multiple times, a process known as 
rehearsal. Long-term memory, on the other hand, is that part of the memory system 
where information is stored for long periods of time; it is believed to be a very large, very 
long-term memory repository. Elaboration or elaborative rehearsal is one of the most 
effective ways to transfer information from short-term to long-term memory. Theorists 
divide long-term memory into three main parts: episodic, semantic, and procedural 
memory. Episodic memory is our memory of personal experience. Conversely, semantic 
memory contains the facts and generalized information that we know while procedural 
memory holds the “how to,” or the steps necessary to fulfill a task. Episodic memory 
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contains images of experiences organized by when and where they occurred. Flashbulb 
memory is the phenomenon in which visual and auditory memories about an important 
event are fixed in long-term memory. Semantic or declarative memory is organized in 
networks of connected ideas or relationships called schemata (singular: schema). Finally, 
procedural memory is organized in a series of stimulus-response pairings.  
 
One important reason people forget is interference, which happens when information gets 
mixed up with, or pushed aside by, other information. Retroactive inhibition, one form of 
interference, occurs when previously learned information is lost because it is mixed up 
with new and somewhat similar information. Proactive inhibition, on the other hand, 
occurs when learning one set of information interferes with learning later information. 
However, there are several mechanisms to help people remember. Proactive facilitation 
refers to the increased ability to learn new information based on the presence of 
previously learned information whereas retroactive facilitation refers to increased 
comprehension of previously learned information because of the acquisition of new 
information. Interestingly, when people learn list of words and are subsequently tested 
immediately they tend to recall the first few (primacy effect) and last few (recency effect) 
items better than those in the middle. Information or skills may exist in long-term 
memory, but may take so much time or effort to retrieve that they are of limited value 
when speed of access is required. This is where automaticity, or a level of speed and ease 
such that tasks can be performed or skills utilized with little mental effort, comes in 
handy. However, it is important to note that automaticity takes much time, often years, to 
achieve.  
 
It is important to distinguish between rote and meaningful learning. Rote learning refers 
to the memorization of facts or association whereas meaningful learning is not arbitrary 
and it relates to information or concepts learners already have. Conversely, inert 
knowledge could and should be applicable to a wide range of activities and situations but 
is applied to a restricted set of circumstances. In the realm of meaningful learning, 
metacognition is important. Metacognition refers to knowledge about one’s own learning 
or about how to learn. Study skills, problem solving and reasoning, and thinking skills are 
examples of metacognitive (i.e., higher-order thinking) skills. In the area of problem 
solving and reasoning, researchers distinguish between well-defined problems, or those 
that tend to have a simple structure and a clear goal with one correct solution, and ill-
defined problems, or those with complex structures that have no one correct solution or 
have many possible solutions. A related family of strategies is outlining and mapping. 
Outlining presents the main points of the material in a hierarchical format, with each 
detail organized under a higher level category. In networking and concept mapping, 
students identify main ideas and then diagram connections between them. Also, advance 
organizers orient students to material they will learn subsequently and help them recall 
related information that could help them incorporate the new information.  
 
Finally, Gestalt psychology, which emphasizes the unified or meaningful whole, helps 
explain why individuals are able to see the whole object even when it is incomplete, a 
concept known as closure.         
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Appendix F: Strategy Training Practice Text 
WINTER DEPRESSION: A CASE OF BEING SAD 
 
 A young woman lies asleep on an overcast winter morning.  At 4 a.m., a faint glow 
emanates from a light bulb placed beside her bed.  The glow gradually gains intensity and 
bathes the room in soft light until 6 a.m. when she wakes.  The woman has just experienced 
a simulated dawn.  After several more mornings of artificial sunrise, the clouds begin to lift 
from her "winter depression" that appears in most cases from November to April. 
 As the study of seasonal affective disorder, or SAD, enters its second decade, 
researchers have marshalled an abundance of new findings.  Along with feelings of sadness, 
anxiety, and tiredness, people who experience SAD often display symptoms not seen in 
other cases of depression.  These include extreme weight gain, trouble waking up, daytime 
drowsiness, cravings for sweets or starches, and a significant drop in work performance.   
 A surprisingly large percentage of people suffer from SAD, with numbers increasing 
as one travels north of the equator.  About 1 percent of Floridians are affected; 6 percent of 
New Yorkers, and 10 percent of New Hampshirites.  The majority of those hospitalized with 
SAD experience their first symptoms in their early 20s, although most fail to recognize their 
winter malaise as SAD and therefore do not seek treatment.  The majority of those who seek 
treatment are women.  Currently it is unknown whether women are more susceptible to the 
disease or are merely more likely to report it. 
 A number of theories have been proposed to explain the onset of SAD.  One 
suggests that major changes occur in the body's biological clock, or circadian rhythms, due 
to decreased exposure to sunlight.  Consistent with this theory, regular exposure to bright 
light, usually 20 times brighter than normal room light, decreases the severity of SAD in 
most severe cases.  Studies with rats show that increased exposure to bright light prior to 
waking increases the uptake of melatonin, a hormone secreted to the brain in larger 
quantities during sleep.  No comparable studies have been performed on humans. 
 Another possible cause of SAD is differences in the sensitivity of people's eyes.  
Researchers speculate that SAD patients may have retinas incapable of squeezing more light 
out of short winter days.  Studies report that SAD individuals, compared to non-depressed 
controls, experience greater difficulty seeing dim light when placed in dark surroundings.  In 
a related study, the retinas of 19 SAD patients generated weaker electrical activity across the 
retina in response to light than control subjects.  Oddly, this phenomenon occurs in SAD 
patients only during the winter months.  Researchers currently have few explanations for 
this puzzling change.   
 Most physicians rely on exposure to intense light to combat SAD.  Light therapy is 
usually conducted using one of two schedules.  In the first, individuals are seated in front of 
a large screen emitting light 5 times brighter than normal room light for 2 hours.  In the 
second, patients receive light 10 to 20 times brighter than normal room light for 30 minutes.  
SAD treatments are usually conducted once each day.  Treatments given in the early 
morning appear to be most effective followed by those administered at night.  Treatments 
administered during midday are least effective.  Approximately 60 percent of SAD cases 
report substantial improvement using these techniques. In comparison, only 10 percent of 
patients report the same degree of improvement when given a "placebo" treatment (i.e., a 
treatment intended to have no effect) of dim light (i.e., 3 to 4 times normal room light). 
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 Another mode of therapy is to gradually expose individuals to light prior to waking.  
This so called "simulated dawn" treatment appears to be quite effective.  In one study, 23 
SAD patients used special incandescent bulbs that gradually produced light comparable to a 
natural dawn between the hours of 4 and 6 a.m. each morning for one week.  Another 18 
SAD patients received a week of placebo treatments which consisted of 30-minute dawns 
with a peak intensity equal to that of moonlight. Those receiving the full-scale dawn 
exposure reported substantial improvement; those receiving the placebo reported little 
change. 
 A third and more recent approach to treatment is to equip SAD patients with "light 
visors."  Treatments usually last 30 minutes per day.  Several preliminary studies indicate 
that visors have limited effectiveness; only about 40 percent of patients report substantial 
improvement under this treatment.  Surprisingly, the intensity of the dosage of light had 
little relationship to subsequent improvement, causing some researchers to suggest that 
visors improve SAD for reasons other than exposure to light.  Currently there are no studies 
that compare the effectiveness of visors with the other treatments described above.  Much 
additional research is needed. 
 Finally, some researchers have observed that many SAD patients experience 
improvements similar to the treatments described above  after taking daily 1-hour walks in 
full sunlight.  Recent studies indicate that SAD patients spend less times outdoors during the 
winter months due to increased depression.  It is especially ironic that depression caused by 
reduced exposure to high intensity light should cause individuals to forego an activity that 
may actually reduce their depression. 
 Fortunately, most of those who suffer from severe cases of SAD can expect 
substantial improvement using one of the four treatment modes described above (i.e., light 
screens, simulated dawns, visors, and walking).  This represents a dramatic change from 
only two decades ago when light-induced depression was thought to be "psychological."  
Perhaps the next decade will see further breakthroughs in understanding the origin and 
treatment of SAD.  Indeed, it is fair to say the future looks brighter every day for individuals 
suffering from winter depression.2 
 
  
                                                 
2 Adapted with permission from Dr. Gregory Schraw.  
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Appendix G: Strategy Training Practice Test 
SAD Test3 
 
Instructions: Circle the BEST response for each item. After you have responded to each 
item, please rate how much confidence you have in your response to that item by drawing 
a vertical slash along the line under each item. The closer the line is to “0% 
CONFIDENCE” the LESS confident you are in your response; the closer the line is to 
“100% CONFIDNENCE” the more confident you are in your response. For example, if 
you draw a line at “0% CONFIDENCE” you have NO confidence in your response to 
that item whereas if you draw a line at “100% CONFIDENCE” you are indicating that 
you have TOTAL confidence in your response to that item. On the other hand, if you 
draw a slash through the middle of the line you are indicating that you have “50% 
confidence” in your response to that item. 
 
1.   Research on SAD has been on-going for _____ years? 
 
 a) 0-5 
 b) 10-20    
 c) 20-30 
 d) 30-40 
 
 0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
2.   The so called "simulated dawn" treatment consists of: 
 
 a) exposing patients to a bright light screen 
 b) equipping patients with a visor 
 c) watching a videotape of the sun coming up 
 d) gradually exposing patients to light prior to waking 
 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
3.   SAD is related to: 
 
 a) physiological factors 
 b) environmental factors 
 c) physiological and environmental factors 
 d) none of the above 
 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
                                                 
3  Taken with permission from Dr. Gregory Schraw 
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4.   SAD usually begins in _____ and ends in _____? 
 
 a) October-May 
 b) November-April   
 c) December-March 
 d) April-November 
 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
5.   Based on the article, one can conclude that light-related depression occurs with certainty 
in: 
 
 a) humans 
 b) rats and humans 
 c) all mammals 
 d) all animals 
 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
6.   Light screen therapy is most effective when administered during the: 
 
 a) morning   
 b) afternoon 
 c) evening 
 d) none of these times differ 
 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
7.   Studies indicate that intense light affects melatonin levels in: 
 
 a) rats  
 b) humans 
 c) rats and humans 
 d) all animals 
 
 0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
8.   Light therapy is usually conducted ______ each day? 
 
 a) once    
 b) twice 
 c) three times 
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 d) up to six times 
 
 0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
9.   One cause of SAD is: 
 
 a) production of melatonin during physical activity 
 b) the way the retina perceives light   
 c) average winter temperature 
 d) general level of fitness 
 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
10.  The acronym SAD stands for: 
 
 a) seasonally activated depression 
 b) seasonally acute disfunction 
 c) seasonal affective depression 
 d) seasonal affective disorder    
 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
11.  The current status of light visors as a treatment suggests  that: 
 
 a) it improves SAD in 60% of cases  
 b) it does not improve SAD at all 
 c) it is as effective as other treatments 
 d) it needs much more research  
 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
12.  One of the symptoms of SAD that is not associated with other forms of depression is: 
 
 a) sadness 
 b) anxiety 
 c) tiredness 
 d) extreme weight gain  
 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
13.  Which of the following statements is true? 
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 a) brighter light is related to better treatment outcomes 
 b) longer light exposure is related to better treatment  outcomes 
 c) length of exposure and brightness compensate for each other 
 d) all of the above  
 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
14.  In the "simulated dawn" study, the placebo group received a treatment which: 
 
 a) was a less intensive dawn  
 b) was a more intensive dawn 
 c) was a simulated dusk  
 d) was a simulated sunset 
 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
15.  Which of the following IS NOT a current explanation of SAD? 
 
 a) changes in one's biological clock due to decreased exposure to sunlight 
 b) greater difficulty seeing dim light in dark surroundings 
 c) changes in how the body metabolizes blood sugar   
 d) retinas incapable of squeezing more light out of winter            days 
 
 0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
16.  Most people hospitalized for SAD experience their first symptoms in their: 
 
 a) childhood 
 b) teens 
 c) early 20's    
 d) mid 30's 
 
0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
17.   Light therapies in general result in: 
 
 a) swift improvements or none at all 
 b) gradual improvements for a minority of patients 
 c) gradual improvements for many patients 
 d) gradual improvement for all patients 
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 0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
 
18.  The 30-minute simulated dawns described in the article are: 
 
 a) very effective 
 b) moderately effective 
 c) produced little change   
 d) increased the severity of SAD 
 
 0%                  100% 
CONFIDENCE      CONFIDENCE 
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Appendix H: Strategy Training Intervention Fidelity Check Survey 
Instructions: Please complete this brief survey regarding your overall impression and 
evaluation of the strategy training intervention. Please be honest in your ratings! Thank 
you! 
 
Rate each item on the following scale: 
 
1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Agree; 4 = Strongly Agree 
  
1. The strategy training was clear and understandable. 
 
1    2    3    4     
2. The strategies covered in the training were appropriately and 
thoroughly explained. 
 
1    2    3    4     
3. The strategies were sufficiently scaffolded and modeled for me to 
understand how, when, and in which situations to apply them. 
 
1    2    3    4     
4. I had sufficient opportunity to practice and apply each strategy. 
 
1    2    3    4     
5. The trainer demonstrated the utility value of each strategy with 
respect to calibration of performance. 
 
1    2    3    4     
6. Overall, I feel that the strategy training has adequately prepared me 
to increase the accuracy and confidence of my calibration of 
performance judgments. 
1    2    3    4     
 
7. The strategy training intervention was useful in enhancing my 
performance confidence judgments. 
 
 
1    2    3    4     
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